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Nederlandstalige samenvatting  
- Dutch Summary - 
Simpelweg surfen op het internet, bekijken van hoge-kwaliteit video streams of 
real-time video conferencing, het gamma van telecommunicatiediensten die 
vandaag beschikbaar zijn, is al erg groot en groeit nog steeds, zowel in kwaliteit 
en kwantiteit. Om deze reeks diensten tegelijk aan te bieden worden huidige 
telecommunicatienetwerken voortdurend geüpgraded, zowel in termen van 
apparatuur als transmissiemedia. Installatie van glasvezel in het gehele netwerk, 
vanuit het kern- naar het toegangsgedeelte, kan datasnelheden aanzienlijk 
verhogen. Hoewel het grootste deel van het netwerk reeds verglaasd werd, wordt 
de installatie van glasvezel in toegangsnetwerken (Fiber-to-the-Home, FTTH) 
vaak uitgesteld, omdat de huidige exploitanten niet voldoende potentiële 
inkomsten zien om deze hoge investering te kunnen dekken.  
 
Door het ontwikkelen van uitgebreide, doch specifieke techno-economische 
modellen, richt dit proefschrift zich op de ondersteuning van huidige strategische 
beslissingen in het domein van de uitrol van FTTH-netwerken. Omdat het 
grootste deel van de investering voor deze netwerken te vinden is in de uitrol van 
de fysieke infrastructuur, kunnen de bestaande investeringsbarrières worden 
verminderd door het delen van de infrastructuur tussen meerdere exploitanten, 
waardoor duplicatie van dure infrastructuur kan worden vermeden en het 
investeringsrisico drastisch vermindert. Het delen van de infrastructuur vereist 
het opsplitsen van de verantwoordelijkheden van de netwerkuitrol en -operaties, 
dit doorgaans in drie conceptuele rollen. De aanbieder van fysieke infrastructuur 
(PIP) is verantwoordelijk voor de passieve glasvezelinfrastructuur en behandelt 
de toegangsrechten, graaft de geulen en plaatst de vezels en eventuele 
wachtbuizen. De netwerkaanbieder (NP) licht het passieve netwerk op door 
installatie van actieve apparatuur aan zowel de netwerkkant (in de lokale 
centrale) als de kant van de eindgebruiker (klantspecifieke apparatuur - CPE). De 
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dienstenaanbieder (SP), ten slotte, maakt gebruik van de connectiviteit 
aangeboden door de NP om applicaties en diensten aan te bieden aan de 
eindgebruiker. Openen van het netwerk op glasvezel- of golflengtelaag laat toe 
dat meerdere NP’s de infrastructuur van de PIP delen, terwijl meerdere SP’s de 
connectiviteit aangeboden door een NP kunnen delen indien geopend wordt op 
bitstream-laag.  
 
Het onderzoeken van de business case voor de uitrol van een FTTH-netwerk 
vereist dus evaluatie van de verschillende rollen afzonderlijk, doch niet 
onafhankelijk van elkaar. Bovendien laat het opsplitsen van de uitrol en 
onderhoud van het netwerk in deze verschillende, aparte rollen toe dat nieuwe 
spelers, zowel publiek als privaat, de telecommunicatiemarkt betreden. Om 
strategische aanbevelingen naar al deze spelers te kunnen verstrekken, is een 
grondige kennis van de randvoorwaarden nodig, op het gebied van 
technologische keuzes, marktstructuren en mogelijke ondersteunende of 
verhinderende beleidsmaatregelen. Om inzicht te krijgen in het belang van deze 
randvoorwaarden en hoe ze de parameters van de business case kunnen 
beïnvloeden, bestudeert dit proefschrift de achtergrond van enkele operationele 
netwerken. Afgezien van verschillende technologische variaties in FTTH-
netwerken, zowel in termen van topologie (Punt-tot-Punt versus Punt-tot-
Multipunt) als technologie (actieve versus passieve optische netwerken), worden 
een reeks van economische en politieke factoren in aanmerking genomen. De 
geografische ligging en bevolkingsdichtheid hebben een duidelijke invloed op de 
initiële investeringen, terwijl de nationale of regionale beleidsmaatregelen voor 
een groot deel de mogelijkheden van publieke financiering en betrokkenheid 
bepaalt. Afhankelijk van welke partners betrokken zijn, publieke of private, 
worden in de huidige netwerken verschillende business modellen toegepast, 
variërend van een verticaal geïntegreerde operator met volledige 
verantwoordelijkheid voor het netbeheer en dienstenaanbod, tot een volledig 
open model, waarin de passieve infrastructuur wordt gedeeld tussen meerdere, 
concurrerende netwerkexploitanten en dienstverleners.  
 
Om deze technologische evoluties, de lokale marktstructuren en regelgevende 
voorwaarden op te nemen, wordt de traditionele kosten-batenanalyse uitgebreid 
naar de evaluatie van de business case voor meerdere actoren, hun specifieke 
kostenstructuur en inkomstenverwachting, evenals naar de extra kosten die 
noodzakelijke samenwerking met zich meebrengt. De economische evaluatie van 
de investering in passieve infrastructuur (PIP) los van de andere rollen, leert dat 
deze enkel winstgevend is in dichtbevolkte stedelijke gebieden waar de adoptie 
door eindgebruikers aan een agressieve snelheid gebeurt (uitgaande van een 
tijdshorizon van 20 jaar). In andere soorten gebieden (kleinere gemeenten of 
dunbevolkte landelijke terreinen), of in geval van een te trage adoptie, zijn de 
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investeringsvooruitzichten minder gunstig. Maatregelen op zowel reductie van 
de kosten als verhoging van de inkomsten kan de economische prognose van de 
uitrol van passieve glasvezelinfrastructuur in toegangsnetwerken echter drastisch 
verbeteren (denk bijvoorbeeld aan hergebruik van bestaande leidingen, het 
verzekeren van voldoende inkomsten vanaf de start van het project door 
vraagbundeling of economische maatregelen zoals het verlengen van de 
terugverdientijd). Installatie in landelijke gebieden blijft zelfs met combinatie 
van deze maatregelen niet economisch rendabel.  
Installatie en onderhoud van de actieve apparatuur (NP) moeten worden 
geëvalueerd op een korter tijdsbestek (in de orde van 10 jaar). Indien een 
vergelijkbare tijdshorizon als voor de passieve infrastructuur (20 jaar of meer) 
gebruikt wordt, moet de analyse rekening houden met de migratie van de 
apparatuur en technologie. Investeringen in de NP-laag zijn winstgevend 
wanneer de initiële investering in CPE apart wordt aangerekend (in plaats van 
deze op te nemen in de maandelijkse vergoeding ten laste van de abonnees). 
Aangezien het dienstenaanbod (SP-laag) agnostisch is over het onderliggende 
netwerk, werd de evaluatie van de business case voor deze laag niet behandeld in 
dit proefschrift.  
 
Het delen van een infrastructuur (op PIP- of NP-laag) onder meerdere 
concurrerende marktdeelnemers voorkomt dupliceren van hoge initiële 
investeringen in het aanleggen van parallelle infrastructuren, zoals hierboven 
vermeld, maar is uiteraard niet gratis. Ter uitbreiding van de business case 
evaluatie voor de individuele actoren ontwikkelt dit proefschrift een kostenmodel 
voor de berekening van de extra kosten voor het aansluiten van een nieuwe 
aanbieder (NP bij het delen van PIP-infrastructuur, SP bij het delen van NP-
infrastructuur), het aansluiten van een nieuwe eindklant en het aansluiten van een 
reeds bestaande klant op een andere aanbieder (churn). De evaluatie leert dat de 
toename in kosten voor een nieuwe provider of eindgebruiker significant is bij 
het vergelijken van een gedeeld, open netwerk met dit van een verticaal 
geïntegreerde operator, maar erg laag wanneer in vergelijking gesteld met de 
uitrol van een parallelle infrastructuur.  
 
Ingaande op de grote betrokkenheid van publieke spelers in wereldwijde uitrol 
van FTTH-netwerken bekijkt dit proefschrift tot slot ook hoe de specifieke 
doelstellingen van deze publieke actoren kunnen worden opgenomen in de 
techno-economische kosten-baten analyse. In tegenstelling tot particuliere 
bedrijven die maximalisatie van hun winsten nastreven, richten publieke actoren 
zich vooral op sociaal-economische doelstellingen. Het identificeren, 
categoriseren en monetariseren van de toegevoegde waarde van deze indirecte 
voordelen (zoals verminderde reistijd en kosten bij het werken van thuis) kan 
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gebruikt worden als overtuigingsmiddel voor publieke betrokkenheid in 
netwerkuitrol, zij het direct of indirect.  
 
Hoewel duidelijk gericht op de uitrol van FTTH, kunnen de raamwerken en 
modellen ontwikkeld in dit proefschrift eenvoudig worden aangepast om te 
worden toegepast op andere domeinen die vragen om een multi-actor benadering 
van techno-economische analyses die zowel gedetailleerde kostenberekeningen 
als inschattingen van directe en indirecte inkomsten omvat. 
 
  
English Summary 
From simply browsing the Internet, over watching high-quality video streams, to 
real-time videoconferencing, the range of telecommunication services that is 
available today is already very large, and is still growing, both in quality and 
quantity. To be able to offer this range of services simultaneously, current 
telecommunications networks are constantly being upgraded, in terms of both 
equipment evolutions and transmission media migrations. By installing optical 
fiber in the entire network, from core to access, data rates can be significantly 
increased. Although fiber has been introduced in the majority of the network, the 
investment in Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH), which requires fiber to be deployed in 
the last mile towards the end user, is frequently postponed because current 
operators do not see sufficient revenue potential to cover for this high 
investment. 
 
By developing extended, dedicated techno-economic models, this dissertation 
aims at supporting the current strategic decisions in the field of FTTH 
deployment. As the main part of the investment for FTTH lies in the rollout of 
the physical infrastructure, investment barriers can be reduced by sharing one 
network infrastructure among multiple operators, thereby avoiding duplication of 
expensive infrastructure and hence reducing investment risk. Sharing the 
infrastructure requires dividing the responsibilities of network deployment and 
operations, which is typically done in three conceptual roles. The Physical 
Infrastructure Provider (PIP) is responsible for the passive, dark fiber, 
infrastructure (Rights-of-Way, trenches, ducts and fibers). The Network Provider 
(NP) lights up the passive network by installing active equipment at both the 
network side (central office) and the end user’s side (Customer Premises 
Equipment – CPE). The Service Provider (SP), finally, uses the end-to-end 
connectivity offered by the NP to offer content and applications in dedicated 
services to the end user. Multiple NPs can share the PIP’s infrastructure if the 
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network is opened on fiber or wavelength layer, while multiple SPs can use the 
connectivity offered by one NP when opening on bitstream layer. 
 
Evaluating the business case of FTTH deployment thus requires investigating the 
different roles separately, though not independently. Furthermore, as dividing the 
responsibility opens up the telecom market towards new players, both public and 
private, providing strategic recommendations requires a thorough understanding 
of the surrounding technological choices, market structures and policy drivers or 
barriers. To gain insights in the importance of these aspects and how they can 
impact the business case parameters, this dissertation studies a range of existing 
deployments worldwide. Apart from different technological variations in FTTH 
topologies (Point-to-Point versus Point-to-Multipoint) and technologies (active 
versus passive optical networks), a range of economic and policy factors are 
taken into account. The geographical setting and population density have a clear 
influence on the upfront capital expenditure, while national or regional policy 
conditions direct the opportunities in public financing and involvement of 
rollouts. Depending on which partners are involved, public or private, different 
business models are applied, ranging from one vertically integrated operator 
taking up full responsibility for network deployment, network operations and 
service offerings, to a three-layer open access model, in which one passive 
infrastructure is shared among multiple, competing network and service 
providers. 
 
To incorporate these technological evolutions, local market settings and policy 
conditions, traditional cost-benefit analysis is extended to allow for the 
evaluation of the business case for multiple actors, their specific cost structure 
and revenue expectations, as well as the extra cost of cooperation. Evaluating the 
business for the PIP separately learns that it only flies in dense urban regions 
with an aggressive uptake by end users (assuming a time horizon of 20 years). In 
other types of regions (urban or rural), or when uptake is progressing too slow, 
improvement measures on both cost and revenue side can ameliorate the 
economic prognosis of passive fiber access infrastructure deployment (e.g. by 
reusing existing ducts, assuring sufficient revenues from the start by pre-
aggregating demand or prolonging the return on investment period). However 
they might still not be sufficient to make deployment in rural areas economically 
viable. The NP’s equipment installation and maintenance should be evaluated on 
a shorter time frame (in the order of 10 years) or take into account migration of 
equipment and technology when considering similar time horizons as for the 
PIP’s business case. Investment in the NP layer is profitable when recouping the 
upfront cost for CPE through separately charged revenues, instead of including 
them in the monthly fee charged to the subscribers. As the SP’s service offering 
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is agnostic of the underlying network deployed, the evaluation of its business 
case was considered out of scope of this dissertation. 
 
When sharing one infrastructure (on PIP or NP layer) amongst multiple 
competing operators, this avoids duplication of high upfront investment, as 
mentioned above, but does not come for free. As an extension to the business 
case evaluation of the individual actors, this dissertation develops a cost model 
for calculating the extra cost for connecting a new provider (NP when sharing 
PIP infrastructure, SP when sharing NP infrastructure), or connecting a new or 
churning end user. The evaluation learns that the increase in cost for a new 
provider or end user is significant when comparing a shared (open access) model 
to a vertically integrated one, but is very low when compared to the deployment 
of a parallel infrastructure. 
 
Finally, as the analysis of existing case studies shows a clear involvement of 
public partners in FTTH deployment worldwide, this dissertation also focuses on 
including their specific targets in the business case. Contrary to private 
companies’ pursuing maximization of their return on investment, public players 
strive at achieving socio-economic goals. Identifying, categorizing and 
monetizing the added value of indirect benefits (such as reduced commuting time 
and costs when working at home) can as such be used as a stimulus for public 
involvement in FTTH deployment, be it direct or indirect. 
 
Although clearly focused on FTTH deployment, the frameworks and models 
developed in this dissertation can be easily adjusted to be applied to other 
application domains that ask for a multi-actor approach to techno-economic 
analysis which includes both detailed cost calculations as well as direct and 
indirect revenue estimations. 
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Introduction and publications 
“You can't stop the future. 
You can't rewind the past. 
The only way to learn the secret… 
is to press play.” 
- Jay Asher 
Who could, a couple of decades ago, have imagined the applications we use 
today? Whereas 20 years ago, people were waiting on the typical dial-up tune to 
retrieve their emails, we now each have multiple connected devices. Where the 
network used to offer only telephone services, telecom now is a fast evolving 
domain, in which new applications can quickly take over, offer ever richer 
services, but also require more and more bandwidth. Recent developments in 
picture and video quality, social networks, the rise of networked storage and 
cloud computing require increasingly more bandwidth and benefit especially 
from higher upstream speeds. The trend to higher bandwidth applications 
(currently HDTV – High Definition television, 3D TV and online gaming, 
extended to 4K TV, videophones, thin clients, etc.) is to be expected and many of 
these applications are already technically feasible today. While clearly none of 
those applications is the “Killer App”, the combination of all services would 
certainly benefit from higher bandwidth and lower latency. As such, telecom 
networks are also constantly being upgraded, by using enhanced hardware and 
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software, but also by upgrading the legacy twisted copper pairs to fiber, which 
has the ability to transfer data at higher speeds and over longer distances. This 
process started in the core networks, and is gradually finding its way to the end 
user. The final step in this upgrading progress is the deployment of fiber in the 
“last mile”, thereby reaching Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH). By using optical fiber 
instead of twisted copper pair or coaxial cables to transmit data signals, data rates 
can be significantly increased. 
The telecommunications sector is not only characterized by technological 
upgrades in both infrastructure and equipment, these upgrades also triggered a 
change in the structure of the market over the last couple of decades. The former 
telephone networks were typically owned and operated by the incumbent: one 
single company per country, such as British Telecom in the United Kingdom, 
Deutsche Telekom in Germany, Proximus (former Belgacom) in Belgium and 
AT&T in the United States, just to give some examples. The technical evolutions 
in equipment for transmitting bidirectional signals over coaxial cable introduced 
new players into the market: the former providers of analogue cable television 
(CA-TV). In countries where the coverage of this coaxial cable infrastructure 
was sufficient, operators such as Telenet in Flanders, Ziggo and UPC in the 
Netherlands, and ComCast in the United States of America (USA), could enter 
the broadband market and as such become competitors to the incumbents. 
Recent advances in FTTH deployment made even more new players emerge, 
both public and private. Private investors recognize a business opportunity in this 
new type of infrastructure, and use new business approaches to start deploying 
FTTH access networks. The most well-known examples here are Reggefiber in 
the Netherlands and Google Fiber in the USA. On the public side, governments 
aim at tackling the digital divide by starting up projects to deploy fast and 
reliable broadband (not necessarily all FTTH), municipalities engage in projects 
to allow cheap and transparent connections for all public buildings, including 
wireless access for their citizens, and utility companies get involved because they 
recognize the possible cost savings of deploying multiple infrastructures 
(electricity, water, gas) in one trench. Examples of this public involvement range 
from very local initiatives (such as the deployment of a neutral fiber 
infrastructure in Stockholm, Sweden), over more regional approaches (e.g. 
deployment led by the Stadtwerke in the region of Cologne, Germany), to 
national initiatives (amongst others the Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative in New 
Zealand and the National Broadband Network in Australia). 
On the other hand, telecom networks are no longer used only for voice services. 
Broadband Internet and digital television are commonly known and used, but 
more recently, applications in the security, health, entertainment and education 
sector broaden the telecom market as well. These services and applications are 
no longer only in the hands of the companies owning the infrastructure; but 
instead are owned by specific service providers that use the capacity of existing 
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networks to offer their own applications to end users. Think of massively used 
applications such as YouTube, Facebook and Skype, or services like Netflix and 
Internet Protocol (IP) cameras that directly connect to the police station, 
surveilling your home. Other service providers do not focus on new types of 
services, but try to compete with the established operators by offering a higher 
quality, better service or more features. These types of service providers also use 
the network of established operators, but on a lower layer: they only rent the 
physical infrastructure and provide their own active equipment. They are said to 
use the unbundled local loop (ULL) of the incumbent.  
The incumbent is often obliged by regulation to provide this ULL access to new 
entrants, which brings us to the third dominant parameter in the 
telecommunications domain. As any market, the telecommunications market is 
subject to certain laws and regulations. These laws have a clear influence on the 
way the market evolves, the level of competition, the price setting for end 
customers, etc. A clear difference in telecommunication law can be observed 
across the world. In Europe, for example, apart from general competition law, 
specific regulations are in force to prevent anti-competitive behavior by 
dominant market players. To come back to the ULL example, incumbents in 
Europe having a significant market power (SMP) are obliged by the national 
regulators to open up their network for new entrants. Furthermore, investment of 
public (tax) money in new network deployment projects is only allowed in 
remote or underserved areas, where it is judged that no private player will 
provide decent broadband access. In the United States, the rules of the game are 
set differently. Regulation is rather absent, as one there claims that competition 
should set the market rules. 
 
When analyzing strategic decisions in the telecom domain, such as the 
deployment of FTTH, it is clear that these decisions are not of pure technological 
nature, but are influenced by market evolutions and policy conditions. Here, the 
different actors on the market – operators, providers, suppliers, public instances – 
are interested in the evolutions of applications, customer demands, prices and 
technologies and the influence of all these parameters on their business models. 
Evaluating these strategic decisions thus asks for a clear understanding of the 
goals and drivers of the different involved actors, both separately as well as 
combined. Performing techno-economic analysis in a market that is characterized 
by such a complex interweaving of actors and responsibilities, requires an 
extension of traditional analysis methods (e.g. the well-known Net Present Value 
(NPV) calculation). The once united responsibility of “operating the 
telecommunications network” can therefore be split up into separate 
responsibilities, smaller roles. Typically, the telecommunications network is 
divided in three responsibilities, each taken up by a different conceptual actor. 
The physical infrastructure provider (PIP) is responsible for the deployment of 
4  Chapter 1 
the passive infrastructure (trenches, ducts and cables); the network provider (NP) 
connects active equipment to this infrastructure in order to provide end-to-end 
connectivity, which is then used by the service provider (SP) to offer specific 
applications. A detailed analysis per actor should be executed, while taking into 
account the allocation of shared costs, and an estimation of the additional costs 
that collaboration across the value chain entails. 
1.1 Overview of this dissertation 
This dissertation tackles the strategic decision of FTTH deployment in the multi-
actor setting telecommunications is in today. Leaning on technological, market 
and policy characteristics, this research employs extended techno-economic 
evaluation techniques to compare cost and revenues in the business case for the 
different actors involved, thereby evaluating them separately, though not 
independently. This work extends traditional techno-economic cost-benefit 
analysis to a multi-actor environment, thereby impacting both the cost side (by 
dividing the responsibilities among multiple actors and including collaboration 
costs), as well as the revenue side (by extending revenue analysis to indirect 
effects). The different chapters of this book rely on the results of various 
publications, of which a list is included in the next section. Furthermore, the 
work leading to this dissertation was also based on extensive collaboration with 
both academic and industry partners worldwide, who helped providing 
international benchmarks for the obtained results. This section will give an 
overview of the contents per chapter, and link to the related publications where 
applicable. 
This dissertation starts by providing a historic overview of the development of 
telecommunications in Flanders in chapter 2, which discusses the evolutions of 
the PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network) and the CA-TV network. 
Following the necessary technological upgrades, aided by market developments 
and regulatory decisions, both these networks are currently used to provide 
broadband services to residential customers. Taking this technical duopoly in 
Flanders as a starting point, it is compared to other regions in Europe that have 
different geographical characteristics and historical developments, thereby 
leading to other settings in their telecom sector. Although Flanders (and 
Belgium) currently take a leading position in terms of broadband coverage, speed 
and uptake (think also about the recent investment announcement by Telenet), 
the process of deploying fiber all the way to the customers’ homes is up till now 
mostly being postponed. The comparison with other regions in Europe learns that 
the strategic decision for FTTH rollout relies on more than a pure technological 
upgrade: it is severely influenced by surrounding market conditions and 
regulatory settings. Before going into the quantitative evaluation of the FTTH 
deployment decision this dissertation tackles, a good overview of the 
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technological, market and policy characteristics needs to be achieved. Therefore, 
an interaction framework focusing on these three domains was developed. [7], 
[10], [18] and [22]. 
Chapter 3 focuses on these characteristics from the technological side. By telling 
the story of how fiber has penetrated through the network, starting in the core, 
arriving in the access, the necessary background on telecom networks and FTTH 
is provided. Leaning on the well-known five-layer Internet protocol stack, the 
different roles in the deployment and exploitation of an FTTH network are 
introduced: the PIP, NP and SP. As new trends in the market show that these 
roles are taken up by different actors, it should be technically possible to separate 
the roles by opening up the value chain (different responsibilities in the network 
are taken up by different entities). The last part of chapter 3 describes the 
different possibilities of opening up the network from a technical point of view 
by indicating the extra equipment, processes and transactions needed. In between 
the PIP and the NP, the network can be opened at fiber layer or wavelength 
layer, while the NP can grant access to multiple SPs on the bitstream layer. This 
opening of the network is referred to as unbundling or open access. Unbundling 
refers to the case in which a single actor is exploiting both a particular layer and 
the layer on top of that, while still allowing the co-existence of other actors on 
top of its own passive infrastructure/network (e.g. PIP also acts as NP, in 
competition with alternative NPs). Open access, on the other hand, refers to the 
situation in which the lower layer is provisioned in a nondiscriminatory way to 
different actors on the layer above (PIP is only allowed the role of PIP). The 
main difference with unbundling is that the actor responsible for the lower layer 
is not allowed to act in the layers above. [4], [5] and [8]. 
The market and policy pillar of the interaction framework are covered in chapter 
4. Conclusions about the boundaries these domains set are drawn using the 
analysis of several FTTH deployment cases worldwide. These cases are 
evaluated on a number of characteristics: the region type and scale of 
deployment, making the distinction between dense urban, urban and rural on the 
one side and city-level, regional or country-wide on the other; the policy 
conditions, which differ significantly between Europe and other parts of the 
world; the initiator and key drivers, thereby identifying who (public and/or 
private) and what (direct or indirect revenues) drove the deployment; the 
financing structure, ranging from a 100% public investment, over a cooperation 
in terms of a Public Private Partnership, to a 100% private initiative; the applied 
business model, indicating how the responsibilities are divided among the 
different actors; and finally existing competition, describing both competition in 
between different infrastructures (inter-platform) as well as competition on top of 
the same infrastructure (intra-platform). 
The analysis of worldwide cases provides important insights in existing, 
operational FTTH deployments, and can thus serve as international benchmark 
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for the techno-economic evaluation of the strategic decisions in FTTH 
investment. [1], [6], [7], [9], [18] and [20]. 
This techno-economic evaluation is the subject of the final chapters of this book. 
First, the analysis for the different, separate roles is executed: the investment in 
the passive infrastructure – the role of the PIP – and the investment in the active 
equipment – the role of the NP. The investment analysis for the service provider 
is considered out of scope of this research, as services can be offered 
independently of the type of underlying network. To evaluate the business case 
for the PIP and the NP, different cost and revenue models are developed (first 
part of chapter 5). On the cost side, we first describe models that acknowledge 
the existing infrastructure and geographical constraints. Secondly, planning for 
long-term infrastructure investment will also have to take into account migration 
of equipment, as the lifetime of active equipment is limited in comparison to 
passive infrastructure (ducts and cables). The cost models developed make the 
distinction between models for the infrastructure deployment itself (PNMN – 
Physical Network Modeling Language), for the installation and maintenance of 
equipment (ECMN – Equipment Coupling Modeling Language), and for the 
evaluation of the cost of processes (BPMN – Business Process Modeling 
Language). On the revenue side, reliable forecasting of direct revenues is an 
uncontestable need for ensuring the business case. Here, existing willingness to 
pay for known services should be combined with forecasted uptake curves to get 
an idea about the profitability of the business case. The developed revenue 
models allow for fixed pricing or varying pricing set based on the overall or 
yearly costs incurred. [8], [9], [16] and [17]. 
The second part of chapter 5 discusses the actual results of the business case 
evaluation for PIP and NP. The investment for the PIP is analyzed for different 
geographical regions, over a time horizon of 20 years. The quantitative analysis 
performed indicates that the business case is in most cases not economically 
viable. Therefore, as a second step, the section investigates possibilities and 
opportunities to improve the business case of the PIP, for instance by prolonging 
the planning horizon, ensuring revenue from the start of the project by 
performing demand aggregation or examining where public funds might help. 
The business case for the NP is evaluated for the same regions. However, since 
the lifetime of equipment is limited, the time horizon for the business case 
evaluation should be shortened, or a migration scenario should be taken into 
account. Both options are studied for active and passive optical networks. [3], 
[8], [12] and [13]. 
On top of analyzing the investment for the roles separately, the multi-actor 
environment entails more possible extensions to the techno-economic evaluation, 
which are described in chapter 6 and 7. Chapter 6 focuses on extending revenue 
modeling towards including indirect effects, while chapter 7 elaborates on the 
costs of collaboration. Indirect effects are effects on one domain, caused by the 
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actions in another domain. In telecommunications, they comprise all effects that 
result from the deployment of a broadband network and are beneficial to society 
(e.g. the well-known example of reducing traffic by allowing people to work 
from home). They are especially important for public partners, as they envisage 
not purely monetary revenues from their involvement in the deployment of 
FTTH. The chapter describes a bottom-up model for identifying, categorizing 
and quantifying indirect benefits and applies it to two cities: Ghent and 
Eindhoven. The comparison of these two cities allows for evaluating the impact 
of FTTH on the indirect benefits, as both cities are quite similar with one main 
difference: an FTTH network is already operational in Eindhoven, while non-
existent in Ghent. [2] and [11]. 
The second extension of cost-benefit analysis focuses on evaluating the cost of 
collaboration, which is a consequence of the opening of the value chain to allow 
for multiple actors taking up different responsibilities. This chapter (7) proposes 
a cost breakdown into equipment, process and transaction costs to evaluate the 
additional costs fiber and bitstream open access (allowing for multiple NPs and 
SPs, respectively) entail. [4] and [5]. 
A conclusion on performing techno-economic evaluation on FTTH deployment 
in a multi-actor environment is formulated in the last chapter of this dissertation, 
chapter 8. It summarizes the results of the previous chapters and draws on these 
results to provide some guidelines on the strategic decisions within FTTH 
deployment, focusing on the multi-actor aspect. An overview of possible 
directions for future work concludes this book. 
 
Because of the multi-disciplinary character of this dissertation, a reading path is 
included to end this introduction, so as to guide the audience to the different 
chapters, depending on their background.  
- The more technical audience with a strong background in fiber optics 
might skip chapter 3, and spend more time in exploring the results of 
chapters 5 (sections 5.3 and 5.4) and 7. 
- Experts on Belgian broadband evolutions and regulations might spend 
less time on the first sections of chapter 2, and instead fast forward to 
the comparison with other countries in section 2.4. 
- The most important results for policy makers can be found from the 
comparison of cases (chapter 4), the monetary value of indirect effects 
(chapter 6) and the impact of the different open access models on cost 
(chapter 7). 
- Researchers may set the focus in the overall work but especially in 
chapters 5 and 6 if they look for cost-benefit models and analysis.
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The need for and barriers to 
deploying Fiber-to-the-Home 
 “Almost overnight, the Internet's gone  
from a technical wonder to a business must.” 
 -  Bill Schrader 
Telecommunications started a long time ago, but developed faster and faster as 
time went by. Starting from communicating via the use of carrier pigeons in the 
Middle Ages to telegraph systems in the beginning of the 1800s, telephone 
networks were starting to be deployed at the end of the 19th century, while 
coaxial cable networks for broadcast services emerged in the 1950s. The 
liberalization and privatization of the former PSTN (Public switched Telephone 
Network) led in the 1990s to the introduction of broadband on both DSL (Digital 
subscriber Line) and CA-TV (cable television) networks. Nowadays, a society 
without telecommunications networks and especially the Internet is hard to 
imagine, on the contrary, their importance in everyday life keeps on growing.  
As a more elaborate introduction to the entire book, this chapter will provide a 
description of the evolution and the dynamics of the broadband market in 
Flanders (Belgium), thereby relying on the analysis performed in [2.1] and [2.2]. 
Following the location of Ghent in Belgium and Flanders, the history of 
telecommunications in Flanders in this chapter is used as a starting point, from 
which the comparison to Europe and the rest of the world will be drawn in the 
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following chapters. Some observed trends in this chapter will be highlighted to 
provide a clear motivation for the performed research.  
This chapter will first give an overview of historical developments of PSTN and 
CA-TV networks and the Telecom Reform in Flanders (section 2.1), after which 
the current duopoly situation of telecommunications in Flanders is elaborated on 
in section 2.2. This analysis is further used in section 2.3 to describe the possible 
paths that could (or should) be taken to comply with ever increasing demands for 
higher bandwidth in the future. The observed trends in Flanders are linked to 
other countries in Europe in section 2.4, and provide a motivation for the 
framework used further in this PhD dissertation (section 2.5). 
2.1 Historical developments in PSTN and CA-TV 
networks in Flanders 
In order to get to a full overview of the historical developments, we will begin 
our analysis at the end of the 19th century, when the first telephone networks 
were deployed. We will focus on the evolutions in both twisted copper pair 
(PSTN) and coaxial cable (CA-TV) networks, since both currently play an 
important role in the offering of broadband. In this section, we will describe how 
private initiatives were soon taken over by local and national authorities, how 
monopolies long ruled, and how liberalization and privatization, triggered by the 
European Telecom Reform, aimed to introduce more competition and dynamic 
efficiency in telecommunications markets. The most important events for the 
developments of both networks are summarized in Figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Overview of historic events in both PSTN and CA-TV networks in 
Flanders 
2.1.1 The development of the PSTN network:  
from private initiatives to a monopolist situation 
The first introduction of the telephone in Belgium originated from the Belgian 
Parliament (1879), but the public became acquainted with the telephone thanks 
to the American International Bell Telephone Company [2.3]-[2.4], which built 
the first local telephone network in Ostend in 1886. The networks owned by this 
and other private organizations covered the densely occupied cities, but did not 
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reach out to the rural areas. The State recognized the value of a nation-wide 
telephone network and therefore invested in establishing a public company that 
received total control of the network.  
As a consequence of the First World War, the Belgian authorities had to deal 
with great financial troubles and could no longer support the public telephone 
company. To avoid losing telecommunications facilities by the lack of financial 
means, a new company was founded: the RTT (Regie Telegraaf en Telefonie) in 
1930. This public company received the monopoly over the whole telephone 
network, but was created as an autonomous entity, no longer depending on the 
funding provided by the government. Competition was out of the question, as all 
threats of entry and substitute products were locked out by law, which 
determined that the RTT not only had the monopoly of owning and exploiting 
the PSTN network, but also the sole rights on offering telephone services. 
To repair the damages experienced during the Second World War, the State 
decided to intervene financially to give a boost to the telecommunications sector. 
While in theory the company was autonomous, in practice, the involvement of 
the State was never far away. This intervention of the State gave the RTT the 
possibility to invest in the development of its network. The booming economy at 
the time provided the opportunity for the Belgian population to subscribe to the 
telephone network. The growing demand of subscribers stimulated the RTT to 
invest even more in its network (the expansion of demand led to an expansion of 
investment, from 350,000 connections in 1946 to 1,049,000 in 1965) making the 
Belgian telephone network one of the most developed and progressive at the time 
with a penetration of 33% of households [2.5]. 
Although the RTT was a successful company, its monopoly rights (not only on 
ownership and exploitation of the PSTN network, but also on the providing of 
services and equipment) made the telecom market in Flanders quite inefficient, 
as the RTT was not obliged or incentivized to offer the most innovative products 
at the lowest prices. At the end of the 1960s, the saturation of the market put a 
stop to the increasing revenue trend, which revealed inefficiency problems of the 
RTT. Customers (especially business subscribers) began to realize that the prices 
they were paying were too high. This awareness also rose in other countries and 
was the major cause for European-wide regulatory intervention. 
2.1.2 Developments of CA-TV networks:  
private initiatives and the influence of the municipalities 
Distribution of television channels by coaxial cable networks originated in the 
USA in 1947. Belgium was the first country on the European mainland that 
established cable distribution networks in the early 1950s. The first lines were 
installed in large apartment buildings where the residents invested jointly in one 
antenna and distributed the signals using coaxial cable. Soon, some of those 
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networks were combined into inter-municipal networks, sometimes with 
participation of private firms. The number of subscribers grew rapidly: more than 
50% of the Belgian viewers had subscribed by 1976. By 1996, 38 cable 
companies with a total subscription base of 95% of the households, made 
Belgium the world’s leader regarding cable penetration. Competition was not 
present at the time, since each cable company operated in its own dedicated 
geographical region. The growing demand resulted in serious expansion 
campaigns during the 1980s-1990s, thereby enhancing the quantity and quality 
of the offered TV services. Starting in the 1990s, many companies merged in 
order to be able to keep up with the required investments. This resulted in a few 
big companies, geographically separated, operating the coaxial cable networks. 
2.1.3 Telecom Reform 
The first legislation concerning the use of the telephone was published in 1896, 
with the monopolization of the network and the foundation of the first public 
company. The first real Telecommunications Law appeared in 1930, together 
with the formation of the RTT. This law remained roughly unchanged for more 
than sixty years, as nothing fundamentally changed concerning the monopolistic 
situation of the RTT. 
So far, telecommunications services had remained firmly in the hands of the 
national operators, but this would change with the 1987 landmark document 
“Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications 
services and equipment” [2.6]. The first and politically acceptable step in the 
process of liberalization aimed at introducing competition at the service level, 
while the infrastructure could remain under monopoly control. However, “the 
Commission recognized that the gains in innovation, productivity improvements 
and price re-structuring would only come about through competitive entry in 
infrastructure, be it at a local level by upgrading cable networks or building new 
ones, or more immediately through alternative backbone investments” [2.7]. By 
the end of 1994, the European Council officially recognized the principle of 
liberalization and set January 1st, 1998 as the date “by which all remaining 
restrictions on service competition would be lifted” [2.8]. 
On 21th March 1991, the proposals from the Green Paper were incorporated in 
Belgian Law [2.9], which led to the foundation of two institutions: Belgacom1, 
an autonomous telecommunications operator with a monopoly concerning the 
PSTN network and the BIPT (Belgian Institute for Postal Services & 
Telecommunications), the Belgian National Regulatory Authority (NRA). 
Belgacom was created as a successor of the RTT and subsumed the entire 
 
1 Please note that Belgacom recently changed its name to Proximus. As most of the 
contents of this chapter deals with historical developments, the company will here be 
referred to as Belgacom. 
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Belgian telephone network. The main difference between the RTT and Belgacom 
concerned the degree of monopoly. The RTT had the monopoly of exploiting the 
whole telephone network, while Belgacom only inherited the monopoly on the 
“public telecommunications”.2 
Furthermore, as a response to the Bangemann Report [2.10], the government 
decided to privatize Belgacom in that same year by selling just under 50% of its 
shares to industry, the State remaining as such the major shareholder. The State 
believed this privatization to be necessary to counter competition from 
international rivals, because of the attractive position of Belgacom as the only 
telecom operator in a country in the center of Europe, but also to be able to face 
the competition emerging from the domestic CA-TV operators. 
The European Commission (EC) liberalization directive obligated Belgacom to 
open up its network to new entrants starting from January 1998. The 
consequence of this liberalization was the emergence of many new OLOs (Other 
Licensed Operators) in the following years. The fragmentation of the PSTN 
market however remained limited, as the new entrants had to combine the 
investments attached to the starting-up of a new company with lower prices 
and/or better products, because they had to overcome customer loyalty for the 
existing brands. With more firms on the market, the customers could play 
competitors off against each other while forcing down prices or demanding 
higher quality or more services. 
Although limited, the opening of the PSTN market stood in great contrast to the 
intense concentration of the market for coaxial cable networks. In the latter, one 
specific public initiative: “Multimedia in Vlaanderen” in 1996 [2.11]-[2.12], set 
up by the Flemish government, initiated drastic changes. The main driver for this 
project was to close the ‘digital gap’, but also other targets – job creation and 
promotion of R&D in the IT sector – played their part. The major element of the 
project was the establishing of Telenet, set up to interconnect and ultimately 
unite the independent Flemish cable companies to achieve an interactive 
broadband network offering broadcast, telecommunication and multimedia 
services. Although the business plan for Telenet was ambitious, the first Internet 
access offer, branded Pandora (launched in August 1997), was too expensive 
(about €50 per month), leading to a delay of the expected boom in take-up and 
very high debts. Furthermore, Telenet (Pandora) only received revenues from 
offering additional services, the network revenues stayed with the network 
 
2 The Law of 1991 classified public telecommunications as: 
  - construction, maintenance, modernization and operation of public                                                                    
         telecommunications infrastructure; 
  -  the exploitation of the reserved services (including telephone and telegraph  
         service, provision of fixed links for third parties); 
  -     the construction, maintenance and operation of the publicly accessible and on public   
         domain located establishments intended for telecommunications.  
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owners (privately owned and geographically divided ‘intercommunales’). In 
2002, the newly appointed CEO, Duco Sickinghe, changed the strategy of the 
company. He bought the intercommunales (UPC Belgium in 2006, Interkabel 
Vlaanderen in 2008) in return for a share in the larger Telenet. As such, he could 
claim the ensured revenues from the network (CA-TV revenues, which 
previously were destined for the intercommunales), thereby securing the business 
case and making Telenet the only true competitor to Belgacom in Flanders.  
Apart from the strategy change, the NRA, BIPT, had an important influence on 
the business case for Telenet: they allowed asymmetric termination fees in the 
advantage of Telenet [2.13], which meant a large extra income for Telenet, and 
saved the company to some extent. Some even considered this regulation as an 
indirect subsidy from Belgacom to Telenet, justified in the context of creating a 
level playing field in telecoms in Flanders. Although this justification may be 
subject to discussion, it led to the current duopoly situation where Belgacom and 
Telenet compete for broadband customers. 
2.2 Development of broadband  
in a commercial and technical duopoly 
Although the European Telecom Reform aimed at introducing more competition 
by allowing new entrants to compete on the twisted copper pair network, it 
mostly resulted in a competitive duopoly between the incumbent operator 
(Belgacom) and the cable operator (Telenet). This section will describe the 
evolutions and most important events in the development of broadband 
(Internet), while focusing on the tit-for-tat competition between twisted copper 
pair and coaxial cable (Figure 2-2). 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Market shares per technology over time clearly show the competition 
between twisted copper pair and coaxial cable (entire Belgium) [2.14] 
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Important to mention here is that, although this chapter focuses on fixed 
broadband markets, we also include a timeline for mobile communications 
because both operators offer quadruple play services (including television, 
Internet and fixed and mobile telephony).3 We refer to Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 
for a graphical representation of the most important events for both networks. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Overview of developments in the PSTN network of Belgacom 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Overview of developments in the network of Telenet 
 
 
3 Telenet offers mobile services in collaboration with Mobistar, who owns the license. 
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The introduction of the Internet in Belgium was realized by the research centers, 
who wanted to provide their researchers with the possibility to connect to 
powerful remote computers. The first narrowband (64 kbps – kilobits per second) 
network was operational in 1993 by BELNET [2.15]. Belgacom entered the 
Internet market in 1996 with the acquisition of Skynet, a company providing 
Internet services founded in 1995. 
Flanders discovered the opportunities of broadband Internet competition in 1997. 
In July, Telenet finished rolling-out an extensive backbone in fiber of about 600 
kilometers in order to connect the individual networks of the different cable 
companies and replacing the amplifiers all over the network with bidirectional 
versions to allow broadband traffic in both directions. The first broadband 
connections were installed in August 1997, using Telenet’s HFC (Hybrid Fiber 
Coaxial) architecture. 
The introduction of broadband Internet over the twisted copper pair network 
followed with the execution of a pilot project for the testing of ADSL 
(Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) in 1998. Because of the success of the 
project, Belgacom Skynet was one of the first operators worldwide to 
commercially introduce ADSL in April 1999. Within short, ADSL covered 30 to 
35% of Belgacom’s telephone customers. The intention was to achieve a 
coverage of 70% by the end of 2000. This objective was exceeded when, in 
November 2000, ADSL services were available to 75% of Belgian population. 
By the end of 2002, the coverage was almost complete when 98% of the 
inhabitants had access to the ADSL services [2.16], making Belgium the leader 
in Europe. 
The need for higher data rates made Belgacom explore the opportunities of fiber 
deployment within the scope of the Broadway Project that was launched in 2004. 
This project aimed at upgrading the network to a combined twisted copper pair 
and optical fiber network. The goal was to connect the Central Offices to the 
street cabinets using optical fiber (the so called Fiber-to-the-Cabinet, FTTC) and 
to roll out a VDSL (Very high bit-rate Digital Subscriber Line) platform between 
the street cabinets and the end users. This VDSL technology offered data rates up 
to 8 Mbps (Megabits per second) download and 400 kbps upload by the 
beginning of 2005. Because the equipment vendor Alcatel Lucent didn’t support 
the particular VDSL technology any longer (it was incompatible with ADSL and 
had a too high spectral noise) and because the need for higher data rates was 
urgent due to the introduction of digital television, Belgacom implemented 
ADSL2+ in 2005 as a temporary solution until the new VDSL2 standard would 
be ready at the end of 2007. By 2009, a total investment of about €500 million 
had led to the deployment of 14,000 km of fiber, connecting 17,000 remote 
optical platforms representing an FTTC (Fiber-to-the-Cabinet) coverage of about 
70%. Thanks to the early investments in the Broadway project and the high 
ranking of the VDSL2-coverage (2nd place in Europe in 2009), Belgacom 
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received the “2009 Innovations Award” from Global Telecommunications 
Business [2.17]-[2.18]. 
Because of the increasing demand for higher bandwidths and in order to stay 
competitive vis-à-vis the cable operator Telenet, Belgacom decided to invest 
further in applications using optical fiber. The first tests concerning Fiber-to-the-
Home (FTTH), bringing the optical fiber into the living room of the customer, 
were executed in Rochefort in 2008, extended to Sint-Truiden and La Louvière 
in 2009 [2.18], and recently added three new test projects in Bredene, Brussels 
and Brecht [2.19]. Although the focus lies on improving the quality on the VDSL 
network, Belgacom also communicated to consider plans for deploying FTTH, 
possibly by considering aerial (on the buildings’ facades) instead of buried 
deployment [2.20]. Starting from December 2014, FTTH will be deployed in 
greenfield areas (“all new residential zones that are sufficiently large”) [2.21]. 
On the one hand, Belgacom is deploying VDSL2 to all its customers, having 
reached a national coverage of 78.9% at the end of 2011, and over 87% by the 
end of 2013 [2.22]. On the other hand, Belgacom recognizes the limitations of 
VDSL2, and therefore already communicated their “Get to fast, faster” strategy 
[2.23]. In a partnership with Alcatel-Lucent, Belgacom aims at maximizing the 
VDSL2 throughput by using the new state-of-the-art vectoring technology. The 
graph in Figure 2-5 provides an overview of the most important changes 
concerning the available data rates for residential users (for a more general 
overview of the different DSL technologies, we refer to Figure 3-4). 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Graphic representation of the evolution of the offered bandwidth by 
Belgacom (maximum download and upload data rate for residential customers); 
[2.24]-[2.31]. 
Figure 2-6 shows the evolution of the data rates offered by Telenet. To provide 
its services, Telenet uses a HFC network, which consists of fiber backbones and 
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coaxial access in the serving areas. To provide broadband access, Telenet uses 
the DOCSIS (Data over Cable Service Interface Specification) technology. Over 
the years, Telenet launched different new products, each time increasing the data 
rates. Telenet Internet XL, for example, came to the market in September 2000, 
providing a downstream of 1 Mbps and upstream of 256 kbps. In 2002, Telenet 
Internet XL offered download data rates up to 4 Mbps, while download data rates 
increased to 20 Mbps in the fall of 2005. In March 2010, Telenet launched 
‘Digital Wave 2015’, a project aiming at improving the existing network over the 
next five years, with an investment sum of about €30 million every year. Now, 
Telenet uses the European version of DOCSIS 3.0 and is expanding to DOCSIS 
3.1, which allows them to offer a download data rate of 100 Mbps and more 
[2.32]-[2.33]. Recently, the company announced further investments in their 
network: €500 million over the next 5 years, thereby making it possible to reach 
data rates of up to 1 Gbps to end users [2.34]. This investment will be focused on 
broadening the “information superhighway” from 600 MHz to 1 GHz, which will 
require the replacement of 150,000 amplifiers and 1.8 million other components. 
Plans for deploying FTTH were not communicated so far. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Graphic representation of the evolution of the offered bandwidth by 
Telenet (maximum download and upload data rate for residential customers) 
[2.35]-[2.41]. 
These evolutions led to the current situation in Flanders: a duopoly between 
Belgacom and Telenet, both taking up almost half of the market share, leaving 
only a few percent for other operators. Both upgrade their network gradually, but 
are not inclined to take on high-risk investments [2.42]. Mid 2014, Belgacom 
offers to residential users a maximum download speed of 50 Mbps and a 
maximum upload speed of 5 Mbps, while Telenet’s limits are at 160/10 Mbps 
(down/up) [2.40],[2.43].  
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To face the competition, both Belgacom and Telenet expanded their range of 
services (Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4). Currently, both Belgacom and Telenet are 
quadruple play operators, offering broadband Internet, fixed and mobile 
telephony as well as digital television [2.43]-[2.44]. Important to mention here is 
the share that digital television takes up in the Internet bundles. Of all Internet 
bundles offered (on a Belgian scale), about 80% includes digital television 
[2.45]. Telenet acquired a license for Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial 
(DVB-T) broadcasts in Flanders in 2010, but because this service was not 
successful, it is no longer commercialized. At the moment only a free terrestrial 
broadcasting service (customers can get this service just by buying a digital 
antenna) is available in Flanders offering the channels of the public broadcaster 
VRT. 
Belgium is one of the leaders of the market when it comes to coverage of 
ultrahigh broadband; according to Akamai, Belgium ranked 10th globally with 
average data rates observed of 6.1 Mbps and ranked 6th on peak data rates 
observed of 26.7 Mbps [2.46] in 2012. In the first quarter of 2014 however, 
Belgium went down to place 14 globally (average speed of 10 Mbps), while the 
peak speed reported is 44.6 Mbps (leading to a 12th place globally) [2.47]. 
2.3 Does the duopoly setting with tit-for-tat 
competition suffice to realize the Digital Agenda 
targets? 
For a very long period, telephone service provisioning in Belgium has been 
characterized by a monopoly regime. It was the imminent threat of competition, 
supported by the pressure from ‘Europe’ that incentivized the Flemish 
government to a project, which would radically change the telecom market 
structure in Flanders. Telenet was founded and became the key competitor for 
the incumbent Belgacom in the Flemish fixed broadband market, and as such, 
competition, innovation and price reduction were stimulated.  
On the other hand, Europe also sets concrete targets for telecommunications 
networks, published as part of its Digital Agenda for Europe [2.48], which 
specify that: “By 2020, all Europeans should have access to Internet of above 30 
Megabits per second (Mbps) and 50% or more of European households have 
subscriptions above 100Mbps”. By describing concrete examples and events, this 
section will analyze the dynamics of the Flemish broadband market and provide 
insights in the road to reach Europe’s Digital Agenda targets. 
2.3.1 Marketing strategies: focus on own strengths 
From the previous section it has become clear that, although there are some 
smaller niche players present, the fixed broadband market in Flanders is 
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dominated by Belgacom and Telenet, each having a close-to-100% coverage 
with their networks (DSL and DOCSIS, respectively). However, since the 
available data rates on those networks differ significantly (maximum download 
data rates for residential users are 70 Mbps for Belgacom versus 160 Mbps for 
Telenet), both players market their offer using different key services and 
promotions. 
Since mid-2012, Telenet focuses its marketing strategy on data rates and 
simplicity, both for the fixed and mobile market. In July 2012, Telenet launched 
King and Kong, two straightforward tariff schemes for its mobile customers. 
Both are bundles, including voice, SMS and mobile data, for a fixed charge per 
month. To attract or convince fixed Telenet customers, discounts are given. In 
June 2013, Telenet launched a similar offer for its fixed services: Whop and 
Whoppa, bundles including digital television, Voice-over-IP (VOIP) telephony, a 
fixed broadband connection and Wi-Fi Internet through their Wi-free hotspots. 
Their advertising emphasizes the high data rates reached (Whoppa: “for whom 
fast isn’t fast enough”) and the inclusion of all services into one simple and 
transparent bundle. 
Belgacom, as a quadruple play operator, goes one step further in bundling its 
services. The company offers both mobile and fixed Internet in one package: the 
“Generation pack”. Different options exist, for different download limits, voice 
and SMS usages, etc. Their strategy focuses as such more on the services, as the 
maximum download rates on VDSL are less than half of Telenet’s offers.  
2.3.2 Regulatory setting: unbundling obligations for both 
Belgacom and Telenet 
1998 was the year of the liberalization of the European telecom market. The 
incumbent Belgacom was obliged to open up its network to new entrants. 
Belgacom remained owner of the network, but had to provide network access to 
other operators. The consequence of this liberalization was the rise of many new 
OLOs in the following years (e.g. British Telecom, MCI, Colt, Versatel, Coditel, 
Tele2, Dommel, EDPnet, Mobistar, Eleven and Scarlet). This fragmentation of 
the market in the field of the DSL network stood in great contrast to the intense 
concentration of the market in the coaxial cable network. This is an important 
observation: while Belgacom was obliged to open up its network, the cable 
companies merged into a united network. 
However, the fragmentation of the market remained limited, as the new entrants 
had to combine the significant investments attached to the start-up of a new 
company with the need to offer low prices to attract customers. New entrants had 
to offer cheaper and/or better products than the incumbent, because they had to 
break the customer loyalty for the existing brands. This ongoing price pressure 
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made it hard for the new entrants to survive, forcing some to end their activities 
(e.g. Eleven) or to sell their activities to another operator (e.g. Versatel, Tele2). 
Other operators managed to develop a customer base of significant size. An 
excellent example here is the operator Schedom, which provides a cheap Internet 
connection for urban subscribers under the brand name Dommel. Its success is 
hidden in the selection of the market segment. By focusing only on urban, 
densely populated areas (consisting of many students and gamers) and offering 
unlimited broadband packages, Schedom could keep its line prices low while still 
acquiring a significant part in that specific global market [2.49]. Now that the 
other operators started offering unlimited packages, their unique selling position 
disappeared. Other operators, like Scarlet, were taken over by Belgacom, 
although Scarlet remains an autonomous subsidiary [2.50].  
The impact of the unbundling obligation remained marginal until the BIPT 
lowered LLU (Local Loop Unbundling) prices in 2006. The scale of the 
alternative operators was by then large enough to climb the ladder of investment 
further and to invest in unbundling. These investments were stopped in 2008 
when the economic crisis hit and when Belgacom announced that it intended to 
close down 10% of its MDFs as a consequence of the move to an all IP 
infrastructure and VDSL deployments in the sub-loop. Because the planned 
closure impacted 40% of the unbundled lines, the BIPT intervened with 
additional obligations4 to guarantee a fair return on investments (ROIs) for the 
alternative operators, but the investments in unbundling never recovered. 
 
Although Telenet long enjoyed a monopoly on the HFC network and services, 
the CRC (Conference of Media Regulators) and the Belgian NRA (BIPT) 
published a proposal for opening up the cable network in 2010. This proposal 
was transformed into a formal decision on July 1st, 2011, in which the regulatory 
authorities regulated Telenet and the other cable operators, and created an 
obligation to provide wholesale access to analogue television and broadband 
Internet services, as well as opening up the digital television platform. The 
analogue TV offer should allow an alternative operator to resell Telenet’s offer, 
although the offer itself would not change. In the digital access, an alternative 
operator can inject their own signals into the digital platform of Telenet, thereby 
having the opportunity to differentiate the offer by providing alternative content. 
Allowing OLOs broadband access, finally, will only be allowed in combination 
with TV [2.22].  
Telenet responded stating that regulating analogue TV is not useful, because of 
the declining number of subscribers, and that regulating digital TV is not 
necessary, as in that market there is enough competition from different platforms 
 
4 Decision of 12 November 2008 concerning the addendum NGN/NGA complementing 
the market analysis of 10 January 2008. 
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(cable, IPTV, satellite and Internet TV). They furthermore argued that regulating 
the most important competitor to the SMP incumbent will definitely not enhance 
the infrastructure-based competition the European Commission favors [2.51]-
[2.54]. On the other hand, the regulators argued that the unbundling obligation 
can also be favorable for Telenet, as it would allow the company to expand its 
services to Brussels and Wallonia (the southern part of Belgium). Furthermore, 
the unbundling obligation will allow mobile operators (such as Base and 
Mobistar) to offer TV services in bundles with their mobile subscriptions. 
Finally, and most importantly, unbundling the cable operators will stimulate 
competition on wholesale level and as such increase competition and reduce 
retail prices. 
The regulators and operators are now defining the implementation of the 
decisions, and final decisions were reached in September 2013 (qualitative 
decision) and December 2013 (tariffs decision on a retail-minus basis). A first 
letter of intent was signed by Mobistar to Telenet, Brutélé and Tecteo in January 
2014 (the latter two are cable operators in Brussels and Wallonia); the cable 
operators then having a six-month period for implementation. Friendly user tests 
are expected for the second half of 2014 [2.22]. 
Concerning the current LLU and bitstream access regulation of Belgacom’s 
network, the BIPT is also re-evaluating its models for calculating the price caps, 
following the European guideline to stabilize the prices for copper lines between 
€8 and €10 per month, as such increasing the flexibility for the deployment of 
fiber-based networks.  
 
 
Figure 2-7: The use of wholesale access on fixed services remains limited in 
Belgium 
A final regulatory intervention worth mentioning is the recent withdrawal of the 
VDSL sub-loop unbundling requirement by the BIPT [2.55]. For VDSL 
vectoring to function properly, i.e. to effectively cancel out cross-talk, the copper 
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lines connected to the DSLAMs (Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer) 
should be handled as one bundle, which would imply the bundle to be controlled 
by the same operator. Moreover, the business case for sub-loop unbundling is 
less attractive as the aggregation point moves lower into the network, hence it 
does not attract many OLOs, BIPT has decided to withdraw this obligation in 
order to stimulate the commercial deployment of VDSL vectoring, thereby 
ensuring the competitiveness of Belgacom’s DSL with Telenet’s DOCSIS 
network. Because of the withdrawal of sub-loop unbundling, the BIPT enhanced 
in the same decision the obligation to provide bitstream access by adding 
multicast functionality and allowing more differentiation possibilities for active 
access at local and regional level. This enhanced form of bitstream is also called 
Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA). 
2.3.3 Realizing the Digital Agenda targets 
Concerning the 100% coverage goal of 30 Mbps or more, set out by the Digital 
Agenda for Europe, 98% was reached by the end of 2011: 85% of households via 
VDSL, 95.5% via the DOCSIS 3.0 technology. Belgium is the leader when it 
comes to the uptake of high data rate broadband (30 Mbps or more). The second 
goal, reaching 50% take-up of high-data rate broadband (>=100 Mbps) by 2020, 
is further away: an uptake of 3.4% was reached by the end of 2012. 
Forecasts however are optimistic for Belgium. Analysys Mason communicated 
that Belgium is one of six countries that should reach the 50% take-up goal of 
high-data rate broadband by 2020. However, the road to reach these targets 
differs strongly from other countries sharing the same goals. Belgacom 
communicated the VDSL vectoring strategy to achieve the goals set out in the 
Digital Agenda to the European Commission [2.56], while FTTH is more 
common in other countries. In Belgium, FTTH coverage remains small: coverage 
of 0.2% was registered at the end of 2011. Therefore, Belgacom commented that 
the Commission should assure “technological neutrality when considering 
investments in broadband infrastructure in view of reaching the Digital Agenda”. 
They stated that the focus is too much on FTTH, while the developments made 
by Alcatel-Lucent clearly indicate that the targets can also be reached with 
gradual upgrades of VDSL. 
Whereas Belgacom reaches data rates of 50 Mbps to 1.5 million households 
(limited availability of 70 Mbps (through vectoring), 30 Mbps elsewhere [2.20]), 
Telenet is far ahead, offering theoretical data rates up to 160 Mbps using their 
DOCSIS 3.0 technology, which is available to 95.5% of households. 
However, ranking 10th in Akamai’s 2011 report, Belgium dropped a few places, 
now only ranked 14th (first quarter of 2014) on average speed, and even dropped 
from 6th to 12th place on peak speed [2.47]. Furthermore, although both operators 
communicate not to opt for a revolutionary FTTH deployment (replacing their 
current networks), the opportunities and possibilities for such a rollout are still 
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being examined by the operators and the NRA [2.57], following the lead taken in 
other countries and by Europe [2.58]. This examination includes thorough cost 
analyses, assessing the relative weight of the trenching costs versus the service 
provisioning and operational costs, investigating opportunities of synergetic 
rollout with other utility network owners, as well as assessing the impact of 
Public Private Partnerships involving the local municipalities. The Belgian NRA 
proposes to harmonize and standardize the Right of Way, to stimulate sharing of 
infrastructure (e.g. empty ducts), to investigate the opportunities of decreasing 
the price for the last mile (by e.g. allowing aerial deployment or micro-
trenching), etc. 
The next section will link these more generally observed trends to some 
historical facts described in the sections above, thereby providing a motivation 
for the framework for investigation used in this research. 
2.4 Comparison of Belgian duopoly to generic trends 
across Europe 
The previous sections detailed the duopoly situation in the telecommunications 
sector in Belgium, where the future road clearly focuses on evolutionary 
approaches for both DSL and DOCSIS upgrades. Although Belgium holds a 
leading position in Europe in terms of high data-rate (> 30 Mbps) broadband 
uptake [2.59], it is still far behind in comparison to Asian countries such as 
Korea and Japan, and its leading position in Europe is also slowly declining. 
When comparing the path followed in Belgium, we notice that it differs 
significantly from other countries in Europe, or the world, where fiber-based 
access networks are already operational or being deployed. In the Netherlands or 
France, for example, the alternative operators Reggefiber and Free started 
nationwide FTTH rollouts, while Portugal Telecom is upgrading VDSL to all-
optical networks. In rural communities, state aid is used for deployment, thereby 
reducing digital divide. As this study aims to go beyond the Belgian borders, this 
section links the observed trends of this chapter to more general trends observed 
in Europe, based on the conclusions drawn on a comparison of twelve countries 
[2.60]. By focusing on specific case studies, this view will be extended to the 
worldwide situation in FTTH in chapter 4. 
2.4.1 Different technical roads 
As mentioned above, Belgium having (almost) no FTTH networks is rather an 
exception in Europe. The gradual upgrade for both DSL and DOCSIS based 
networks stands in clear contrast with for instance most East European countries, 
where PSTN networks only covered parts of the population, and where CA-TV 
networks are also limited, or only seen as broadcast network, i.e. the switch to 
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broadband networks was never (successfully) made. As in these countries, the 
investment choice now lies between deploying FTTH and deploying DSL, most 
(if not all) initiatives prefer the future-proof fiber solution, as the investment for 
both types of networks is comparable. 
In the Western European countries, different trajectories are observed, ranging 
from gradual upgrades from ADSL to VDSL to FTTH (as seen in the example of 
Portugal, see also further in section 4.2.4), over Fiber-to-the-Building 
deployments where existing cabling in apartments is reused (e.g. in Munich, 
Germany), to full FTTH deployments (e.g. in Amsterdam and other cities in the 
Netherlands – section 4.2.3.a). 
Observing these different technical trajectories across Europe, asks for an 
adjusted approach when analyzing the business case for FTTH rollout, thereby 
taking into account the evolutionary (gradual upgrade) or revolutionary 
(greenfield FTTH rollout) approach. Furthermore, the choice between Point-to-
Point (P2P) and Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) deployments (see section 3.2.1 for 
more information) is an important technical decision to be made. 
2.4.2 Alternative investors and impact of uptake 
Following the historical development of the creation of the CA-TV networks by 
the municipalities in geographically distinct cable networks in Flanders, and the 
later merging of those intercommunales, it is worthwhile to investigate whether 
municipalities will also take the lead in taking the initiative in setting up NGA 
(Next Generation Access) networks. Although this is not directly seen in 
Belgium, the impact of municipalities, and other alternative investors, is clearly 
observed in other EU countries.  
The most well-known example perhaps is the FTTH deployment by Stokab in 
Stockholm, Sweden (section 4.2.1), which is a public company founded by the 
city of Stockholm. Another example can be found in Amsterdam, where both the 
city and the housing corporations invested in a rollout (section 4.2.3.a). Other 
cases of municipal involvement can be found in Germany, where the majority of 
the investments are made by the municipal public utility companies 
(Stadtwerke). 
On the other hand, alternative providers also emerge, thereby making the case for 
private deployment. Two examples are most stringent here: Reggefiber in the 
Netherlands, using demand aggregation to ensure revenues from the start, and 
Iliad/Free in France, that used the access to the Paris sewer system to start 
deploying FTTH. 
On this range of cases, which is far from exhaustive, it can be concluded that the 
market for FTTH is no longer only dominated by the incumbent and cable 
operators, as is the case for Belgium. Multiple actors, not necessarily having 
telecom as their core business, are emerging to compete in the field. 
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Furthermore, the presence of alternative investors can shake up the available 
offers for end consumers, and hence impact the uptake for the different networks. 
As uptake has an important influence on the business case for FTTH deployment 
[2.61], the market structure and consumer preference is an important factor in the 
analysis. 
2.4.3 Strong impact of regulation and policy 
Following the historical analysis of Flanders in the previous sections, the impact 
of regulations is significant. The asymmetric regulation of BIPT in the beginning 
period of Telenet is said to have avoided a bankruptcy and hence ensured 
competition in the broadband market. More recently, the unbundling obligation 
on the DSL network was expanded to the DOCSIS network, thereby hoping to 
ensure competition on wholesale level as well. 
These are just a few examples from Belgium that demonstrate the influence of 
policy decisions in the telecommunications domain. When comparing it to other 
countries in Europe, more examples can be found: the functional separation of 
British Telecom in the UK, the obligation for sharing the in-building wiring in 
France and Poland, the regulatory unbundling holiday in Portugal, etc. 
Furthermore, policy has a strong impact on who is allowed to deploy NGA 
networks, on different hierarchical levels. On a European level, for example, 
state aid rules dictate where public involvement in deployments is allowed 
(section 4.1.2.a). 
Following these examples, it is clear that the policy level can have a significant 
impact on the business case evaluation, ranging from direct involvement, over 
financial aid to laws and guidelines for operators to follow, and should therefore 
be included in the analysis of FTTH deployment. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
Following the broader, European analysis, it is clear that answering the question 
on how the need for higher broadband will be covered is not straightforward. 
Technological variety of solutions, be it on topology (P2P versus P2MP), 
architecture (e.g. Active or Passive Optical Network - AON or PON) or upgrade 
approach (evolutionary versus revolutionary), makes a standard economic 
analysis fall short. The impact of multiple actors, both public and private, as well 
as the amount of policy laws, directives and guidelines, on different hierarchical 
levels, is of even bigger importance. Hence, our research question is thus not 
only of technological nature, but involves multiple actors, and depends strongly 
on historical developments and market settings, in both legacy networks and 
policy laws. Solving the question therefore requires looking beyond typical 
economic investment techniques, as well as beyond standard technological 
solutions. Multiple public and private entities will take decisions on different 
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domains, thereby influencing the business case for FTTH deployment, as well as 
each other.  
By investigating the goals and targets of these multiple actors, as well as their 
costs, benefits and cooperation mechanisms, conclusions can be reached about 
the way to analyze the FTTH investment problem.   
2.5 Technology – Policy – Market (TPM)  
interaction framework 
Although the development of new products and services is facilitated by 
technology, they only make it into the market when demand for them has built 
up. Similarly, if market dynamics do not provide enough incentives for operators 
to, for instance, adopt new technologies and upgrade the networks, government 
intervention in the form of acts, laws or regulation could be justified. Finally, 
markets don’t develop or evolve independent from policy decisions or 
technological innovations. These statements are true in general, for multiple 
types of projects, but have been proven to be of significant importance in the 
FTTH investment research question as well. Before evaluating the business case 
for FTTH (evaluating economic viability by comparing costs with potential 
revenues), a thorough analysis of these different domains and their interactions is 
needed to be able to set the right boundary conditions. In a second step, these 
conditions can be used to evaluate the business case for FTTH, using both 
standard and extended evaluation techniques. 
 
As such, following the argumentation followed above, the road and barriers to 
FTTH should be investigated within a framework that uses these three domains: 
technology, policy and market. Following the research by Melody [2.62], who 
identified the impact of technology through applications, the impact of markets 
through services and the impacts of policy through the regulations, this book will 
use the interaction between technology, policy and the market to sketch the 
underlying conditions that make up the business case for FTTH deployment, 
uptake and operations (Figure 2-8). 
 
The technology pillar groups all innovations, both in network upgrades and 
applications and services development, not limited to the telecom sector only. 
Within the scope of FTTH networks, it includes the choice of network topology 
(Point-to-Point or Point-to-Multipoint), network architecture (Active Ethernet or 
Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON)), deployment method (aerial or 
buried), equipment innovations (e.g. on network or customer side), etc. 
Policy comprises all laws, guidelines, regulations and directives that impact the 
deployment of FTTH either directly or indirectly. They can be made on local, 
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regional, national or international level. Examples include wholesale price 
regulation, competition law, Digital Agenda guidelines, etc. 
The third and final pillar, the market, combines all commercial and strategic 
decisions, both by the end-user and by the industry players itself. Examples 
include the customer’s decision to take up on a fiber connection, the SP’s service 
offers in terms of speeds and caps and the FTTH platform’s wholesale tariff 
structure.  
By focusing on the decisions made by actors in the three different pillars of the 
framework, the effect of their decisions on the other pillars can be studied, and 
possible interaction identified. 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Technology - Policy - Market Interaction Framework 
The following chapters will apply this framework: chapter 3 will discuss the 
technological pillar, while focusing on open access FTTH networks, while 
chapter 4 will describe the boundary conditions set by the market and policy 
pillar. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Starting by the evolution of PSTN (telephone) and CA-TV (broadcast) networks, 
this chapter provided the overview of historic developments of broadband 
networks in Flanders, Belgium. Developments of two separate networks, both 
capable of offering broadband access, led to the current situation of fixed 
telecommunications in Flanders, where one DSL and one DOCSIS operator 
Market''' '''Policy
Technology
Process'or'Issue
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compete for customers in a duopoly setting. Leaning on the historical 
developments in Flanders, and comparing to other European countries, leads to 
the conclusion that FTTH is the future for Next-Generation Access networks, but 
that the investment decision is hard, which leads to different paths that are 
followed by different actors across different countries. The deployment is 
moreover not only a technological decision, but is strongly influenced by market 
evolutions and policy decisions. To study the business case for FTTH, one 
should therefore make use of a technology-policy-market interaction to clearly 
define the boundary conditions for different settings, and focus not only on inter-
platform, but also on intra-platform competition in a multi-actor setting when 
evaluating the business case. 
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3  
Technical possibilities for deploying 
an open FTTH network 
“It turns out that all Netflix streaming peak on Saturday night can fit 
inside a single fiber optic, which is the size of one human hair.”  
- Reed Hastings 
Following the developments described in the previous chapter, the 
telecommunications sector has experienced many evolutions, on technological, 
policy and market domains. This chapter will focus on the technological 
evolutions in the telecom domain, while chapter 4 will detail the important 
boundary conditions set by policy decisions and market evolutions. This chapter 
relies on the work done in [3.1]-[3.3], but is only descriptive in nature. The 
resulting analyses in terms of costs will follow in the next chapters. 
The starting point of this chapter is based on the penetration of fiber throughout 
the network structure: from core over metro and aggregation to, more recently, 
fiber-based access networks, more commonly referred to as Fiber-to-the-Home 
(FTTH). FTTH is the most future-proof technology for the deployment of Next-
Generation Access networks. It is therefore important to understand the technical 
characteristics of these FTTH networks. Here, the well-known protocol stack, 
consisting of five layers, will be used to describe the different responsibilities in 
the FTTH access network, which will be each assigned to different entities: the 
service provider (SP), the network provider (NP) and the physical infrastructure 
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provider (PIP). The latter is responsible for the passive network (trenches, ducts, 
fibers); the NP for the active network (end-to-end equipment in central office and 
customer premises) and the SP for the services and applications offered using the 
NP’s end-to-end connectivity. As this work researches the business case of the 
network deployment itself, not the applications offered on top, the focus will lie 
on the description of the responsibilities of PIP and NP only. 
As recent trends (see chapter 2) show that these entities move from one company 
taking up all responsibilities, to a divided model in which each entity is taken up 
by one single, or multiple competing, firm(s), the business case evaluation of 
FTTH should be split up, not only economically, but also technically. In order 
for multiple parties to collaborate, extra equipment, process or transaction steps 
might be needed. The cost of these steps is often referred to as “the cost of 
collaboration” or “the cost of open access” – following the open access business 
models which will be described in the following chapter.  
A second part in this technological chapter focuses on describing the different 
forms of collaboration, i.e. between an SP and an NP on the one side, and 
between an NP and a PIP on the other, resulting in different types of opening the 
network. The impact on the technological offer of opening at fiber layer, 
wavelength layer and bitstream layer will be discussed, whereas the cost for 
opening at these layers will be evaluated in chapter 7. 
3.1 The penetration of fiber through the network 
Transmitting signals using light pulses originated not too long after the invention 
of the telephone, in the form of the Photophone (1880, Alexander Graham Bell) 
[3.3]. However, apart from a few specific uses, such as guiding ships, true optical 
communications did not develop at the same speed as electrical communication 
did. As fiber cables use the total internal reflection of light to transport signals, 
they allow high transmitting speeds, and hence provide for an alternative to 
twisted pair copper and coaxial cables.  
Fiber cables consist of a glass core encapsulated in a cladding material with a 
lower refraction index. To transmit signals over a fiber medium, there is a need 
for convertors of electrical to optical signals and vice versa, at the source and 
destination of the link, respectively. At the source node, a laser diode serves as 
the transmitter of the light pulses, thereby serving as electrical-to-optical 
convertor. At the destination node, the optical-to-electrical conversion is 
executed by a photo-diode, thus serving as a receiver of the optical signal. This is 
graphically represented in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Transmission of signals through optical fiber 
By the 1960s, fibers were used for medical imaging, but the attenuation (which 
at that time was close to one decibel per meter) was considered to be too lossy 
for use in communications on greater distances. Attenuation is the reduction of 
the intensity of the light beam as the distance the beam travels increases, and 
hence decreases the maximum length that can be covered in a link. However, the 
huge information-carrying capacity of fibers (reported as “equivalent to about 
200 TV channels and 200,000 telephone channels” by Kao in Laser Focus 
(edition April 1, 1966) [3.5]), supported the research to reduce this attenuation 
loss. By 1970, Corning Glass Works announced they could produce fiber with an 
attenuation below 20 dB/km. By 1980, Bell Labs announced the installation of 
the first transatlantic fiber-optic cable, with an attenuation of below 0.5dB/km. 
This first cable introduced fiber-optic technology in the telecommunications 
domain, and was able to transmit 565 Mbps through two operating fiber pairs (in 
1988) [3.3]. This capacity was enhanced by the introduction of optical amplifiers 
and transmission at multiple parallel wavelengths (see further for an explanation 
of so-called wavelength division multiplexing). For example, the submarine 
cables installed in 1998 could transmit up to 20 Gbps (Gigabits per second) 
through a single pair of fibers. 
These fast evolutions in transmitting capacity of fiber-optic cables, as well as the 
increasing demand for higher data rates at the nodes of the network (the end 
user), sparked the interest to install fiber closer to the end user, in the access 
network and even the customer premises (Figure 3-2).  
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Figure 3-2: The structure of the telecommunications network 
The core network connects countries and continents over large distances, 
frequently using submarine cables. Its topology is strongly meshed, and the 
newest, fastest technologies are used to transmit huge amounts of data over thick 
cable bundles. This is the first part of the network where fiber-optic cables were 
used, as described above. Nowadays, wavelength division multiplexing (WDM, 
see further) is used to transmit multiple parallel signals over different 
multiplexed wavelengths on one fiber. The current challenge is to reach over 100 
Gbps on one wavelength channel, thereby reaching up to 8 Tbps (Terabits per 
second) per fiber over 80 channels. 
The core or backbone network is connected to specified nodes of the metro 
network (so called Internet Exchanges – e.g. Ams-IX in Amsterdam). This metro 
(or metropolitan) network connects cities, or larger areas within cities, in less 
densely, though meshed networks. Frequently, ring structures are used to connect 
the network nodes (referred to as central offices). At the time of this writing, 
most/all of the metro networks are constructed out of optic-fiber cables. Typical 
is the use of WDM and 10 Gbps channels. 
The next part of the network is the access, which connects the metro nodes 
(central offices) to the buildings, be it single homes, businesses or multi-dwelling 
units. In the latter part, an intermediate network is added: the in-building 
network, before going into the Local Area Networks (LANs) of the single 
homes. The access network is typically built up as a tree structure, where 
redundancy is limited to the connections of business users, mostly in a ring 
structure. Figure 3-3 gives a more detailed overview of this tree structure in the 
access network: a feeder cable connects the central office (CO) to multiple 
core metro access building home
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aggregation points (street cabinets – SC), from which a distribution cable runs to 
the single homes. Note that, although only one level of street cabinets is shown 
here, multiple levels are possible, each time aggregating multiple cables. Typical 
data rates in the access network range from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps per end user. 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Overview of the access network 
Over the years, multiple technologies were used in the access network, the main 
differentiator being the physical medium used for transmission: twisted copper 
pair, coaxial cable, optical fiber or wireless spectrum. We will only describe the 
evolution of the wired media, as this is the focus of this research. 
In the case of twisted pair copper networks, the evolution of the DSL technology 
has to be described (Figure 3-4). As noted in section 2.2, the first broadband 
offered on these networks was ADSL, introduced by Belgacom in 1998. 
Nowadays, more than three quarters of Belgian households are covered with 
VDSL2, offering data rates up to 50 Mbps (downstream, see further), while 
future evolutions of VDSL will allow for even higher speeds. VDSL2 vectoring 
is a noise-cancelling technology that will allow to use VDSL2 at its theoretical 
data rates, which will lead to rates of 100 Mbps and beyond to be transmitted on 
twisted copper pairs. Belgacom opts for this upgrade, because it will bring high 
data rate broadband to the end-consumer in a fast and cost-effective way. Tests 
of VDSL2 vectoring started at the end of 2012, and VDSL2 vectoring was 
officially introduced in February 2014, thereby offering download rates of up to 
70 Mbps. 
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Apart from vectoring, other technological upgrades on VDSL are possible to 
boost bandwidth capabilities. In VDSL bonding, two physical twisted pairs to 
each customer are used instead of one which almost doubles the data rate. As 
there are however little spare copper pairs in Belgium, it is unlikely that this 
upgrade can be implemented for every customer. Phantoming adds a third – 
virtual – twisted pair, which would bring data rates up to 200 Mbps to each 
individual household. However, Alcatel Lucent has recently halted phantoming 
research [3.8], [3.9].  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Evolution of download data rates versus distance from 
exchange/cabinet for the different DSL types (based on data from [3.6] and [3.7]) 
Important in this evolution is the “shift” in the access network, where a clear 
trend of increasing data rates is supplemented with a clear decrease in distance 
the twisted copper pair can span. With each new technology that is introduced, 
the fiber cable is hence brought closer to the end user.  
A similar evolution can be found in the HFC networks, which are operated by 
cable operators (e.g. Telenet in Flanders). By introducing new versions of the 
DOCSIS standard and reducing the service areas, data rates are increased. As the 
attenuation of coaxial cable networks is much lower than twister pair copper 
cables, the speed evolution on the DOCSIS network precedes the evolution on 
the DSL network (see also section 2.2). 
 
As the access network gets more and more “fibered up”, the technology moves 
from DSL- or DOCSIS-based to fiber-based, and hence does the naming. In 
general, three types of fiber-based access networks are currently distinguished: 
Fiber-to-the-Cabinet or Fiber-to-the-Curb (FTTC), Fiber-to-the-Building 
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(FTTB), and Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH, also referred to as Fiber-to-the-Premises 
(FTTP)).  
In FTTC, the fiber runs from the central office (CO) to the street cabinet (SC), 
while the rest of the connection relies on twisted copper pair or coaxial cable. 
FTTC is thus the same as DSL (ADSL or VDSL depending on the distance from 
the cabinet to the home), and DOCSIS, in which the size of the service area 
determines the coaxial sub-loop. FTTB draws the fiber all the way to the 
basement of multi-dwelling units, from where existing cabling connects to the 
individual living units. FTTH finally, connects the single homes or living units 
with optical fiber, removing the need for legacy cabling. Inside the living unit, 
wireless connections are now most frequently used to connect individual devices, 
although future applications could require fiber to every room. Current in-house 
wireless nodes are capable of transmitting speeds of 300-450 Mbps (shared 
among all users in the house), which suffices when compared to typical access 
speeds of 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps. In-house fiber cables will therefore only be 
needed when the access network capabilities go well beyond 1 Gbps. 
Recently, telecom vendors have researched more intermediate solutions, such as 
G.fast, which brings fiber to the distribution point (located between the cabinet 
and the building) [3.10]. 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Overview of different flavors of fiber-based access networks 
As this dissertation focuses on evaluating the business case for FTTH, we will 
focus on the different topologies and architectures of this flavor only, although 
FTTC and FTTB can be treated similarly. 
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3.2 Different responsibilities within one network 
The functioning of a network, and thus the interaction between its nodes, is often 
abstracted in a layered model, in which each layer uses the functionalities offered 
by the lower layer. There are two commonly used methods for representing the 
layered structure of the Internet: Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) [3.11] and 
the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) model [3.12], but 
we will use here a hybrid model: the protocol stack [3.13] (Figure 3-6). 
The application layer controls the services and applications the end consumers 
directly use. This layer is responsible for exchanging messages between 
applications, running on different end systems. The second layer, the transport 
layer, transports data segments along a path that is set up between two end-users, 
thereby guaranteeing delivery and control against errors.  The most well-known 
protocol on the transport layer is TCP. The next layer is the network layer, which 
operates the IP protocol. This layer ensures end-to-end connectivity and transfers 
datagrams from sources to destinations. Transfers from one network entity to a 
neighboring entity are the responsibility of the link layer, while the physical 
layer transfers raw bits. 
 
 
Figure 3-6: Different representations of the layered character of 
telecommunications networks (based on [3.14]) 
In chapter 2, it became clear that the deployment of FTTH is frequently 
postponed by incumbents, and showed that multiple, different entities are 
claiming their part in the FTTH rollout. As not all entities take up all levels of 
responsibility, the business case evaluation for FTTH should be split up, 
evaluating the strategic decisions for different levels of responsibility separately. 
In general, three generic roles can be defined on a business level (Figure 3-7). 
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Figure 3-7: Business roles mapped on network layers in the access network 
 
The Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP) is responsible for the physical 
layer: obtaining Right of Way (RoW, the right to open up the streets) and 
performing the digging works itself, installing ducts and fibers or blowing the 
fibers afterwards. The PIP can also take care of other passive infrastructure, such 
as the housing of the Central Office (CO), installation of empty racks, 
provisioning of man- and handholes and so on.  
The Network Provider (NP) deploys and operates all the active equipment 
necessary to provide an end-to-end connectivity between the customers and the 
CO. They install specific equipment at the CO and at the customer’s premises 
and are responsible for the other network equipment (e.g. switches) in between. 
When an end-to-end connectivity is present, the Service Provider (SP) can use 
the active network to offer services and applications. His responsibility is to 
install the service-specific equipment (e.g. a set-up box for digital television) and 
to send the right content and applications to its subscribers. 
 
This allocation of network layers to conceptual roles was based on two 
parameters: the distinction between active and passive on the one hand, and the 
network dependency on the other. The PIP only deploys passive infrastructure, 
thus only taking up the physical layer. All network-specific, active equipment in 
deployed and operated by the NP, hence the choice for data link, network and 
transport layer. The SP, finally, is agnostic about the underlying network 
topology and technology, but only considers the end points, hence the choice of 
only allocating the application layer. 
 
Application
Transport
Network
Data2Link
Physical
Service2Provider
Network2Provider
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The following paragraphs of this section will describe the different topologies 
and architectures for FTTH for the PIP and the NP, respectively. As mentioned 
in the introduction of this chapter, the analysis for the SP falls outside the scope 
of this research and will therefore not be taken into account.  
3.2.1 Physical Infrastructure Provider 
The PIP is responsible for the deployment of the passive infrastructure, and is 
hence only interested in the layout – or topology – of the network, i.e. the 
structure in which the trenches are dug and the cables are laid. In general, only 
two topologies exist within the tree-based deployment of an access network: a 
Point-to-Point (P2P) and a Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP) network (Figure 3-8). 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Graphical representation of the P2P and P2MP topology 
In the P2P topology, a dedicated fiber connects each end user (household or 
business) to the central office, while a P2MP scenario connects each user with an 
individual fiber to a flexibility point (street cabinet), after which the different 
signals are aggregated on one fiber to the central office. The P2P topology has 
the highest fiber count (number of fibers equals the number of end users), and 
hence a higher deployment cost, but offers on the other hand a full fiber’s 
capacity to each end user, whereas this capacity is split amongst multiple users in 
the P2MP topology. 
3.2.2 Network Provider 
The NP is responsible for providing end-to-end connectivity, and therefore needs 
to install equipment at the network’s side (central office), in the field (at the 
flexibility points, or also referred to as (street) cabinets, aggregation points or 
remote nodes) and at the customer’s premises. Independent of what technology is 
used in the field (e.g. TDM or WDM aggregation, see further), the line should be 
terminated at both endpoints, using an Optical Line Terminal (OLT) at the 
network’s side and an Optical Network Unit (ONU) at the user’s side. An OLT 
performs conversion between the incoming signals received from the service 
P2P P2MP
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provider’s equipment to the signals used in the optical network and coordinates 
the multiplexing between the ONUs. An ONU performs conversion between the 
incoming optical signal from an optical network and the in-house cabling at the 
customer’s premises. An Optical Network Terminal (ONT) is a special case of 
an ONU that serves a single subscriber. 
 
Figure 3-9: Downstream and upstream directions of traffic in the access network 
Because the traffic is bidirectional, both OLT and ONU consist of a transmitter 
(laser diode) and receiver (photo diode). The traffic that flows from the OLT to 
the ONU typically takes up the largest part of the traffic and is referred to as 
downstream. The other direction – from ONU to OLT – carries the upstream 
traffic (Figure 3-9). 
Applications that demand high data rates are mostly video-based. Broadcast 
High Definition (HD) television requires 8-15 Mbps downstream, and new 4K 
and 8K video with or without 3D will require 100-300 Mbps downstream, 
although 8K video is not commercially available yet for residential users. High 
upstream traffic consuming applications are video conferencing and uploading of 
data in e.g. the cloud. 
To transmit both downstream and upstream traffic in between OLTs and ONUs, 
a multitude of technologies can be used. In general, a distinction is made 
between passive optical networks (PON) and active optical networks (AON) 
[3.15]. The main difference between these two types is the presence of active 
equipment in the outside plant (meaning between the central office and the 
customer’s premises): AON relies on active equipment in the flexibility point(s), 
while in PONs, only passive components, such as splitters or arrayed waveguide 
gratings (AWGs, see further), are needed there. As such, there is no need to 
provide energy supply to the flexibility point(s) in a PON, thereby avoiding the 
extra costs of powering and maintaining active equipment in the field. Note that 
we mention here both single and multiple flexibility points, as the signal can be 
aggregated at one or multiple stages. 
OLT ONU
CO SC
downstream
upstream
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3.2.2.a Passive Optical Networks 
When using a PON, only passive components are used in the field to aggregate 
the signal of multiple end users. The main advantages of these passive 
components are that they don’t require electrical energy or regular maintenance. 
Multiple types of aggregation possibilities exist, of which two will be discussed 
here: Time Division Multiplexing (TDM), which is the most commonly used in 
operational deployments, and Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM), which 
is widely used in core networks and is slowly finding its way into access as well. 
TDM-PON (Figure 3-10a) allocates different time slots to the end users, which 
the latter can use to send and receive their data packets. The allocation of time 
slots happens in the central office and requires precise synchronization of the 
packet transmission instants of the ONUs. The power splitter at the flexibility 
point is passive, it only aggregates the signals coming from the different ONUs 
(upload traffic) and sends the downstream traffic originating from the OLT side 
to all ONUs. The ONUs decide which data to receive based on the same 
allocated time slots. The OLT is shared by multiple ONUs (and hence end users), 
which reduces the available capacity per end user. Typical power splitting ratios 
are 1:16, 1:32, 1:64 or 1:128 as a practical upper bound in today’s deployments. 
GPON (Gigabit PON) and EPON (Ethernet PON) are the most commonly used 
TDM-PONs at the moment. GPON is considered the preferred technology of 
most incumbent operators deploying FTTH (e.g. Portugal Telecom, see also the 
cases in chapter 4), while EPON is mainly used by Asian operators (e.g. as China 
Telecom [3.16]). Typical downstream data rates of 1Gbps (EPON) and 2.5Gbps 
(GPON) can be achieved on the feeder fiber (and are shared amongst all users 
aggregated on a splitter). By increasing the processing speed and upgrading the 
transceivers, the capacity can be increased to 10/2.5Gbps (down/up) in XG-PON 
and even to 40/10Gbps (down/up) in future technologies such as XLG-PON. 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Schematical representation of the aggregation techniques in PONs 
The second aggregation technique, WDM, makes use of an AWG to demultiplex 
the feeder fiber signal (in between the OLT and the flexibility point) in different 
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wavelengths (amount depending on the wavelength spacing, varying between 16 
to 160, with 32 as the most commonly used in today’s access networks [3.17]) 
(Figure 3-10b). Each customer then receives one or multiple dedicated 
wavelengths (if one output port of the AWG is connected to one user, each user 
will receive its own dedicated wavelength). In upstream direction, the different 
ONU wavelengths are multiplexed by the same AWG. The main advantage of 
the WDM technique is that it generates independent channels, thereby increasing 
the security of the communication. The disadvantage is that each ONU needs a 
wavelength-specific laser diode, which can transmit the signal to the AWG at the 
assigned wavelength, but is very costly too (great loss of economies of scale in 
production and more complicated maintenance). As a solution, colorless (non-
wavelength specific) ONUs may be used, to which a tunable (adjustable to the 
right wavelength) in-field multiplexer to cut out the right part of the spectrum 
must be added. This of course reduces the cost (economies of scale), but also 
decreases the available optical power, which limits the reach of the system. 
As mentioned above, because of cost considerations, WDM systems these days 
are rarely used in access networks (e.g. South Korea, UNET in the Netherlands), 
but already widely deployed in core and metro networks. Future implementations 
could furthermore combine both TDM and WDM concepts in hybrid 
architectures, which use the advantages of both. Whereas WDM increases the 
capacity by allowing to transmit data signals using multiple wavelengths over 
one single fiber, it does not optimize the network utilization. As the usage of the 
Internet capacity follows the Pareto principle (80% of traffic is generated by 20% 
of the users), it makes sense to combine the parallel wavelength capacity with the 
efficient utilization of this capacity that TDM offers. This TWDM-PON 
architecture combines both AWGs and power splitters (Figure 3-11) and is the 
primary solution for the NG-PON2 range, which is currently being standardized 
[3.18]. 
 
 
Figure 3-11: Schematical representation of combining TDM and WDM 
aggregation techniques into TDWM PON 
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3.2.2.b Active Optical Networks 
AONs use active equipment to direct the signals to the right end users. The 
difference can be made between an active star architecture (on top of a P2MP 
passive infrastructure) and a home run architecture (on top of a P2P topology) 
(Figure 3-12). 
 
Figure 3-12: AON architectures: Home Run network and Active Star network 
In an active star architecture, a shared feeder fiber sends all aggregated traffic to 
a flexibility point, in which active equipment (e.g. an Ethernet switch) then 
transmits the right data to the intended end user. In a home run architecture, all 
the active equipment is located in the central office, from which a dedicated fiber 
connects to each house. As there is no aggregation of signals in the field, there is 
in theory no need for flexibility points, although they are frequently installed for 
ease of deployment and maintenance. 
To conclude this section, Table 3-1 gives an overview of the considered 
architectures. 
Table 3-1: Overview of parameters of considered architectures 
Architecture Downstream speed Upstream speed 
Ethernet P2P 1 Gbps 1 Gbps 
EPON 1 Gbps 1 Gbps 
GPON 2.5 Gbps 1.25 Gbps 
XG-PON 10 Gbps 2.5 Gbps 
XLG-PON 40 Gbps 10 Gbps 
WDM PON 1 Gbps (per λ) 1 Gbps (per λ) 
TWDM PON 40 Gbps 10 Gbps 
... ...
CO CO
...
...
Home Run Network Active Star Network
Active Optical Network
1:1
1:1
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3.3 Opening the network on different layers 
While the previous section focused on the specific responsibilities of PIP and NP 
separately, this section will describe the extra features that are necessary if the 
different business roles are executed by different entities. Parts of the network 
will as such be shared by entities operating on a higher layer, and the network 
can be referred to as “open”. The part of the network where multiple providers 
(NPs or SPs) are brought together on the same device (e.g. Optical Distribution 
Frame or ODF, splitter, etc.) is referred to as the provisioning interface, what is 
offered to the higher layer is called the provisioned element. 
Three types of opening the network can be identified: at the fiber, wavelength 
and bitstream layer.  
Opening at the fiber layer means that different parallel fibers are available in the 
same cable / trench infrastructure, so that each user is connected by a dedicated 
fiber (feeder and/or distribution fiber, depending on the topology, see further), 
and as such can choose NPs. The provisioned element is the fiber. The network 
is opened at the PIP level. This model allows NP competition. The main 
disadvantage of opening at the fiber layer is the higher fiber count. 
Opening at the wavelength layer means that the end users can select NPs based 
on different available wavelengths. The provisioned element is the wavelength 
and the model is opened on top of the PIP level. Note that the mapping between 
customers and the wavelengths required to reach them is dependent on the 
architectural design. In order to allow a user to connect to multiple NPs 
simultaneously, multiple transceivers are required. Those form the provisioning 
interface. This model allows NP competition.  
Opening at the bitstream level means that there is a provisioned element on the 
network layer 2 or layer 3. Here, the network is opened at the NP level, so that 
SP competition is allowed. This way of opening the network has lower 
complexity (no problems arise from the co-existence of multiple operators’ 
equipment), albeit that it only allows competition amongst SPs, not amongst 
NPs.  
For each of the three types, a qualitative description will be given below. 
3.3.1 Opening on fiber layer 
Opening of the fiber layer allows multiple NPs on top of one PIP. Hereby, the 
PIP is responsible for the passive infrastructure, meaning the trenches, ducts, 
fibers and passive equipment like power splitters in the street cabinets. 
As the type of opening on fiber layer is influenced by the topology that is being 
used in an FTTH network, this section will make a distinction between P2P and 
P2MP topologies, where the latter only considers time-division multiplexed 
(TDM) architectures (e.g. GPON, which is the most used TDM flavor). 
Theoretically, there is no upper limit to the number of competing NPs in fiber 
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open access but the assumption was made that never more than five network 
providers will be active in the same geographical area at the same point in time. 
This follows the study of existing fiber deployments (see chapter 4). 
3.3.1.a Point-to-Point access network 
Within a P2P network, a dedicated fiber runs from the central office to the end 
user. All the active equipment and supporting equipment is stored within the 
central office. The PIP will provide a general layout to put all the necessary 
equipment. This consists of the needed floor space, an Optical Distribution 
Frame (ODF) to terminate the incoming fibers, cooling equipment and system 
racks. On the other hand, the NP will provide all the active equipment. The NP 
will place different OLTs to ensure the communication to the end user, alongside 
an Ethernet Aggregation Switch (EAS) at the Point of Interconnect (POI), to 
which the SP can connect its router (see further). At the customer’s side, the NP 
installs an ONU, to which the SP’s Residential Gateway (RGW – which is 
service-specific) can be connected (the case for bitstream layer 2, see further). 
Figure 3-13 shows the impact of opening up the network. The difference 
between the single and multi-NP network when it comes to a P2P network, only 
lies within the central office. Here an extra patch panel has to be installed to 
connect the different NPs to the different dedicated fibers. This cross-connect 
allows for connecting the right NP to the right end user as it will function as a 
cross-bridge between the fiber termination side of the PIP and the system side of 
the NP. The equipment of the NP should furthermore be installed in fully 
separated racks with access control mechanism in order to prevent physical 
tampering of other parties’ equipment. At the end users’ premises no extra 
equipment will be needed.  
 
Figure 3-13: Opening on fiber layer for a P2P topology 
3.3.1.b Point-to-Multipoint access network: GPON 
The second topology for the access network is P2MP. In this network, there is 
only a dedicated fiber between the end users and the street cabinet. From the 
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street cabinet onwards to the central office, there are only a limited number of 
feeder fibers, each of them corresponding to one single NP. Hence, the 
maximum number of NPs per geographical area is limited to the number of 
feeder fibers that serve the street cabinets; in realistic scenarios this maximum is 
around five. As an example, in the case of a fiber network with two feeder fibers, 
this means that each end user within a geographical area can only choose 
between two NPs. 
As a reference, we will use the GPON technology, which is an example of a 
TDM-PON, on top of the P2MP topology. In a TDM-PON, power splitters 
located at the street cabinets will distribute the downstream and aggregate the 
upstream signals. Although we focus on GPON, a similar reasoning can be 
followed for implementing an open network on fiber layer on other TDM-PON 
technologies (e.g. EPON, XGPON [3.21]).  
The effect of opening the network on fiber layer for a P2MP topology becomes 
clear from inspecting Figure 3-14. The main impact of open access is located at 
the street cabinets (flexibility points). Alongside each NP specific feeder fiber a 
NP-specific power splitter will have to be installed in the street cabinets. In case 
an end user wants to connect to a certain NP or wants to switch between different 
NPs, next to a change on ONU and OLT side, the dedicated fiber from the end 
users premises to the street cabinet will need to be (re)connected to the right 
NP’s splitter. Note that, although the figure indicates only one stage of splitters, 
it is possible to have multiple stages as well (e.g. a 1:32 split divided in a 
cascaded 1:4 and 1:8 split). The splitters then need to be duplicated for the 
available NPs at all stages. 
 
Figure 3-14: Opening on fiber layer for a P2MP topology 
In case there is an imposed maximum of NPs, a different approach may be 
applied. In this case, the PIP can provide multiple distribution fibers per premise 
(one for each possible NP), either voluntarily or regulated by the government, 
which allows the switching between different NPs to occur at the end users’ 
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premises. The different distribution fibers will already be connected to the 
different NP specific splitters and a fiber switch will be installed at the end users’ 
premises. The connection to an NP or the switching to a different NP can 
therefore be made by switching to a different fiber in the switch.  This model is 
applied in Switzerland and France, where the “building operator” (the PIP 
chosen by the building owner) is obliged to deploy multiple fibers to the 
building, for each alternative operator requesting them [3.19]-[3.20]. As this 
method is not applicable everywhere, it will not be evaluated further. 
3.3.2 Opening at wavelength layer 
Next to opening at fiber layer, another type of opening exists on the interface 
between the PIP and the NP. In wavelength open access, different wavelengths 
will be assigned to different NPs. When an end user connects to a specific NP, 
the equipment of the end user should be able to receive the NP specific 
wavelength(s). In case the wavelength spectrum allows for enough 
differentiation, the use of user-specific wavelengths can be achieved. However, 
this would require tunable ONUs at the end users’ premises.  Offering opening 
on wavelength layer allows providing a dedicated channel to each end user, 
thereby making it comparable to opening on fiber layer.  
Wavelength open access is a fairly cheap and easy option (depending on 
technology), only requiring limited extra equipment to divide the wavelengths 
among the NPs on the central office side, and among the end-customers on the 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) side. The main disadvantage is that this 
way of open access is not technology-agnostic. Depending on the (T)WDM PON 
architecture and equipment used (e.g. split factor of AWG), different equipment 
should be installed, and should therefore also be replaced when switching to 
next-generation options.  
3.3.2.a Feeder fiber based wavelength open access 
The first possible architecture for wavelength open access is feeder fiber based 
wavelength open access (Figure 3-15) [3.22]. Within this architecture, each NP 
has a separate and dedicated feeder fiber to transport the signals to the AWG.  
Similar to the opening on fiber layer on top of the P2MP topology, the number of 
feeder fibers determines the maximum number of NPs. However, the signals of 
different NPs might be combined into one feeder fiber, but this leads to 
additional complexity in terms of complexity and cost through the sharing of a 
particular spectrum of wavelengths. The AWG in the street cabinet will then split 
up the signals by sending the signal with the right wavelength into the dedicated 
fiber to the end users’ premises. 
Opening at wavelength layer through feeder fiber will mostly have an impact on 
the equipment. The OLTs in the CO must be able to transmit signals at different 
wavelengths. Furthermore, an AWG must be installed to combine the signals of 
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different wavelengths into one feeder fiber. Within the street cabinet an M:N 
AWG is required, meaning that the AWG is able to take the incoming signals 
from M feeder fibers and split them towards the N outgoing fibers. Finally, at the 
end users premises, a tunable ONU will be needed in order to select the right 
wavelength of the selected NP. 
 
Figure 3-15: Opening on wavelength layer, feeder fiber based access 
3.3.2.b Wavelength open access based on manual patching 
The second type of opening at wavelength layer considers manual patching 
(Figure 3-16) [3.22]. Within this architecture, open access is realized by the 
installation of a patch panel. Also, this architecture will only have N wavelengths 
available where N equals the number of end users within a geographical area. 
When an end user wants to connect to a certain NP, the output port of the central 
AWG in the CO will be connected through the patch panel onto the 
corresponding NP-specific OLT. 
 
Figure 3-16: Opening on wavelength layer, manual patching 
Offering wavelength open access through manual patching will impact both the 
equipment to be installed and the processes to be executed. Within the CO, the 
OLTs of the different NPs must be able to transmit signals at the N different 
wavelengths. This means that every OLT must be able to transmit as many 
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different signals as there are end users within the geographical area. 
Furthermore, an additional AWG is needed to combine N different signals (one 
for each end user) onto one feeder fiber. Between this AWG and the different 
OLTs, a manual fiber patch panel will be installed. This patching panel is 
necessary so that a fiber connection can be made between the output port of the 
AWG, containing the right end user specific wavelength, and the OLT of the 
corresponding NP. Within the street cabinets, the power splitter must be replaced 
by an AWG. This AWG will split the signals for the incoming feeder fiber onto 
the right fiber towards the end user. Finally, the ONU at the end user’s premises 
must be able to receive the specific wavelength. This can be arranged through the 
use of fixed receivers. 
3.3.2.c TWDM-based wavelength open access 
The third option for wavelength open access is the use of a TWDM architecture 
(see section 3.2.2.a), in which each network provider is allocated one (or 
multiple) dedicated wavelength. On each wavelength, the network operator itself 
can deploy a TDM-based architecture, which allows to differentiate between end 
users (Figure 3-17). This wavelength open access option seems to be the most 
promising, as it does not put direct requirements on the number of feeder fibers 
and it does not require manual patching. 
Though, similar to the two previous options, the OLTs should be able to transmit 
only at specific wavelengths, ONUs should be tunable, and there is a need for an 
installation of an extra AWG in the CO. However, contrary to offering 
wavelength open access using feeder fibers or manual patching, these equipment 
requirements are not only needed for offering open access, they are part of the 
TWDM architecture. An important drawback of this TWDM option, however, is 
that the different NPs are not isolated, i.e. all signals are transmitted to all ONUs. 
A rogue ONU (misbehaving ONU – deliberate or not) could effect the service of 
another NP. 
 
Figure 3-17: Opening on wavelength layer, TWDM-based 
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Although being described here, opening on wavelength layer is not realistic yet, 
as WDM PONs are only rarely used in current operational deployments, and as 
all options described above have significant downsides (the need for manual 
patching, the extra feeder fibers or the lack of NP isolation). We will therefore 
not elaborate on opening on wavelength layer in the quantitative cost analysis of 
chapter 7. 
3.3.3 Opening at bitstream layer 
The third possibility at which the network can be opened is the bitstream layer. 
Two types exist and the classification of the different types depends on the 
specific layer of activity: on layer 2 (Ethernet) and layer 3 (IP). In this 
dissertation, we will only evaluate bitstream on layer 2. Bitstream on layer 3 can 
be handled similarly, as both come down to providing a secure bandwidth pipe. 
The main advantage of opening at bitstream layer is the low additional cost in 
comparison to opening on fiber or wavelength layer. On the other hand, the 
competing service providers only receive access to a dedicated bandwidth pipe, 
and have as such less choice in terms of functionality or control (whereas 
network providers have greater flexibility by installing their own equipment). 
Within Ethernet bitstream open access, the network is opened at layer 2, meaning 
that one NP gives access to multiple service providers on layer 2. This type of 
open access can be offered over any topology or architecture; it is technology-
agnostic in that sense that it only considers the endpoints. To gain access on 
bitstream layer, an interface needs to be provided at both the user side and the 
network side (mostly at the POI or local exchange), see Figure 3-18.  
 
Figure 3-18: Opening at bitstream layer 2 
At the end user’s side, the SP should install a residential gateway (RGW) and 
connect it to the ONU, which is installed by the chosen NP. The installation of 
the RGW does not necessarily require a physical visit from a technician. If easy 
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and well-documented, the connection and installation could be done by the end 
user itself, which will reduce costs significantly. 
There are basically two options for the connection RGW-ONU [3.23]. In the first 
option, the network provider will place the ONU while the service provider will 
place the RGW. In the second option, the equipment at the end users’ premises 
will consist of one box and this single piece of equipment will act as both the 
physical line termination and the residential gateway. This one box will be 
provided, configured and managed by the SP. Advantages of this one box 
solution are the fact that it will be cheaper, will consume less power and less 
space, and may therefore be seen as more suitable by customers. A disadvantage 
of this implementation is the fact that interoperability has to be established. It 
furthermore complicates the provisioning of services from multiple SPs. The first 
option gives a clearer separation between the different functionalities of ONU 
and RGW, and will therefore be considered first. However, the cost savings for 
using a standardized RGW will be calculated as well (see section 7.3). 
At the exchange side, access needs to be provided to both the access and the 
backhaul network. The connection of an SP to the access network is a one-time 
procedure similar to the connection of a new NP to a geographical area. The 
process is referred to as “establishing the handover point” which connects the SP 
equipment (frequently a layer 3 router) to the EAS of the NP, the latter being 
located at the POI. The establishing of the handover point occurs according to 
the MEF (Metro Ethernet Forum) External Network-Network Interface (E-NNI) 
standard and allows for a 1 Gbps or 10 Gbps interface carrying multiplexed 
traffic streams. The E-NNI is considered to be the physical and logical 
demarcation point for the offered services and is implemented at the EAS. The 
SP must ensure that there is enough backhaul capacity from the L3 router to the 
handover point. On the end user side the User Network Interface (UNI) will be 
the demarcation point. An Operator Virtual Circuit (OVC) works as the 
association between a UNI and an E-NNI. Furthermore, a certain amount of 
dedicated bandwidth can be assigned per OVC and priority can be given to 
certain types of contents. The amount of content that can be given priority 
depends on the amount of Committed Information Rate (CIR - the minimum 
bandwidth that is available to the end user’s OVC at all times) purchased by the 
SP.  
Alongside the dedicated bandwidth a difference can be made between a unicast 
and a multicast OVC. A unicast OVC refers to a single link between provider 
and end user. Here, all end users have a unique OVC and the delivered service is 
user specific. Examples include Voice over IP (VoIP) and most broadband 
Internet services, as well as Video on demand (VOD), where each end user can 
request a distinct service. A multicast OVC on the other hand, consists of a 
single root or parent transmitting the same signal to multiple children nodes. As a 
result, all end users using a multicast OVC receive the same service, e.g. IPTV. 
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As multicast transmits content simultaneously towards multiple end users, the 
data stream should be carried as far into the network as possible before 
replication, which can lead to significant bandwidth savings [3.24].  
Next to the generation of the different OVC, the SP must make sure that there is 
enough capacity from the EAS to the different OLTs in the CO. This 
connectivity is ensured through the use of a connectivity virtual circuit (CVC) 
and this virtual circuit aggregates the capacity of different OVC from the EAS to 
the designated OLT. 
When looking to a geographical area, the number of COs will be much larger 
than the number of POIs. By connecting at one of the POIs, an SP can as such 
provide services to an entire region, which is rather cost-efficient. As such, SPs 
can connect on a coverage area by coverage area basis, where each coverage area 
roughly corresponds to the households served by one POI. 
Connecting a new end user to an established SP is rather easy, and does not 
involve any manual labor. It basically comes down to a business-to-business 
interaction and only involves a software configuration: the connection of the 
right EAS port, which is a virtual port, to the right SP. As such, the cost for 
connecting a new end user, as well as the cost for churn (customers changing 
provider, see section 7.3.3) will be relatively low. Changing SPs thus involves 
the installation of a new RGW and a software configuration of the EAS-SP 
router link. Furthermore, the relative burden for the user is relatively low, no 
“staying at home for technicians to show up” is required, and outage can be as 
short as 1 hour. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Following the steady increase in consumed bandwidth in all parts of the network, 
this chapter provided an overview of the possibilities fiber brings to tackle this 
increase. After having given an overview of the different parts of the network, 
the focus shifted to fiber-based access networks, in which the different types 
were listed (FTTC, FTTB, FTTH). As business trends indicate that not all 
responsibilities within an FTTH deployment will be taken up by a single entity, 
they were split up based on the protocol stack, in three conceptual layers: the 
physical infrastructure provider (PIP), the network provider (NP) and the service 
provider (SP). For both PIP and NP, an overview of the different technical 
deployment implementations was given, where at the PIP level, the distinction 
was made between Point-to-Point and Point-to-Multipoint, whereas for the NP, 
active optical networks were compared to passive optical networks. The SP was 
not taken into account, since its activities are agnostic of the network deployed 
(only interested in the endpoints). 
Different entities taking up different roles not only have implications for the 
separate entities, it also requires additional costs in terms of equipment, 
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processes and transactions. Although this cost of collaboration will be analyzed 
in more detail in chapter 7, this chapter already listed the different possibilities of 
opening up the network, thereby sharing the underlying infrastructure. In 
between the PIP and the NP, the network can be opened at fiber or wavelength 
layer, while opening the network at bitstream layer allows collaboration in 
between the NP and multiple SPs. At fiber layer, each user is served by a 
dedicated fiber in case of a P2P topology, whereas each NP receives a dedicated 
fiber in a P2MP scenario. Two types of opening at wavelength layer were 
discussed: based on feeder fiber access and based on manual patching. However, 
since WDM is not yet common in access networks, this opening option will not 
be taken into account in the further analysis. Finally, opening on bitstream layer 
provides opportunities for collaboration between the NP and the SP, where the 
SP gets a dedicated Operator Virtual Circuit, which can be used to serve its end 
customers. 
This chapter served as the necessary technological background for understanding 
the evolutions and possibilities in the FTTH domain, and will be used in the 
analysis sections of the following chapters. 
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4  
The impact of collaboration, 
competition and regulation on the 
FTTH market 
 “People have a hard time accepting free-market economics  
for the same reason they have a hard time accepting evolution:  
it is counterintuitive. Life looks intelligently designed,  
so our natural inclination is to infer  
that there must be an intelligent designer--a God.  
Similarly, the economy looks designed, so our natural inclination is  
to infer that we need a designer--a government.  
In fact, emergence and complexity theory explains how the principles of 
self-organization and emergence cause complex systems  
to arise from simple systems without a top-down designer.” 
- Michael Shermer 
Where the previous chapter focused on the technology pillar of the TPM 
framework introduced in section 2.5, this chapter will describe the policy and 
market pillars of that framework,! as they serve as important conditions for 
setting up techno-economic models. The goal of this part of the research is to 
investigate, on a case-to-case basis, the links between the different policy and 
market characteristics of FTTH deployment, so that they can serve as inputs 
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and/or boundary conditions to the quantitative evaluations performed in the 
following chapters. First, the identified parameters and their theoretic 
foundations and background will be described, while they are applied to selected 
cases in a second step. The parameters aim at describing the surrounding 
conditions that impact the FTTH business case: the region type and scale of 
deployment, the policy conditions, the initiator and key drivers, the financing 
structure, the applied business model, and finally the existing competition. The 
case studies were chosen based on their variation in the identified parameters: a 
public dark fiber infrastructure deployment in Stockholm, Sweden; the national 
Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative in New Zealand; Google Fiber’s private 
investment supported by demand aggregation in Kansas City, USA; a Public-
Private Partnership under the Market Economy Investor’s Principle in 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands; and finally the incumbent deploying FTTH driven 
by the competitive threat of the cable operator in Portugal. By including more 
cases in a third step, this chapter ends with general conclusions about the impact 
of the market and policy pillar in FTTH deployment. The results described in this 
chapter are based on a number of publications [4.1]-[4.5], each focusing on 
different case studies. 
4.1 Defining the parameters for comparison 
Within the evolution of telecommunications access networks, the deployment of 
FTTH is a worldwide trend. However, given the huge investment needed to 
deploy new networks, traditional incumbent operators in Europe generally 
postpone the large-scale rollouts, leading to a broad range of smaller-scale 
initiatives, steered by different economic models and technological requirements. 
The different cases furthermore find themselves on different stages of 
development with one case already fully operational for several years and 
another being in a very early phase of construction. Getting to conclusions about 
the linkage between these different types of policy- and market-related 
parameters, seems therefore a right step in analyzing the overall business case for 
FTTH. 
4.1.1 Region and scale of deployment 
A first parameter denotes the region and scale of deployment. In order to link the 
cases with the quantitative results from the following chapters, three generic area 
types will be defined, based on number of households, surface and therefore also 
cable distance. The defining parameters per area type are based on average 
numbers of buildings per square km and average number of households per 
Multi-Dwelling Unit (MDU). They were discussed amongst members of the 
OASE project [4.6], so that they would represent generic areas in Europe. They 
are summarized in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Parameters for the area types (note HH = households) 
 
4.1.2 Policy conditions and constraints 
Although the mindset of all regulatory authorities is set in the same direction, 
namely towards offering broadband to all, the variety of policy measures and 
government-imposed laws, make it hard to draw general conclusions. The 
European Union, for instance, aims at achieving one single telecommunication’s 
market across Europe, which however needs to be implemented by many 
different regulatory institutions on regional, national and European level, all 
having their own rules. This section will therefore focus on the regulatory setting 
in Europe, and compare it to other best practices abroad.  
4.1.2.a Regulation in Europe 
In general, European telecommunication law consists of competition law and 
telecom-specific regulation, and aims at reaching sufficient broadband quality at 
a fair price. These goals are, amongst others, listed in the Digital Agenda [4.7]. 
This section will first give, as background information, an overview of the 
different ways to implement an obligation or guideline, to continue with the 
different measures on these levels for telecom operators in Europe, as they set 
boundary conditions to the FTTH business case. 
EU Instruments to implement legislation and objectives  
There are various instruments used by the European Commission (EC) to 
implement its objectives and goals and they have diverse degrees of 
enforceability vis-à-vis the Member States’ legislative bodies (i.e. obligation to 
follow a given instrument); thus, such instruments (treaties, directives, decisions, 
recommendations and regulations) may have a direct or indirect effect on the 
laws of the EU’s Member States.  
- Any action undertaken by the EU is founded on Treaties approved by 
the EU Member States. To achieve the target goals, legislative acts such 
as regulations, decisions, directives and recommendations are used. 
- Regulations are binding legislative acts that have to be implemented in 
their entirety across all EU Member States. For example, the EU has 
capped the maximum amount telecoms companies can charge a user for 
Area type Number of HH 
Surface 
(km2) 
Household 
density 
(HH/km2) 
Total 
trenching 
length (km) 
Trenching 
length per 
HH (m) 
Dense urban 
(DU) 
15,600  5  3,120  12,950 6.75 
Urban (UR) 8,640  24 360  14,040 19.00 
Rural (RU) 3,060  57 54  7,840 16.50 
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the roaming costs of their cellular telephone (EC Regulation No 
544/2009) [4.8].  
- Directives are, just as regulations, binding legal instruments. The main 
difference with regulation is that the transposition from European to 
national level can take into account national circumstances. In the 
Framework Directive (Directive 2002/21/EC) for instance, the EC set 
out a roadmap in establishing a harmonized regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services [4.9].  
- Decisions are binding legislative acts that are directly applicable to 
whom it is addressed (e.g. The European Commission's March 2004 
Microsoft Decision, [4.10]).  
- !Recommendations are not binding. Instead they express the known 
views of an institution. In its recommendation of 30th of March 2012 
(Action for Stability, Growth and Jobs), the EC stressed the potential of 
the ICT industry in a job-rich recovery for the EU [4.11].  
Current Regulation  
The current rules which govern the telecommunication sector in the European 
Union (EU) were set in 2002 and revised by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union. This revision entered into force on 18 December 
2009 (after two years of discussions), and has been implemented into Member 
State legislation since May 2011 [4.12].  
Currently, broadband is regulated in EU Member States by national telecoms 
regulators in order to avoid distortions of competition. However, a new 
Recommendation was put forward in October 2014, aiming at reducing ex ante 
sector-specific regulation progressively [4.13]. This Recommendation proposes 
two approaches for regulating telecom markets. In case there is a separate retail 
market, this market should be assessed on competitiveness using a forward-
looking approach. If concluded that this retail market is competitive, there is no 
need to regulate the corresponding wholesale market. 
In case of vertically linked markets, the so-called three criteria test should be 
applied on the wholesale market. This test consists of three cumulative 
conditions that should be filled before one can regulate: 
1. The presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry. Barriers can 
be structural (cost and demand conditions) or legal (legislative, 
administrative or other measures that have a direct effect on the 
conditions of entry and/or the positioning of operators in the relevant 
market). 
2. The assessment that the market structure does not tend towards effective 
competition within a relevant time horizon, including both 
infrastructure-based and other competition. Effective competition as 
such can be expressed as evidence of positive dynamics, or a “limited - 
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but sufficient - number of undertakings having diverging cost structures 
and facing price-elastic market demand”. 
3. When competition law alone is insufficient to adequately address the 
identified market failure(s). 
One important focus point of this new Recommendation, is that ex ante 
regulation should only applied on wholesale level, downstream markets should 
be competitive. Furthermore, ex ante regulation should never be applied on 
newly emerging markets, as the three criteria test is hard to apply and might 
hinder innovations. 
 
This recently published Recommendation follows the same road as has been 
taken in the C(2013) 5761 Directive on consistent non-discrimination obligations 
and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband 
investment environment [4.14]. This Directive has three main goals. 
1. By applying a non-discriminatory obligation, the Directive wants to 
assure Equivalence of Inputs and as such a fair level playing field for all 
operators. Equivalence of Inputs refers to the wholesale operator using 
exactly the same downstream products, same price, same transactional 
processes, as he offers to other retail providers. 
2. It aims at setting a predictable and stable regulated wholesale copper 
access prices by obliging the use of the BU LRIC+ (Bottom-up Long 
Run Incremental Cost Plus) approach. This approach calculates current 
costs based on forward-looking basis (based on new technologies, 
expected demand etc.) and estimates the current cost that a hypothetical 
operator would incur to build a modern and efficient NGA network. 
3. Finally, the Directive details the non-imposition of regulated wholesale 
prices for NGA services: when Equivalence of Inputs is assured and 
competitive safeguards (sufficient uptake on competitors’ offers) are in 
place, no price regulation is needed. 
The third and final relevant document, the Broadband Guidelines [4.15], outlines 
the rules and conditions on how public funding could be provided to build 
broadband networks in line with the European Union State Aid rules (see next 
section). These Guidelines provide guidance for governments and public 
authorities on how to finance very high speed, NGA networks, as well as 
addressing the funding of traditional broadband networks (like ADSL, DOCSIS, 
Wi-Fi networks).  
The main aim of the Guidelines is to facilitate a rapid deployment of NGAs in 
Europe by providing to all stakeholders (including local and regional authorities, 
as well as network operators) a clear, predictable and comprehensive framework 
for the public financing of such networks.  
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State Aid 
In case a Member State Member supports the roll-out of broadband by way of an 
equity participation or capital injection into a company that is to carry out the 
project, it becomes necessary to assess whether this investment will be regarded 
by the EU as State Aid. In principle, State Aid can play a useful role in cases 
where the market does not provide sufficient broadband coverage.  
In order for a measure to qualify as State Aid, the following cumulative 
conditions have to be met:  
1. The measure has to be granted out of State resources;  
2. it has to confer an economic advantage to undertakings;  
3. the advantage has to be selective and distort or threaten to distort 
competition;  
4. the measure has to affect intra-Community trade.  
On the other hand, there are two scenarios in which public investment is not 
regarded as State Aid in accordance with the Case-law of the European 
Communities (“ECJ”):  
" When the capital placed by the State - directly or indirectly- is at the 
disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to 
normal market conditions, it cannot be regarded as State Aid (Market 
Economy Investors Principle); 
" When the Member State may consider that the provision of a broadband 
network should be regarded as a service of general economic interest 
("SGEI") [4.15] as qualified by the Altmark5 criteria, the State funding 
may fall outside the scope of State Aid.  
In order for the EC to assess whether State Aid for NGA networks is allowed, 
black, white and grey area designations are used. Because this designation is 
mostly in the assessment of traditional broadband development, it requires a 
 
5 The four conditions to meet in accordance with the Altmark criteria, as defined in 
Article 86(2) of the Treaty of the European Community, are: (a) the beneficiary of a State 
funding mechanism for an SGEI must be formally entrusted with the provision and 
discharge of an SGEI, the obligations of which must be clearly defined; (b) the parameters 
for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand in an objective and 
transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may favor the 
recipient undertaking over competing undertakings; (c) the compensation cannot exceed 
what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the SGEI, 
taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those 
obligations; and (d) where the beneficiary is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement 
procedure, the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an 
analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in 
discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable 
profit. 
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more refined definition [4.15] to take into account the specificities of the NGA 
networks, as explained below. 
- The white area refers to an area where NGA networks do not at present 
exist and where they are not likely to be built in three years. It certainly 
includes an area where there is no basic broadband infrastructure. It also 
includes areas where only one basic broadband provider is present or 
there are several basic broadband providers. However, in the latter case, 
Member States must prove that the current services are not sufficient to 
satisfy the needs of citizens and business users and there are no less 
distortive means. Recent examples of rural areas (regarded as white 
since no broadband or NGA services were available) that have been 
deserved are Ireland and Slovenia, as per decisions no. N 607/2009 and 
N 172/2009 where the European Commission decided favorably for the 
granting of State-Aid.  
- The grey areas are areas where only one NGA network is in place or is 
being deployed in the coming three years. In order to have such State 
Aid approved by the Commission, Member States must provide 
evidence that the current or planned NGA network is not sufficient to 
satisfy the needs of citizens and business users and there are no less 
distortive means. This was the case in Appingedam [4.16], where 
various broadband offers were already provided over two existing 
networks (KPN and cable), at prices similar to those of other regions in 
the Netherlands. The measure would distort competition due to its 
discriminatory impact on existing or future private networks; 
consequently, the construction of an additional network with state 
funding would address neither a market failure nor a cohesion problem, 
so State-Aid was prohibited.  
- Finally, black areas are areas where more than one NGA network exists 
in a given area or will be deployed in the coming three years: no 
subsidies are allowed in this case.   
4.1.2.b Asia Pacific 
Where Europe applies clear rules about state aid, only allowing it in certain 
geographical areas, the regions of Asia and the Pacific (comprising of Australia, 
New Zealand and the surrounding islands) have clearly another view on 
government involvement. In both Australia and New Zealand, the government 
initiated a national broadband project, with significant financial involvement of 
the State. Telecom law is therefore partly taken out of the hand of the national 
regulator, as (wholesale) prices for the NGA network were set by the 
government. In New Zealand, other specifications of the contracts the 
government concluded with the deployment partners included open access 
obligations, thereby forbidding the deployment partner to act as a retail provider 
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(see further in section 4.2.2). In Australia, the project dictated that the new 
network would replace the incumbent’s one, in which policy thus sets the rules 
for a monopolistic infrastructure. 
Asia is clearly leading the deployment of high-speed fiber access networks: 
Japan and Korea showing up as top countries in most coverage and uptake 
graphs. Laws vary significantly from country to country (e.g. regulation favoring 
inter-platform competition in Korea versus intra-platform competition in Japan, 
see also section 4.1.6), but public involvement is not as restricted as in Europe. 
4.1.2.c United States of America 
Regulation in the USA is governed on two levels: federal and state. In theory, 
regulation is in the hands of the federal government, but as the state police are 
responsible for the citizens’ health, safety and general welfare, they consider 
price and business service regulation for public utilities their responsibility. 
Friction in between both levels of regulation thus happens regularly [4.17]. 
Regulatory institutions in the USA take legislative, executive and judicial 
decisions: they write the laws (legislative), they carry out and enforce the laws 
(executive) and they resolve legal disputes (judicial). 
Telecommunications specific policy in the USA is governed by the Federal 
Communications Committee (FCC), and is based on two landmark documents: 
the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
latter is a revision of the first, and leans on the strength of competition in 
organizing and steering the USA telecommunications market. The goal of this 
Act was to “let anyone enter any communications business—to let any 
communications businesses compete in any market against any other” [4.18]. 
The Act includes three methods for local telephone service entry: the 
construction of an own, competitive network; the leasing of dedicated line at the 
network of the incumbent (AT&T) or buy and resell the incumbent’s service. 
Contrary to Europe and Asia, fixed telecommunication network ownership has 
been in the hands of private, investor-owned providers [4.19]. State intervention 
has always been limited, until recently, where the government (both state and 
municipal) has become involved in deploying backbone and wireless networks, 
as a response to the slow deploying pace of the private investors.  
Currently, there are several problems with the legislative power of the FCC. In 
the USA, two service types exist: basic telecommunications and enhanced 
services or data processing (value-added services). These latter were considered 
‘essentially competitive’, thus there was no need for regulating them. As the 
Internet is a “software protocol that moves packetized information amount 
computers”, it is regarded as a value-added service, and can hence not be 
regulated.  
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4.1.3 Initiator and key drivers 
A third parameter that allows for comparison of cases, is the initiator of the case 
combined with what drove this party to start up the FTTH project. Roughly, the 
initiator can be a public or a private party, or of course a combination of both. 
Public parties are authorities (on national, regional or municipal level) who can 
allow easy Right-of-Way, or public utility network owners (electricity, water, 
gas, sewerage) that can use their expertise in infrastructure deployment and look 
for synergies with telecom networks. Private partners are of course the 
incumbent telecom operators, owning a legacy twisted copper pair (DSL) or 
coaxial cable (HFC) network, or other large investment firms (e.g. banks). 
It is clear that these initiatives are driven by different actors that have different 
goals [4.20]. In general, these drivers to investment can be identified: 
" Competition from other infrastructures as a driver for investment, 
which will lead to private initiatives (as in the case of Portugal, see 
section 4.2.4); 
" Public contract, where the government takes the leading role in a pure 
public procurement model (Australia), or as a partner in a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP, in New Zealand (section 4.2.2) and Amsterdam 
(section 4.2.3.a)); 
" Regulation, which can force the current operator (e.g. incumbent) to 
deploy, either directly or through other stimuli (e.g. regulatory holiday 
in Portugal, section 4.2.4); 
" Societal value of broadband, detailing the indirect effects a broadband 
network can entail, thereby increasing GDP and reducing the digital 
divide (e.g. Stockholm, see section 4.2.1). 
" Political incentive, whereby an authority gives a financial or other 
stimulus to help improving the business case, e.g. through a subsidy or 
risk premium, following the examples of Australia and New Zealand; 
" Horizontal integration, in which a utility company expands its area of 
expertise to telecom, and reduces costs by applying synergies in 
deployment and operations (e.g. the initiatives by German 
“Stadtwerke”). 
4.1.4 Financing structure 
As mentioned multiple times in this book, the business case for FTTH 
deployment is rather difficult, and will as such not always be taken up by a 
private party alone. Over time, different mechanisms are used to start an FTTH 
deployment. Figure 4-1 gives an overview of the six main financing structures 
that can be identified for large projects (and as such not limited to 
telecommunication networks deployments).  
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Figure 4-1: Overview of types of public private collaboration possibilities 
(Adapted from [4.21]) 
They range from 100% public investment to 100% private investment: 
" In the complete government production and delivery, the public 
sector constructs and operates the network itself, retaining full control 
and offering services on a retail or wholesale basis. 
" When a public party invests the funds and retains ownership, but 
outsources the execution (and possible operations or maintenance) of 
the project to private partners, the investments mechanism is referred to 
as public procurement or public outsourcing. 
" A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) finds the middle point between 
public and private investment, and is defined as a contract between an 
authority (e.g. the national government or a municipality) and one or 
more private partners [4.21]. By including both public and private 
money, the alignment of objectives can be assured: the service-delivery 
objective of the public parties along with the profit-maximization of the 
private parties [4.22], making the agreement mutually beneficial and 
economical [4.23]. Another approach is considering PPPs as lying 
between the government and the market [4.24], with the government 
representing centralized control of transactions and the market 
representing decentralized control. Because of this, a PPP seems to be 
favored as Howell argues that the “most efficient organization is always 
within institutions positioned somewhere along the continuum between 
the market and the government”. The decision on where to draw the line 
between the government and the market then depends on the cost of 
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transactions, which represent the added or reduced cost of trading on or 
off the price of producing. 
" The fourth mechanism is a concession, frequently also referred to as a 
tender. In this case, the public party grants a private partner the rights 
to deploy and operate an infrastructure (or to execute and maintain a 
project). The private partner relies on revenues from the project’s users, 
to recoup its investment. Notice that, in this case, the private investment 
(and risk) is higher than in the case of a PPP. 
" A co-operative or bottom-up investment: a group of end users decides 
to invest in the deployment of a network. Public involvement is usually 
limited to issuing grants or guaranteeing loans, and/or facilitating access 
to publicly owned infrastructure such as ducts. 
" Privatization is the final financing structure, and involves no public 
investment.  
 
This range of six investment mechanisms are, although possible, not allowed in 
every deployment case, especially with regard to the level of government 
involvement. In general, competition law dictates that government intervention 
should only be allowed in cases where the market is not delivering the right 
quality and/or quantity. Lemstra and Groenewegen argue that governments 
should only intervene in case of a market failure, where it has been proven that 
the private market players have tried to correct the failure without any result 
[4.25]. In this situation, the authorities can use competition law to correct the 
abuse of market power; they can set specific regulation on standards (quality of 
service) or impose price corrections through the use of taxes and subsidies.  
One key aspect that differentiates PPPs from traditional procurement models is 
the fact that the agreement involves private money at stake, i.e. the private 
partners in a PPP bear their fair share of the risk, and as such are incentivized to 
deliver the product as efficiently as possible. PPPs are expected to deliver high 
value-for-money, but while also achieving the same goals as public procurement 
models. On the other hand, the involvement of public money is also key, and 
provides the main differentiator to privatized projects. Public money ensures that 
government can impose their coverage targets and can provide a type of 
“subsidy” to ensure the economic viability of the entire project. 
4.1.5 Applied business model 
One of the most important issues when analyzing an FTTH deployment is the 
identification of the business model: who is responsible for which role and does 
this mapping of actors to roles allow for competition. Three actors were 
identified (see section 3.2): the Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP), the 
Network Provider (NP) and the Service Provider (SP). 
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Depending on which roles these different market actors take up, the network will 
be open at different levels and different business models will arise, as illustrated 
in Figure 4-2. Here, the difference should be made in between open access and 
unbundling, based on the existence of a vertically integrated operator.  
" Open access refers to the situation in which the lower layer is 
provisioned in a non-discriminatory way to different actors on the layer 
above (models a, b, c, d). This is a typical situation in a newly deployed 
network where split responsibilities can be one of the objectives from 
the start.  
" Unbundling refers to the case in which a single actor is exploiting both 
a particular layer and the layer on top of that, while still allowing the 
co-existence of other actors on top of its own passive infrastructure/ 
network (models e, f, and g). The main difference with open access is 
that the actor responsible for the lower layer can also act in the layers 
above. For example, unbundling on the bitstream level means that the 
actor offering the connectivity at the network layer, the NP (potentially 
integrated with the actor on the physical layer, the PIP) is also offering 
services at the service layer (and thus also acts as SP). 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Access network business models 
A single actor may act as PIP and NP (a), in which case the network is open at 
the service level. In this case, the business model is referred to as Active-Layer 
Open Model (ALOM). If the roles of NP and PIP are separate (b), openness at 
infrastructure level is achieved, which corresponds to Passive-Layer Open 
Model (PLOM). Although this model is theoretically possible, no real case 
example was found so far.  In case all three roles are taken up by different actors 
(c, d), the model is referred to as Passive-Active-Layer Open Model 
(PALOM). Generally, one PIP operates the infrastructure, while one or several 
NP can be allowed to operate the active infrastructure generally over a fixed 
period of time, at the end of which the contract may or may not be renewed (in 
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which case a new NP is designated and active equipment may need to be 
replaced).  
The unbundling models vary on the same levels of opening up the network. 
When one party takes up all the roles, the business model is said to be Vertically 
Integrated (g). In (e), the incumbent’s network is unbundled using Local Loop 
Unbundling (LLU), while bitstream access is used to allow competitors on the 
service level in (f). 
Most often, economies of scale make it impractical to have a truly multi-NP 
network (although larger networks may assign the operation of different 
geographical parts of the network to different NP). Independently of the specific 
model, however, the NP should offer different service providers access to the 
network (and therefore the users) on non-discriminatory conditions.  The end 
users typically purchase services directly from the service providers. The NP 
receives revenue from the SP and pays a connection fee to the PIP for network 
access.  
4.1.6 Inter-platform and intra-platform competition 
The final parameter used for case comparison is the level of competition present 
in the investigated broadband market. Two types of competition are possible: 
intra-platform and inter-platform. Inter-platform competition can be defined as 
technology competition as such. The main competitive technologies for FTTH 
can be wireline or wireless based ones. It can be all kind of hybrid fiber copper 
solutions as FTTC and FTTB in combination with xDSL were x stands for all 
DSL flavors like A, S or V, or HFC networks of the former cable operators. 
Wireless technologies, such as WiMax, 3G and 4G, can be seen as competitive 
inter-platform technologies, but as they will rather serve a complementary goal, 
they will not be taken into account in the case comparison further down in this 
chapter.  
Intra-platform competition is defined as competition between different 
initiatives, operating on the same network (and hence focuses on competition 
between NPs (network level) and SPs (service level). It is clear that, given the 
limited maturity of FTTH deployment, evolution is expected in the future. 
4.2 Detailed analysis of selected cases 
After having described the different parameters for analysis, some specific cases 
will be detailed: Stockholm, where a public company operates a dark fiber 
network; the Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative in New Zealand, the private Google 
Fiber project in Kansas city and around in the United States, a PPP led by the 
municipality in Amsterdam and an incumbent deploying FTTH in specific areas 
in Portugal. These cases were selected as they provide a wide variety of 
possibilities, thereby familiarizing the reader with the concept of the parameters 
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from section 4.1. In the third section of this chapter, the list of cases will then be 
elaborated, in order to draw more general conclusions about the impact of 
regulations and market conditions on the FTTH deployment initiative and 
business case. 
4.2.1 A public company operating a dark fiber network in 
Stockholm 
Driven by the incentive to increase the economic attractiveness of the region of 
Stockholm, the city decided to invest in an FTTH deployment [4.28]. Stokab, 
founded in 1994, is a public company, 100% owned by the city of Stockholm, 
and was established to deploy a point-to-point, dark fiber access infrastructure 
(thereby acting only as PIP) to all businesses and households in the Stockholm 
region. The company was founded as a public infrastructure company 
(comparable to other public firms responsible for road, railway etc.): all the 
development, deployment and operations is in direct hands of the company, no 
outsourcing is done. As the deployment started before the EU State Aid 
regulation was established, its public involvement was not questioned. 
 
Figure 4-3: TPM interactions for the public deployment by Stokab in Stockholm 
In its initial phase, the network rollout was financed by publicly-backed loans. 
As a first goal, the network aimed at connecting mainly public and educational 
institutions, but was quickly expanded towards private businesses, which 
requested to be connected on the dark fiber circuits. The initial €300 million 
investment was based on loans backed by the city of Stockholm, while the 
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customers’ revenues provided the necessary funds for a later expansion of the 
network. Stokab reached a breakeven point in 2001, and is now a profitable 
company, although the majority of their profits are still re-invested in 
maintenance and further expansion of the network. 
The goal of creating ultrafast reliable connections to the highly knowledge-
intensive region that would “meet future communications needs, stimulate 
competition, promote diversity, offer freedom of choice and minimize the need 
for excavation” [4.29], has definitely been reached. Stockholm is now home to a 
number of successful international companies (e.g. Ericsson, Spotify and 
Transmode), all of which were attracted to the “the most densely fibred city in 
Europe”. 
The deployment and operations of the FTTH network in Stockholm is provided 
by three types of actors: one PIP: Stokab, a couple of NPs and over 90 SPs, thus 
follows the business model of PALOM. Stokab is responsible for the passive 
infrastructure in between the Central Office (CO) and the basements of the 
Multi-Dwelling Units (MDUs), as well as in between the different COs 
(redundant connection). They do not own any active equipment. They lease out 
dark fiber and rack space for the active equipment to all operators (NPs) for less 
than it would cost them to build their own network. The NPs provide 
transmission capacity to the end-user or to the SP, by lighting up the dark fiber 
rented from Stokab (by installing active equipment). An NP typically has 
contracts with different SPs, so that competition exists between SPs serving the 
same customer. 
Next to these telecom-oriented actors, over 500 enterprises make use of Stokab’s 
network. These companies (banks, media, security and more) rent point-to-point 
connections directly from Stokab and provide their own equipment (or via 
outsourcing to an NP) to light up the network and have their own (security-
sensitive) services. Important to note is that about 50% of Stokab’s revenues 
originates from this type of clients. 
4.2.2 The Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative in New Zealand 
Following a 2009 election promise, the New Zealand government committed 
NZD $1.5 billion to an FTTH deployment aimed at reaching 75% of households 
and businesses, an initiative known as the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) [4.30]-
[4.32]. The remainder of households is to be served mainly by the Rural 
Broadband Initiative (RBI), through investment in wireless connectivity and 
VDSL connections, a result of Telecom NZ’s cabinetization program in the mid-
to-late 2000s. Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH), a publicly-owned company, was 
created to manage the investment funds.  A tender process saw four private 
companies win shares in the total investment funds to deploy the UFB. The four 
partnerships so created are known as Local Fiber Companies (LFCs) and will 
eventually own and operate the network on a wholesale-only basis, and thus act 
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as PIP & NP while allowing competition on service level (ALOM). They are: 
NorthPower Fibre, UltraFast Fibre, Enable and Chorus; the latter was established 
from a demerger of Telecom New Zealand into Chorus (the wholesale company 
owning the network) and Telecom Retail (now Telecom, providing the retail 
services which include mobile).  
 
Figure 4-4: TPM interactions for the UFB deployment in New Zealand 
The PPP was structured in two different models: the “funds-recycling” model 
with the LFCs, and the “investment” model with Chorus. The contract with the 
LFCs is based on the recycling of capital in which CFH funds the fiber passing 
(the dark fiber, Layer 1 network deployed along the streets). When a customer 
shows interest to subscribe to fiber services, the LFC then funds the drop section 
(from the street to the customer’s premises) and a subscription-based retail 
commercial relation starts between the customer and a retail service provider, 
which in turn pays for capacity to the LFC at wholesale prices. This income can 
then be used by the LFC to buy a share in the UFB network (so far owned by 
CFH), gradually acquiring ownership of the entire network. CFH in turn can re-
invest the regained funds in network deployments elsewhere. The contract signed 
with Chorus is different in that sense that CFH directly invests in Chorus as a 
company, but Chorus bears the main risks of the uncertain demand uptake. In 
return for this government loan, Chorus has to comply with specific coverage 
and uptake goals, set on milestone dates. 
The business model applied in the UFB is open access based, as the LFCs are not 
allowed to interact with end-users (they are not allowed to act as SP). On SP 
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level, there are over 65 SPs active on the New Zealand market [4.33], among 
which two (Vodafone and Telecom) take up more than 75%.  
As the deployment has not matured enough, it is hard to draw conclusions about 
the success of the UFB initiative. What can be mentioned, is the struggle for 
uptake, given the uncertainty regarding the wholesale copper pricing (an ongoing 
debate between the regulator, Chorus and the government) in comparison to 
wholesale fiber pricing (which has been fixed in the CFH-LFC contracts), as 
well as the need for a minimum market (thus minimum coverage) for service 
providers before starting marketing campaigns. 
4.2.3 Demand aggregation in the United States: the case of 
Google Fiber 
Google, a best-known search engine company that gets its revenues from 
advertisement and pay-per-click, recently started a new department:  Google 
Fiber. The main purpose of this department was to find an area to deploy a fiber 
network with the best conditions possible: maximizing the value of every dollar 
spent on the new network while providing an outstanding broadband symmetric 
offer (a symmetric 1 Gbps connection). 
 
Figure 4-5: TPM interactions for the Google Fiber deployment in the USA 
Municipalities from all around the USA answered to a public contest launched 
by Google and provided as much data as possible about their already existing 
facilities and some proof of engagement of their population to the project. After 
the first contest in 2010, Google received data from over 1,100 communities and 
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local governments, endorsed by more than 194,000 individuals, all of them 
applying to get fiber deployed in their towns and cities.  
From these applications, Google selected Kansas City. There, Google divided the 
city into fiber-hoods (smaller than neighborhoods) that allowed them to set some 
goals of pre-engagement before starting any deployment. If a fiber-hood does not 
reach the minimum engagement needed, Google does not deploy fiber there. 
Having those levels of pre-subscribed users allows a better planning to deploy 
the new fiber network (passing and connecting houses at once) while it reduces 
the risk of investment. After this first deployment, Google is expanding into 
other cities along the USA like Austin and Provo (in the states of Texas and Utah 
respectively). 
Google’s model seems to be reaching more than the minimum presubscription 
goal per fiber-hood. According to Sanford C. Bernstein it could reach 50 to 60% 
of possible subscribers in two years after deployment [4.34].  
The model, although not being a true Public Private Partnership, has a strong 
commitment from the public administration. The latter provides access to any 
existing telecom infrastructure, if available (poles, dark fiber, conduits), and 
eases as much as possible the provision of rights of way needed to deploy the 
network. On the other hand, the city council gets involved in the demand 
aggregation process by stimulating residents to subscribe, thereby reaching the 
minimum pre-subscription-foreseen level to deploy fiber into the neighborhood, 
and in return gets a fiber connection to some schools, churches, hospitals or other 
public buildings in the fiber-hood from Google for free.  
4.2.3.a A PPP under the Market Economy Investors Principle in 
Amsterdam 
Although the FTTH deployment in the Netherlands is now mainly driven by 
Reggefiber, a passive infrastructure provider set up by an investment company 
(Reggeborgh), the first Dutch FTTH initiatives were taken by municipalities. 
In the case of Amsterdam, the city wanted to explore the importance of high-
speed connectivity to the economic well-being of the city, and launched a formal 
investigation into the best way to proceed. Based on the outcome of several 
studies with and without the collaboration of the national incumbent, KPN, and 
the local cable operator, UPC, the municipality decided to create a public-private 
partnership (PPP) to invest in a passive fiber infrastructure. This PPP, GNA 
(Glasvezelnet Amsterdam BV) was incorporated with three groups of investors 
— the municipality itself, the housing associations and the private sector— each 
investing €6 million in return for a one third stake in the company. Another €12 
million in funding was provided as debt financing, bringing the total investment 
to €30 million. Although GNA was taken to court multiple times by the cable 
operators, the public investment was eventually allowed under the Market 
Economy Investor Principle: 
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" All shareholders should invest under the same conditions in a profitable 
business with an acceptable risk/reward ratio.  
" The network should be operated using the ‘open network’ concept, 
meaning that the wholesale specifies that all service providers must be 
able to purchase transport capacity on non-discriminatory conditions.  
 
Figure 4-6: TPM interaction for the PPP in Amsterdam 
The passive infrastructure was outsourced to a construction company (Draka), 
while operations are taken up by GNA. Based on a tender procedure, BBNed 
was chosen to operate the active network (NP responsibility). Services are 
available from multiple service providers. Since currently, KPN is also active on 
the network layer, this structure can be seen as an example of PALOM: 
competition exists on both network and service layer. 
The investment fund of €30 million was used to cover about 40,000 homes with 
fiber access; this process took about 2.5 years and finished in February 2009. 
Then, GNA announced to connect the remaining parts of the city (420,000 
homes in total) by 2013, and estimated an overall budget of €300 million to do 
so. 
Soon, however, the ownership structure in Amsterdam changed, as Reggefiber 
(the operator deploying fiber networks in the entire country), bought about 70% 
of the shares, in a partnership with KPN (the Dutch incumbent). The remaining 
30% is still owned by the municipality of Amsterdam. This evolution makes 
tracking the actual process of the initial project hard, as parts are now integrated 
with the plans of Reggefiber. 
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4.2.4 Portugal: private investment driven by cable competition 
Although most European FTTH initiatives are based on some form of PPP, 
exceptional examples of other financing structures can be found. The main 
example for a private investment is to be found in Portugal, where the national 
incumbent, Portugal Telecom (PT), started a GPON rollout to face the fierce 
competition by the cable operator which could offer more attractive video-based 
offers using its HFC network. At the end of 2011, PT had passed 1.6 million 
homes [4.35], in comparison to Vodafone Portugal, who has currently covered 
more than 700,000 homes with FTTH, while aiming for the 1.5 million target by 
mid-2015 [4.36]. 
 
Figure 4-7: TPM interaction for the private investment driven by competition in 
Portugal 
This decision to upgrade to FTTH was backed by the decision of the National 
Regulatory Authority ANACOM, who adopted a segmented regulation after a 
market analysis in 2008. The decision determined that access to ducts and 
associated infrastructure (so-called market 4) should be an obligation for all 
infrastructures (DSL, DOCSIS and FTTH), but that a wholesale offer (bitstream 
access, market 5) should only be regulated in non-competitive areas. In areas 
with sufficient competition (defined as areas where the percentage of passed 
homes by the main competitor – the cable operator ZON – is larger than 60%), 
there is as such no SMP, and according to European guidelines, no need for 
access regulation [4.37]. In that type of areas, Portugal Telecom is therefore 
deploying in a vertically integrated business model, providing all technical layers 
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themselves. In most of these competitive regions, the combined market shares of 
ZON and PT currently exceeds 85%. 
The upgrade of Portugal Telecom’s network started in 2007 and was a gradual 
process. First, the network was quickly upgraded to DSL and later the twisted 
copper pair loop was shortened by Fiber-to-the-Node installations, with the final 
step deploying fiber to the actual homes with the GPON technology. The choice 
for GPON was largely based on its capability for broadcasting, as many 
Portuguese homes have multiple TV-sets and thus require enough signals (the 
analogue TV signals could be carried over a third wavelength in the GPON 
system (RF overlay)). 
Installing FTTH furthermore allowed to easily and cost-efficiently upgrade the 
mobile network to LTE, providing Portugal Telecom with the opportunity of 
offering quadruple-play for competitive prices. 
4.3 Comparing FTTH deployments worldwide 
In this final section, we include more FTTH deployments worldwide, which are 
characterized using the parameters defined in section 4.1, thereby aiming at 
drawing general conclusions about these cases. It becomes evident (Table 4-2) 
that urban regions are characterized by the presence of alternative networks, like 
DSL and DOCSIS networks, that were already in place long before one started 
deploying FTTH. In the rural areas on the other hand, FTTH networks are 
sometimes the first broadband networks to be installed, which can result in 
different marketing strategies to be applied by the operators. There is a strong 
difference in who initiated the project and their strategies used, as well as what 
drove them to start deploying an FTTH network. Furthermore, four cases 
described in the table deal with large-scale deployments (on a country-wide level 
in Portugal, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, the USA and Japan), which makes it 
harder to categorize the case in purely urban or purely rural. For these reasons, 
we will divide our analysis into three parts: urban cases, rural cases and large-
scale deployments, and discuss the different characteristics for each of them. 
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Table 4-2: Overview and characterization of a variety of FTTH deployment cases 
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Urban regions 
Urban regions are characterized by the presence of other broadband networks, 
like the DSL network of the incumbent and/or an alternative network owned by a 
cable operator. This might be one of the reasons why we see here a clear 
preference towards an open business model, allowing room for competition 
resulting in a reduction of prices charged.  
In four out of the six urban cases under study, it was the city (or a publicly 
owned utility company) that recognized the need for a fiber network and initiated 
the venture. In general, the main reason for deploying the network comes down 
to boosting the local economy and the ICT market, as well as increasing 
competition. Apart from the public entity (city or utility), housing corporations 
and private investors seem to have a rather big influence, both financially and in 
aggregation of demand. In Amsterdam for instance, the housing companies took 
up 1/3rd of the initial investment (1/3rd was taken up by the city of Amsterdam, 
1/3rd by private banks), meanwhile ensuring a certain take-up rate from the start, 
as all their homes got connected. Key motivations for the housing corporations to 
invest in FTTH networks were two-fold: being able to offer a fast and reliable 
FTTH connection to their residents, which in turn increases the value of their 
real-estate property. 
The remaining two cases were driven by private companies: Reggefiber in the 
Netherlands and Google Fiber in Kansas and other cities in the USA. Noticeable 
here is that they both use the deployment strategy of demand aggregation prior to 
rollout, this to ensure sufficient income from the start of the project. Although 
being privately initiated, the city did play an important role. In the Netherlands, 
Reggefiber used the deployment in Amsterdam as an example for their model, 
while part of the demand aggregation process in the USA is led by public 
buildings convincing their neighbors to subscribe, thereby ensuring their own 
connection (see section 4.2.3). 
Large-scale deployments 
The second category of European cases under consideration is that of large-scale 
(country-wide) deployments. Seven examples are given here: Portugal, Italy, 
Norway, New Zealand, Australia, Japan and the deployment by Verizon in the 
USA. 
In Portugal, it was the incumbent itself that decided to start rolling out FTTH, in 
order to stay competitive vis-à-vis the cable operator in the digital television 
market. This case leads to interesting conclusions, as it is often said that the only 
application that truly needs FTTH networks, is video. Cable operators are ahead 
because their networks are built to transmit video services, and they can more 
cost-efficiently upgrade their network bandwidth as well. Clearly this illustrates 
that there is no such thing as a “killer app”, but the use of multiple high-quality 
video-related services simultaneously is a good motivation to begin to deploy 
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FTTH. Note that the case in Portugal is very similar to what is happening in 
many Eastern European countries where incumbents are starting with FTTH 
rollouts due to a lack of good infrastructure.  
In Italy, a new company was set up: Fastweb. They saw opportunities in 
connecting the residents in seven municipalities (cities like Milan, Rome, etc. 
and their environments), where the Internet conditions were rather rudimentary. 
Formulating a partnership with AEM, the electricity company in Milan, they 
were able to save costs on digging, and in turn gained additional subscribers for 
the network. 
The third large-scale deployment listed in the table was initiated and fully 
deployed by Altibox, a subsidiary of the regional Norwegian energy supplier 
Lyse Energi. This again is a completely different case, with a utility company 
opting for a “multi-utility” strategy, offering both energy and broadband. 
The two following large-scale deployments were all initiated by the public 
authorities, being in the form of a PPP in New Zealand and a public procurement 
model in Australia. 
Finally, the two last large-scale deployments listed in the table are privately 
initiated: the incumbent NTT in Japan and the private company Verizon in the 
USA. An important similarity here is that they both use their existing customer 
base (former DSL clients) to ensure sufficient revenues for the FTTH (mainly 
FTTB for Verizon) deployment. By removing the legacy cabling when passing 
with fiber, both operators “oblige” the customers to switch to the fiber offer. 
Note that, although the initiators for the large-scale deployments under study are 
very diverse, all business models have one company that is responsible for both 
the passive and the active infrastructure, whereas the provisioning of the services 
is taken up by the same company (in case of a private initiative), or left to the 
market (in case of a public initiative). It is further remarkable that the real large-
scale deployments are to be found outside of Europe, where the regulation is not 
as strict in prohibiting public involvement or obliging unbundling on private 
operators. 
Rural regions 
As mentioned before, rural areas are characterized by rudimentary access to the 
Internet, and broadband DSL or DOCSIS networks are not available everywhere. 
One could conclude that rural areas form good markets to start deploying FTTH, 
wouldn’t it be that the upfront costs are much higher than in urban areas (because 
the distances to be bridged in between two homes are much higher, see Table 
4-1). Because of this high upfront investment, and lack of interest from the 
incumbents to invest, the initiative to deploy the network was always taken by a 
public institution: a public utility firm or the municipality itself. 
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Furthermore, it is important to mention that rural areas with no other broadband 
infrastructure available are the only areas where public funding is allowed (the 
so-called white areas, as defined in the European Regulatory framework [24]). 
General remarks 
Finally, all cases are put together to verify if other conclusions can be taken, 
independent from the type of region. A relationship can be found between the 
key drivers and the business model applied. If the goal of the initiator is to 
promote the local economy, encourage competition or a similar reason related to 
public interest and the advantage for the end-customer, the business model used 
is more open. On the other hand, if the initiative is taken by a private company 
that aims at maximizing its ROI, the business model is Vertically Integrated, not 
allowing any competition. 
4.4 Summarizing the impact of policy and the market 
on the viability of FTTH deployment 
By giving an overview of ongoing FTTH deployments worldwide, this chapter 
aimed at analyzing the impact of the policy and market pillar on the business 
case for FTTH deployment. The different cases were analyzed based on six 
characteristics:  the region type and scale of deployment, the policy conditions, 
the initiator and key drivers, the financing structure, the applied business model 
and existing competition, both inter- and intra-platform.  
The region type (dense urban, urban or rural) proved to be an indicator for the 
existing competitive infrastructure, whereas the scale of deployment could be 
linked to the available regulation. The European policy rules (basically coming 
down to only allowing state aid in rural areas or in some specific exceptions) are 
therefore of major importance to take into account when quantitatively 
evaluating the business case for FTTH deployment in Europe (see chapter 5). 
The absence of state aid rules in Oceania allows direct public funding, while the 
absence of access regulation in the United States does not inhibit private 
initiatives such as Verizon FiOS or Google fiber to deploy a Vertically Integrated 
model (these private initiatives are of course not prohibited in Europe, but 
typically set back by the fear of unbundling or open access obligations). 
In almost all cases there is a clear influence from public parties. There are 
exceptions, e.g. Portugal, where the incumbent was motivated to deploy FTTH 
as a result of competitive pressure from the cable operator. This competitive 
pressure was not found elsewhere as deployed DSL networks generally meet the 
needs of currently offered TV-services. The public actor is the municipality itself 
or a utility firm, and its role varies among the cases: from active deployment of 
the network, to investment of public money where the municipality acts as a 
genuine market player or to the aggregation of demand where the municipality 
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ensures a certain take up rate from the start of the project (public administrative 
buildings, schools, hospitals and so on). Another conclusion involves the 
relationship between the actor who takes the initiative and the business model 
applied. A public actor tends to opt for a more open business model (ALOM or 
PALOM), while a private actor will try to minimize the threat of entry by 
applying a Vertically Integrated model. A similar link can be found between the 
initiator and the key driver: a public actor will deploy the network because of the 
advantages for the end users (both in the matter of public interest – access for all 
– as to force a reduction of prices stimulated by enhanced competition), while a 
private actor will try to maximize ROI. Two approaches to ensuring sufficient 
revenue (for ROI maximization) were found: demand aggregation, which lets 
users pre-subscribe before deployment, and replacing of legacy cabling, thereby 
forcing the migration of the existing subscriber base to the fiber network. 
In general, our analysis showed the importance of the policy pillar in all types of 
deployment, be it as full investment, participation in a PPP or indirect aid in the 
form of regulatory holidays. The policy pillar furthermore showed to impact the 
technological pillar significantly, in obliging open access on a dark fiber or 
bitstream layer. The impact of the market pillar is limited in case of a public 
investment or PPP, but significant in the case of a private deployment, as there, 
the competitive threat provided a driver for investment. 
 
Following the conclusions of this chapter, it becomes evident that a thorough 
analysis of the business case for Fiber-to-the-Home deployment requires more 
than standard economic evaluation techniques. First, it is clear from the different 
cases studied, that multiple actors take up different roles, while having various 
drivers or key targets to reach them. The business case for FTTH deployment 
and operations should therefore be divided into separate segments, allowing for 
the evaluation of the different separate roles in open access business models. The 
cost-benefit models and results for the roles of Physical Infrastructure Provider 
(PIP) and Network Provider (NP) are therefore the subject of the next chapter. 
Second, as the key drivers vary along with the initiator of the analyzed case 
projects, it makes sense to not only evaluate the targets of private investors, i.e. 
maximizing the financial ROI, but also investigate the key goals of public actors, 
who focus on reducing digital divide and increasing efficiency of the economy in 
general. A quantification model for these indirect benefits is explained and 
applied on two exemplary cities in chapter 6. Finally, although having the main 
advantage of reducing the investment in FTTH by sharing lower layers of the 
network, the open access business models also entail an extra cost of 
cooperation. This cost for open access consists of equipment, process and 
business related sub-items and is further detailed and calculated in chapter 7. In 
the end, this PhD book thus gives an overview of the evaluation of a Social (i.e. 
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including indirect effects) Cost-Benefit Analysis for Multi-Actor (i.e. evaluation 
of both individual business cases and cost of cooperation) deployment of FTTH. 
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5  
Cost-benefit analysis for FTTH 
 “If they started by saying you have to prove to me this has  
a 90 percent chance of success, they'd never invest in anything” 
 – Guy Hamel 
In the previous chapters, the conditions on technological, political and market 
domains were specified. These settings define the context for the quantitative 
techno-economic analysis, which will be executed in this and the following two 
chapters. 
Leaning on the identified trend of open networks, in which the responsibilities 
are shifted from one company operating in a vertically integrated model, to 
multiple firms each taking up separate layers in an open access model, a first step 
in analyzing this business trend therefore consists of evaluating the business case 
for the layers separately (the subject of this chapter). The relevant cost and 
revenue models will be explained (section 5.1 and 5.2), after which a business 
case analysis will be dedicated to the evaluation of the investment of the physical 
infrastructure provider (PIP, section 5.3) and the network provider (NP, section 
5.4) respectively. Here, a business case analysis refers to evaluating the 
economic viability of the investment by comparing costs with potential revenues. 
Please note that we do not devote any attention to the business case of the service 
provider, as their core business focuses on the application, rather than the 
network layer, which is, as been mentioned before, beyond the scope of this 
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research. The results of this chapter are based on the work described in [5.1]-
[5.7]. 
In the following chapters, the elementary business cases will be extended 
towards broader cost and revenue models, which respectively include indirect 
benefits, especially important for public actors, and cooperation costs, focusing 
on the extra equipment, processes and transactions needed to be able to share the 
infrastructure and networks in the open access business model. 
5.1 Generic cost modeling 
The first step in evaluating the economics of an FTTH network for possible 
future scenarios is to make a good estimation of all costs incurred. In order to do 
this, we start from a project lifecycle – planning, deployment, migration, 
operations and teardown – as shown in Figure 5-1, and combine this with a 
zooming approach in which we increase the detail of the largest or most 
risky/unknown cost components first. The figure already gives an indication of 
the importance of the different cost components, by means of stronger and darker 
text and lines, in the total cost of the exploitation and upgrade of an FTTH 
network. Following this approach, the total cost of the network over its entire 
lifetime can be calculated, also referred to as the Total Cost of Ownership 
(TCO). 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Network lifecycle model for an FTTH rollout 
As mentioned with the zooming approach, we delve into more detail in the 
largest subcomponents (or influences) of the final cost. An example of this is 
shown in the deployment phase, where it will be important to make a distinction 
between outside plant and inside plant. We further split this cost to come up with 
detailed cost components for which both input and calculation are easier to 
make. The outside plant deployment, for instance, consists of rolling out the 
physical network: digging the trenches and laying the ducts, micro-ducts and 
fibers (in case of the most common buried deployment that is). The inside plant, 
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on the other hand, consists mainly of equipment (both passive: e.g. racks and 
shelves, and active, such as OLTs and ONTs) that need to be installed and 
maintained. As cost calculations for network deployment in the streets are clearly 
different to equipment installations in central offices or customers’ homes, 
different cost models (or cost modeling languages) should be developed. The 
first section of this chapter gives an overview (including dedicated, though basic 
examples) of three modeling languages designed for evaluating (1) the cost of 
network deployment (PNMN: Physical Network Modeling Notation), (2) the 
cost of equipment installation, possibly including maintenance (ECMN: 
Equipment Coupling Modeling Notation) and (3) the cost of operational 
processes (BPMN: Business Process Modeling Notation). 
Before diving into the detailed explanation of the separate modeling languages, 
we will first give a short overview of their structure: all three languages consist 
of a graphical user interface (GUI), which is used for visualization of the model. 
It allows to graphically represent the links between different types of equipment 
(ECMN) or activities (BPMN), which in turn simplifies discussions about the 
models. The backend of the GUI is then linked to a calculator, which uses 
specified input data to perform the needed calculations for obtaining the total 
cost of the network deployment, equipment installation or operational process. 
5.1.1 PNMN: Physical Network Modeling Notation:  
fast estimation of infrastructure deployment costs based 
on analytical approximations  
When deploying a new infrastructure, the largest part of the investment cost is 
taken up by the installation of the outside plant, i.e. the manual labor for 
trenching and installation of the cables. Although real deployments need a 
detailed rollout plan indicating the exact amount of cables and trench distance, in 
the business modeling phase, a fast, yet reliable estimation is preferable in the 
strategic investment analysis. In this phase many alternative installations will be 
compared to each other in search for a set of scenarios for instance in which 
costs are reduced, revenues increased, risks contained.  
The Physical Network Modeling Notation (or PNMN) aims at drawing the 
infrastructure layout of a physical network (e.g. a buried cable network used for 
telecommunications purposes). By depicting the surface of the area to be 
covered, the number of connection points to be addressed and by choosing an 
analytical calculation model from a selected list, the total trenching and cable 
length will be calculated by the model. This amount can then be used to estimate 
the total cost of deployment of the network infrastructure. Within the model, the 
topology of the network can be added as a parameter, thereby allowing to choose 
between Point-to-Point (P2P) and Point-to-Multipoint (P2MP).  
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PNMN is built up in a hierarchical manner, allowing to calculate different levels 
of infrastructure deployment (e.g. from Central Office to Street Cabinets in a first 
level, from Street Cabinets to individual houses in a second level). As the model 
is structured hierarchically, it is possible to use different deployment models for 
different parts of the network (see example below), and the level of hierarchies is 
unlimited. 
Building this hierarchical structure can be done top-down or bottom-up, 
depending on whether you start by dividing the entire area into smaller pieces, or 
by grouping the lowest level connection points into groups, respectively. 
- Top-down: by specifying, for each level of connection points, what area 
size they should cover or how many connection points will be linked, 
the area can be divided into smaller pieces, which each can have its own 
dedicated analytical calculation model.  
- Bottom-up: by specifying, for each level of connection points, how 
many of these connection points should be served by the higher level, 
groups can be formed. Each group can have its own dedicated analytical 
model. 
The different analytical models have been specified in [5.8] and are visualized in 
Figure 5-2: simplified street length (a), street length (b), double street length (c), 
diagonal tree (d) and simplified Steiner tree (e). 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
Figure 5-2: Graphical representation of the different analytical models for PNMN 
The calculator uses the chosen layout to calculate the installation (trenching) 
length, as well as the fiber length, based on two parameters: 
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- n: the number of connection points on one side of the square 
- l: the distance between two connection points 
The higher-level connection point (grey circle) is always located in the middle of 
the square. 
For the simplified street model, the installation length I and fiber length F can 
then be determined: ! = !! − 1 ∗ ! ! = 4 ∗ ! ∗ min !, ! − ! ∗ (! − !)!!!!!!  
An analogous reasoning can be followed for the other analytical models, for 
which we refer to [5.9]. 
In the example given below (Figure 5-3), an FTTH access network with two 
levels of hierarchy is schematically represented. On the left side of the figure, the 
feeder section (in between central office and street cabinet) is modeled using 
direct connections, analytically approached as a diagonal tree structure, while the 
right hand side indicates the distribution section from the street cabinet to 
individual houses, which will typically follow the sidewalks and is analytically 
approached as a uniform double street length model.  
 
 
Figure 5-3: Schematic representation of an FTTH access network: direct feeder 
section from central office to street cabinet (left), double street model distribution 
section from street cabinet to houses (right).  
5.1.2 ECMN: Equipment Coupling Modeling Notation: 
modeling granular equipment placement over time  
When tackling the problem of how to dimension a central office, a street cabinet, 
a server room, etc., one is repetitively having the same discussions and making 
very comparable calculations. For instance a central office of a telecom operator 
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contains ODF racks and System racks in there. A System rack contains at max 3 
(sometimes 4) shelves and each of those shelves can be equipped with a 
predefined amount of OLT cards. Finally this amount of line cards will be 
directly correlated to the amount of customers to serve via this central office. 
Calculations of the dimensioning are as such clearly hierarchical in nature. For 
instance the amount of shelves will depend on the amount of OLT cards which is 
in turn dependent on the amount of customers to connect. 
ECMN draws from this hierarchical structure and allows determining the amount 
and cost of equipment to be installed. By installing only the equipment that is 
needed at each point in time (based on the amounts of drivers), the costs of 
equipment are spread out and the investing firm receives a direct payoff that can 
be used to pay back the investment in equipment.  
The model is built up of four types of elements: drivers, equipment blocks, 
connectors and aggregators: 
 
 
The driver serves as the input for the model, and is as such 
coupled to the “leaves” of the tree structure. Drivers, as their 
name indicates, drive the amount of equipment that will be 
installed. They are linked to equipment blocks by the use of 
connectors. 
 
The equipment block identifies a type of equipment for 
which the needed amount (and cost) over time needs to be 
calculated. Apart from their cost, they can contain other 
operational parameters such as energy consumption, 
maintenance, etc. 
 
The connector connects drivers, equipment and aggregators 
to each other. The granularity factor links the different 
levels of equipment types, by indicating the maximum 
number of equipment of the lower type (children - N) that is 
needed before a new equipment of the higher type (down 
flow parent - M) is to be installed. 
 
An aggregator will combine multiple constraints into one 
new constraint to link to blocks further in the calculations 
(down flow parent), thereby linking multiple children to one 
parent. Additionally aggregators can define how the 
combination of constraints should be performed by means 
of a flexible rule set (RA, e.g. summation, multiplication) 
indicated directly into the symbol. 
 
Going back to our simplified example of the central office with which we started 
this paragraph, we can now apply the ECMN to it (Figure 5-4).  
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Figure 5-4: Example of an ECMN tree for installation of a central office in an 
FTTH network  
In a first step, a tree structure is graphically drawn indicating the equipment that 
needs to be installed in the central office, while linking them using granularity 
factors. In this case, a central office consists of maximum 10 racks (both ODF 
and System racks), which in turn consist of a number of ODF slots (ODF rack) 
and shelves with OLT cards (System rack). The lowest level of the tree (typically 
most left in the GUI) are then linked to drivers, in this case the customers. 
In a second step, the needed input parameters are defined per equipment (cost, 
maintenance, failure rate, power consumption, etc.) and on the entire model 
(time functions for the drivers initiating the calculation, e.g. the amount of 
customers that will need to be served in each year). As these drivers are linked to 
the lowest equipment types in the graphical tree (customers drive the amount of 
ODF slots and OLT cards), they serve as such as drivers for the higher branches, 
thereby allowing calculations of the entire tree bottom-up, for the amounts of 
each equipment type and their costs, both initial investment (Capital 
Expenditures - CapEx) and continuous costs (Operational Expenditures - OpEx).  
The output of the model then indicates the total cost for equipment deployment 
over time. Figure 5-5 gives an example of an ECMN output for a linearly 
increasing number of customers. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: Example of ECMN output (amounts of equipment) 
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ECMN can of course be applied for more and different types of equipment 
modeling, e.g. the ratio of the different parts needed for assembling a new 
product based on different requirements, the equipment installed in computer 
rooms in schools based on the number of students, etc. Additional features allow 
easy identification of minimal installation sizes, switchover of equipment types 
over time, aggregation rules based on summation (as shown in Figure 5-4), 
maximum, average, etc. The calculations render the amounts to install in time, 
but also the expected cost, energy consumption, space requirements, etc. when 
the specifications for the equipment are completely filled. For a more detailed 
description of the modeling and calculation, as well as more detailed examples, 
we refer to [5.2].  
5.1.3 BPMN: Business Process Modeling Notation:  
using flows to determine the cost of automated or manual 
processes  
Finally, this section includes a third and final specific cost modeling language for 
the modeling of processes. When tackling the problem of how to dimension and 
estimate the costs of executing operational processes such as physical repair 
processes, installation procedures, etc., one is repetitively performing the same 
tasks. Although many approaches exist for visualizing the flow of a process, 
typically by means of some flowchart based modeling language, the link of this 
flowchart towards estimation of future new costs is not straightforward. There 
are several tools which allow the user to perform such operational modeling for 
their current organization with the focus on allocation of the costs to the different 
departments and predict the effect of small changes in these models.  
BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation) is a well-developed standard 
[5.10] based on flowchart structures. Processes can easily be translated into 
flowcharts and BPMN contains a rich set of modeling elements allowing to 
model even the more arcane process structures. Linking these flowcharts to the 
right cost parameters (e.g. cost per hour of manual labor), and using activity 
based costing [5.11]-[5.12], allows for a clear, statistical calculation of the 
operational process cost for a specific time horizon.  
 
A process model in BPMN is built around three basic building blocks: events, 
activities and gateways, indicated by circles, rectangles and diamonds 
respectively.  
 
Events indicate the start, intermediate 
and end points of the process. 
 Activities indicate the actions taking 
place in the execution of the process. 
They will contain a descriptive name and 
Start event Intermediate event End event
Cost-benefit analysis for FTTH  105 
 
 
can contain parameters for the calculation 
of the costs. 
 
  
 
Gateways indicate splits or joins in the 
process. Those splits can either be 
conditional or unconditional and can 
have multiple incoming and outgoing 
execution paths of which more than one 
can be chosen at the same time. 
    
 
 
Figure 5-6: Example of a BPMN process for the connection of a (new or existing) 
customer to an FTTH access network  
An example of a BPMN process model is given in Figure 5-6. This is a 
simplified example of a customer provisioning process, in which the customer 
wants to connect to the network, or change his existing connection. This process 
details the different steps that need to be executed in order to complete his 
request. BPMN already provides all flexibility to incorporate decisions and 
conditions by exclusive gateways (change/new customer, succeeded or failed 
line test (OK/NOK)) and fork or join gateways (the line test will only be started 
if the location has been changed or the physical connection has been formed). By 
inserting the right information at the different events (time to execute, needed 
man power, etc.), at the gateways (probability of each paths) and at the start 
events (number of events per time), the cost for execution of the entire process 
can be calculated using the activity based costing approach. 
Again operational processes are not limited to telecommunication networks and 
can be used for modeling any kind of process-based work (with manual and/or 
automated tasks). 
5.2 Direct revenue modeling 
Once the full network, the equipment and the operational expenditures are 
modeled, all costs of the business model can be calculated. Still, this is only part 
of the analysis and should be complemented with a modeling of the revenues for 
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each activity in the business model. Given the costs and the number of paying 
customers, in combination with a desired profit margin or break-even point, the 
revenue model will calculate the needed charge per user. As such it has a notion 
of a fixed pricing scheme but also of an adaptive scheme aiming at break-even or 
a profit over break-even (cost-plus pricing) with an adjustable timing on when to 
get up to this point, or a revenue scheme that is adjusted to the yearly costs 
(running cost-plus pricing).  
5.2.1 Fixed pricing 
In a fixed pricing scheme the provider directly indicates the price for the 
customers to pay. There are no additional parameters and calculations. Clearly 
the fixed pricing scheme can also make use of a timed predefined price. 
5.2.2 Cost-based pricing (=cost-plus pricing) 
In cost-based pricing the price the provider will charge, will be based on an 
intended profit margin over the time horizon. This profit margin can be fixed or 
changing over the time horizon.  
The parameters in this pricing scheme are 
• P   expected profit margin (%)     
• N  time horizon, expected lifetime of the project  
The inputs of this pricing scheme are 
• TCO the costs per year, summed and discounted to TCO over N  
years 
• A(i)  the customers per year, or the absolute adoption in year i,  
determined following theoretical adoption curves, such as 
Rogers [5.13], Bass [5.14] or Fisher-Pry [5.15] 
• r  the discount rate, typically ranging between 5% and 10% in  
telecom network investments 
 
For example, we can calculate the revenues needed (per subscriber and per 
month) based on the known TCO. The following formula is used:  12 ∗ X ∗ A i ∗ 11 + r ! = 1 + P ∗ TCO!over!N!years!!!!  
 
The formula takes into account a monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) of X 
(multiplied by 12 to arrive at a yearly ARPU), the absolute uptake (adoption) of 
customers and a discounting factor to incorporate the time value of money. By 
equating this revenue potential to the above calculated TCO, the needed monthly 
ARPU can be derived. 
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Figure 5-7 underneath gives an overview of this pricing scheme, based on a 
decreasing cost function and a desired profit of 10% after a time horizon of 20 
years. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Cumulative costs and revenues for a cost-based pricing scheme with 
10% profit expected after 20 years 
Note that this profit margin can be set to zero for a break-even calculation, or 
that it can vary over time (e.g. in an early stage, one wants to attract customers 
by setting a low price – low profit margin – which is then increased after a 
certain customer threshold is reached). 
5.2.3 Running cost-plus pricing 
In running cost-plus pricing the price will be based on a short term part of the 
total costs. It can be mimicked by a repetitive cost based pricing over the short 
term and with the repetition ending at the total time horizon. Typically the 
provider would want to have its costs of this year repaid by the customers of the 
same year taking into account an intended profit margin.  
 
The parameters in this pricing scheme are 
• Pi   expected profit margin (%) per year    
• N  time horizon, expected lifetime of the project (in this case  
infrastructure   
The inputs of this pricing scheme are 
• Ci  the costs per year (which, when summed and discounted,  
amount to TCO over N years) 
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• A(i)  the customers per year, or the absolute adoption in year i,  
determined following theoretical adoption curves, such as  
Rogers [5.13], Bass [5.14] or Fisher-Pry [5.15] 
• r  the discount rate, typically ranging between 5% and 10% in  
telecom network investments 
The formula is thus adjusted to calculate a varying ARPU (per subscriber and per 
month) based on the known yearly costs:  for!year!i = 1. .N:!12 ∗ X! ∗ A i = 1 + P! ∗ C! 
 
Figure 5-8 underneath gives an overview of this pricing scheme for a decreasing 
cost function as input, wanting to achieve a yearly running profit of 10% (thus 
having each year a profit of 10%). 
 
 
Figure 5-8: Yearly costs and revenues for a running cost pricing scheme with a 
yearly 10% profit, for a time horizon of 20 years 
Additionally the revenue model allows switching between revenue schemes at a 
given time or condition (e.g. critical customer mass reached). This revenue 
model allows answering questions on the main economic indicators such as 
profitability, minimal and advised pricing or payback period.  
5.3 Business case analysis for the Physical 
Infrastructure Provider 
Having introduced the cost and revenue modeling specifics, the next section will 
apply them on the business cases for the Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP). 
Deploying the passive infrastructure requires a huge initial investment that 
consists of manual labor cost for trenching and costs for fiber cables, ducts and 
micro-ducts. The combination of this outside plant cost with the upfront cost for 
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installing the necessary passive equipment in the central office and street 
cabinets (e.g. Optical Distribution Frame (ODF) racks), results in the total 
Capital Expenditure (CapEx) for the PIP (Figure 5-9). Note that we only take 
into account the cost for the access network; we do not calculate the in-house 
cabling and deployment. Typically, this in-house cabling is done by the house 
owner (in case of single houses), or outsourced and paid by the housing 
organization (in case of multi-dwelling units). Furthermore, note that all 
calculations throughout this section are based on a P2P access network topology, 
because this technology allows more flexibility in terms of unbundling and open 
access (see also chapter 3 and 7). Although this chapter analyzes P2P 
infrastructure, it has to be mentioned that the cost of deploying a P2MP network 
will not differ significantly, as the main part of the cost for physical 
infrastructure deployment (up to 80%) is spent on civil works [5.16], which are 
similar for both topologies. 
Apart from the upfront investments, there are also costs during the lifetime of the 
infrastructure: a cable may break, which requires digging and splicing to repair, 
and renting costs for the floor space in the central office have to be paid every 
year. These yearly recurring costs are grouped as Operational Expenditures 
(OpEx). 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Overview of the passive infrastructure in an FTTH network 
The summation of both the upfront investment (CapEx) and the costs for keeping 
the network up and running (OpEx) results in the Total Cost of Ownership 
(TCO) of the passive infrastructure, which was modeled in more detail in [5.17]. 
The main parameters are summarized in Table 5-1. Please note that the values of 
these parameters, as well as the financial parameters that will be introduced later, 
were verified by European telecom operators and vendors, and checked with 
main sources in literature. They therefore are reliable for evaluation of FTTH 
deployment in Europe, but should be revisited when analyzing other 
deployments abroad. This can either be done using other input sources, or by 
following a more general sensitivity approach. 
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Table 5-1: Unit costs for different parameters, possibly varying over area types 
Parameter Dense urban Urban Rural 
Trenching (per m) €50 €35 €20 
Duct (per m) – 
depending on 
diameter 
€3 – 6 
Fiber cable (per m) – 
depending on number 
of fibers per cable 
€0.3 - €1.7 
 
Outdoor Cabinet €7500 
Floor space (per m2 
per year) 
€220 €110 €170 
Labor cost (per hour) €45 
 
The evaluation will be done for three area types: dense urban, urban and rural 
(for a detailed description we refer to section 4.1.1) and three adoption types: 
conservative, likely and aggressive, that reflect the uncertainty in uptake of 
customers over time. To model different levels of generic curves, input values 
for three countries were chosen, because they represent typical deployment and 
uptake status in Europe (Figure 5-10). The likely curve represents an average 
adoption uptake and speed, and is modeled based on the forecast for the 
Netherlands (where some fiber networks are already present). The aggressive 
curve models a fast uptake of a large-scale deployment and uptake, as forecasted 
for Slovakia, while the conservative curve is based on the forecast for Germany, 
which has a lower speed of adoption than average. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: The adoption curves for the scenario studies 
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5.3.1 Total Cost of Ownership for the PIP 
When calculating the TCO of the physical infrastructure for the three areas, the 
differences in number of users and average distance covered per user are clearly 
reflected (Figure 5-11). For the reference scenario, we use a planning horizon of 
20 years (based on the typical estimated lifetime of the passive network [5.18]-
[5.19]), and a discount rate of 5%, which is based on the reference discount rate 
for a low-risk investment [5.20]. As the PIP cost is nearly entirely driven by 
upfront distance-based trenching cost, there is negligible impact from the 
adoption curves, therefore only the results for the likely curve are shown here. 
When considering the cost for the physical infrastructure spread over all 
potential customers (cost/HP = cost/ home passed), we clearly see that this is 
growing with a decreasing household density and therefore increasing trenching 
cost per household. Note that the cost/HP in the dense urban area (572 euro) is 
doubled in the urban area (1094 euro) and tripled in the rural area (1764 euro). 
On the other hand, the TCO for the physical infrastructure also reflects the 
overall surface and total amount of customers per area. Here, we observe that the 
overall cost for the rural area (5.40 million euro) is significantly smaller than that 
for the urban area (9.45 million euro), which is only based on the significantly 
lower amount of customers. The cost for the dense urban (8.92 million euro) is 
only slightly smaller than for the urban area. 
As the initial investment for the trenching takes up the highest part of the 
deployment cost, this is also reflected in the ratio of CapEx versus OpEx. As 
mentioned before, the CapEx consists of the upfront investment in trenching, 
cabling and passive equipment, while the OpEx denotes the maintenance, repair 
and floor space costs, which is considerably lower. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Total Cost of Ownership for the PIP, cumulative and discounted 
over 20 years (for the likely adoption curve) 
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5.3.2 PIP business case over 20 years 
When using the revenue model explained in section 5.2.2 to calculate the needed 
monthly ARPU for break-even after 20 years, we notice a large spread over the 
different areas and adoption curves (Figure 5-12): from €8.6 for the dense urban 
area to €26.5 in the rural area, for the same aggressive adoption curve. When 
comparing the areas on the likely and conservative adoption curves, the 
difference only gets bigger.  
 
 
Figure 5-12: Revenues needed per subscriber per month for the physical 
infrastructure for the reference scenarios 
Although this range proves a relevant outcome, comparing the results to realistic 
values is needed to provide a good benchmark. Despite massive changes in the 
telecommunications offer (from voice and analogue TV to Voice over IP, digital 
TV and fixed and mobile broadband), the total household spend on 
communications services, as well as the allocation of this amount over the 
different types of services, remains static over time [5.21]. Revenue models for 
funding the physical infrastructure can therefore be based on (i) regulated DSL 
or fiber unbundling offers, or (ii) on revenues from existing cases. Please note 
that the revenues mentioned below are values found at the moment of executing 
the study (mid 2013), and could therefore slightly have changed. 
In the first case, we can expect the PIP revenues to fall in the same range as the 
current DSL unbundling offers, since new fiber alternatives should be able to 
compete with existing DSL offers, especially in (dense) urban areas. We 
therefore compare revenues for an FTTH infrastructure provider with the charges 
OLOs (Other Licensed Operators) currently pay to the incumbent for unbundling 
of the local loop (LLU) in DSL networks. These regulated prices vary amongst 
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EU Member States, but the average OLO pays between €7 and €10 per customer 
per month for the use of the unbundled DSL local loop [5.22], [5.23].  
Secondly, real-life case studies exist that apply the open access business model 
with different actors on different layers. Stokab, the PIP in Stockholm for 
example, charges €5 to €7 per customer per month for dark fiber access in the 
inner city [5.24]. Another example can be found in the large-scale deployment of 
fiber in the Netherlands by Reggefiber, which agreed with OPTA (the Dutch 
National Regulatory Authority) on prices for ODF access on a regulatory basis 
[5.25]. These prices varied between €7.39 and €25.39, depending on the number 
of individual fiber pairs and the CapEx per household. However, Reggefiber has 
recently adjusted its fiber tariffs, stepping away from different pricing schemes 
for different regions. As of January 1st, 2013, the operator can choose to apply 
the varying tariff or to use the average national charge of €16.39 [5.26], [5.27]. 
Averaging these different sources, we can assume that a future PIP can expect 
around €10 per customer per month. This value will be used as a reference for 
the remainder of our calculations of this section. Comparing this €10 average to 
the needed revenues (Figure 5-12), learns that only in the dense urban area with 
aggressive adoption curve this €10 suffices to achieve a viable business case over 
20 years. 
 
This means that in all other cases the monthly revenue of 10 euro for the PIP 
does not suffice to cover for the costs (Figure 5-13). This observation can be 
interpreted in two ways. Either the observed time frame of 20 years (or the 
combination of the time frame of 20 years and the used discount rate of 5%) is 
not appropriate for the evaluation of an infrastructure project as considered here; 
or 20 years is the right timeframe indeed and the business case simply does not 
fly based on the current regulatory prices. As such, high investments in fiber 
access infrastructure can be considered unlikely. 
However, referring back to the real-life deployments operational today (e.g. 
Reggefiber, Stockholm, etc.), we see that the responsible companies are 
successful and even expanding their rollouts. We will therefore investigate how 
the business case could be improved in the next section. 
 
One important remark that should be made at this point, deals with the focus of 
the model. Although the model was built using a bottom-up approach, thereby 
ensuring that all relevant parts of the technical calculations are included, the 
model does not take into account business related and management costs, which 
are also referred to as transaction costs. These transaction costs are part of the 
cooperation costs that follow an open access model, and will be evaluated as part 
of chapter 7. Furthermore, recent literature [5.28] has shown that in 90% of 
investigated large transportation projects, actual costs are higher than estimated 
costs, on average 27.6%. Since telecommunication access network deployment 
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can be categorized as a large infrastructural project, like roads and railways, it is 
likely to experience the same effect. Taking these two remarks into account 
when analyzing the results of the business case leads to a risk that obtaining a 
zero-NPV in an upfront modeling, fed with realistic data, could still not be 
economically viable in real-life. 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Cumulative costs, revenues and NPV for the physical infrastructure 
for the reference scenarios 
5.3.3 How to improve the business case?  
Although the results above are based on benchmarked input data, the results 
indicate rather negative business cases. When comparing these results with 
existing deployment cases, among which successful ones (see chapter 4), we can 
identify a number of differences in market, infrastructural and regulatory 
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parameters. The cost of deployment can for instance be decreased by reusing 
existing ducts, while the uptake rate can be influenced by demand aggregation. 
In order to better predict the outcome of future business cases, these types of 
improvement measures should be taken into account in our cost-benefit analysis 
as well, which is the subject of this section.  
5.3.3.a  Impact of demand aggregation  
The business case for the PIP is especially difficult because of the combination 
of a high upfront investment with revenues that have a very slow uptake. One 
solution could be to have high revenues sooner in the project lifetime. Demand 
aggregation is a process in which interested customers sign a cooperation 
agreement before the deployment is started. In this way, areas can be chosen in 
which there will be a guaranteed uptake from the start. For example, Reggefiber 
(the Netherlands) requires, depending on the cost for the envisaged area, a level 
of 30-40% demand aggregation before starting the deployment (see section 
4.2.3.a and [5.29]). Google Fiber also applies this strategy in promoting their 
offers in the specific cities in the United States (see section 4.2.3). 
 
Based on these realistic assumptions, we have modeled the impact of demand 
aggregation of 20 or 40% on the aggressive adoption curve, by adding this 
percentage to the expected adoption (see Figure 5-14). We assume however that 
the curve does not exceed the original maximum adoption percentage.  
In the dense urban case, the original aggressive curve already led to a positive 
business case, which is clearly strengthened by an additional demand 
aggregation. For the urban area, we see that the negative NPV of minus 4 million 
euro is halved by demand aggregation of 20% and nearly equaled out by a level 
of demand aggregation of 40%. The rural case remains difficult though. 
Of course, aggregating demand requires extra costs for marketing your offer, and 
going door-to-door for customer’s agreements. This cost however is low 
compared to the overall gain, and can - to some extent- replace the cost of 
marketing in a later stage. Another advantage of demand aggregation is a lower 
uncertainty and a reduction in the cost of upfront revenue estimation.  
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Figure 5-14: Cumulative costs, revenues and NPV for demand aggregation of 
20% and 40% on top of the aggressive adoption curve 
5.3.3.b Impact of duct reuse  
It is clear from Figure 5-11 that the majority of the PIP costs, and by extension of 
the entire FTTH deployment cost, is in the CapEx. More specifically it is in the 
trenching and ducting cost (because we consider only buried deployments), 
which is significantly higher than the cost for the fiber itself [5.30]. In case some 
parts of the ducts can be reused, this will therefore lead to a significant cost 
benefit. Actual duct reuse can take different forms. Of course, “old” telecom 
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ducts used in the DSL network can be an option, but for example in Paris, fiber 
was deployed in sewer systems [5.31].  
To quantify the effect of possible duct reuse on the business case for the PIP, we 
compared three scenarios (the percentages differ for the areas under study and 
are based on discussions with the project partners of the European FP7 research 
project OASE [5.32]):  
- a greenfield deployment, where no ducts can be reused,  
- a “small” scenario, in which between 25% and 70% of the ducts in the 
feeder fiber section can be reused, and 15 to 20% in the distribution 
cable section of the network (Figure 2),  
- a “large” scenario, with a duct reuse of 35 to 80% in the feeder fiber 
section, and about 20 to 40% in the distribution cable section.  
The variances in duct reuse are explained by a different estimation of the 
available ducts in the different areas: the availability of ducts will be much 
higher in a dense urban region, where most probably, an existing telecom 
network is already present, while the availability and/or quality of current 
telecom network in rural areas might be much lower. 
 
Figure 5-15: Impact of small and large reuse of available ducts on the TCO of the 
PIP 
Figure 5-15 shows the impact of the three levels of duct reuse on the TCO, which 
clearly is significant. It should be noted that this duct reuse does not always 
come at zero cost, as owners of the ducts (other operators, utility companies) can 
charge for their use. In the case an incumbent deploys the fibers in ducts 
previously used for legacy cables, the costs can be assumed negligible (this is the 
assumption used here, which follows the views by OpenReach, UK, which report 
a charge per annum of less than €1 [5.33]). It should furthermore be noted that, 
when evaluating P2MP topologies, the duct reuse in the feeder fiber section 
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might be higher, as this topology uses a lower number of feeder fibers than P2P, 
and as such requires less spare capacity in existing ducts [5.34]. 
Because of the higher duct reuse in the dense urban area, the savings that can be 
achieved are also higher (savings up to 32% compared to 15% in the rural area). 
Although reusing ducts proves a significant reduction in the deployment cost, 
this measure on its own does not make the business case in an urban or rural 
region. 
Reusing available ducts is only one option to reduce the overall trenching costs. 
These costs can also be lowered by using other techniques, like for example, 
micro-trenching, which installs the cables in a very narrow trench [5.35]. In the 
Netherlands, this deployment, immediately in the road, was considered. Aerial 
deployment using poles or facades is another, cheaper option for deployment 
[5.36], which has been successfully applied in Cornwall, United Kingdom [5.37]. 
However, in some countries, aerial deployment is not allowed under regional 
legislation (e.g. certain regions in New Zealand) or there is, as for example in the 
Netherlands, “a silent assumption among permitting local governments that new 
FTTH outside plant will be trenched” [5.38].  
Finally, the deployment of FTTH can be combined with other utility network 
rollouts (e.g. water, gas, electricity, etc.), which can entail cost savings up to 
21% [5.39]. The disadvantages of this latter approach are clearly the cost of 
needed coordination: joint rollout requires synchronized planning amongst all 
utilities, as well as synchronized operations and repair of the cables. Research 
[5.40] has furthermore proven that it is not always clear where existing ducts lie 
exactly, neither is it a foregone conclusion on who owns them. The European 
Union follows this line of thoughts, as they specify in their guidelines [5.41]: 
“Member States may decide in accordance with the EU regulatory framework for 
electronic communications, for instance, to facilitate the acquisition process of 
rights of ways, to require that network operators coordinate their civil 
engineering works and/or that they share part of their infrastructure. In the same 
vein, Member States may also require that for any new constructions (including 
new water, energy, transport or sewage networks) and/or buildings a connection 
suitable for NGA should be in place”. These guidelines were made stricter in 
2014, as all network operators are now obliged to share details about their 
ongoing or planned civil works and even meet “any reasonable request to 
coordinate civil works on transparent and non-discriminatory conditions” [5.42]. 
5.3.3.c Prolonging the planning horizon  
Since the passive infrastructure that is currently providing Internet, the 
incumbent’s DSL network or the cable operator’s HFC network, has been 
deployed decades ago, and still has not reached the end of its lifetime (if there 
would be no need for higher speeds, the copper networks could still be used 
much longer), it is likely to expect that the same holds for the dark fiber cables 
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(current operators also expect lifetimes of up to 50 years [5.19]). It thus makes 
sense to prolong the planning horizon, since it is very likely that the dark fiber 
infrastructure will generate revenues for more than 20 years. Furthermore, 
prolonging the business case will also extend the adoption curve, leading to a 
higher adoption potential in a later stage of the project (Figure 5-10). These 
revenues are not captured in the initial business case with a lifetime of 20 years. 
 
 
Figure 5-16: NPV curves for a prolonged planning horizon of up to 40 years show 
a positive business case for dense urban and urban areas 
On the other hand, the current economic investment climate is reluctant towards 
granting loans for long-term payback periods. The argumentation for the long 
lifetime of the fiber infrastructure should therefore be assured, as some now do 
by comparing broadband infrastructure to other network infrastructures, such as 
electricity or water, roads or railways [5.43]. 
!10
!8
!6
!4
!2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
M
"e
ur
o
likely
conservative
aggressive
!10
!8
!6
!4
!2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
M
"e
ur
o
likely conservative aggressive
!10
!8
!6
!4
!2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
M
"e
ur
o
rural
dense:urban
urban
120  Chapter 5 
  
 
When considering discounted cash flows over a period of 40 years (2010-2050, 
Figure 5-16), we observe a discounted payback time of less than 40 years in the 
dense urban scenario, independent from the adoption curve. Also for an 
aggressive adoption in the urban scenario, we see a positive case in less than 40 
years. The rural case, however, never breaks even within the observed time span. 
The difference between the business case for 20 years and 30 years is much 
higher than going from 30 to 40 years. This can be explained by two effects. 
First, in 2030, the adoption curve hasn’t reached its maximum potential, so more 
customers will subscribe in 2030-2040 (while the number of new subscribers 
between 2040 and 2050 is negligible). Secondly, the further in the future the 
revenues are paid, the higher the effect of discounting, and thus the lower the 
impact on the cumulative revenue. Therefore, we decided not to look beyond a 
business case of 40 years. 
5.3.3.d Additional revenue sources  
Results up till now have assumed PIP revenues based on a per customer fee (of 
maximum 10 euro), in some cases differentiated based on the associated cost 
(Reggefiber model) combined with an expected adoption for advanced 
broadband services. We can however imagine additional revenues for a physical 
infrastructure provider, as the dark fiber he deploys could also be of interest to 
non-telecom customers. These revenues can be significant, as Stokab reported 
they can add up to 50% of their total revenue [5.44].  
Possible additional revenues can come from large businesses or public 
institutions (like administrations, hospitals, schools, etc.) that want to rent an 
end-to-end dark fiber connection, and use their own active equipment for lighting 
it up. This ensures a safe and secure connection between multiple establishments 
of one enterprise (e.g. a bank). If an FTTH network is present, it can also be used 
as a backhaul network for Next-Generation wireless offerings, such as Long-
Term Evolution (LTE) networks. The base stations of these networks can be 
connected to the fixed fiber network, and the wireless operators pay their fair 
part of the lease.  
As these extra revenue sources are very diverse and case-dependent, the 
quantification of these effects falls outside the scope of this research.  
5.3.3.e Combining improvements 
Although all separate improvements clearly benefit the economic outcome of the 
business case, they will most probably not be applied in isolation in real-life 
cases. Furthermore, the analysis still shows scenarios (especially in the urban and 
rural region) that do not find a positive outcome. It therefore makes sense to 
combine the improvements to verify whether positive business cases for those 
areas can be reached. We chose here to implement a selection of combined 
scenarios: small or large duct availability, a demand aggregation of 20 or 40% 
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and a planning horizon of 40 years. These combined improvements were 
compared to the reference case (which is the aggressive adoption curve, no duct 
availability, no demand aggregation and a planning horizon of 20 years). Figure 
5-17 shows the results for the three regions under study. 
 
Figure 5-17: Needed revenues per home connected for different combinations of 
combined improvements for the business case for the PIP 
Taking into account the assumed ARPU of €10 per month (red bold vertical lines 
in Figure 5-17) we see that the business case in a dense urban region is actually 
!
Revenues needed per Home Connected 
€ # € 2.0! € 4.0! € 6.0! € 8.0! € 10.0!
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
no
!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
sm
al
l!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
la
rg
e!
du
ct
!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
Dense%urban
BC!40!years
BC!20!years
 
€ # € 5.0! € 10.0! € 15.0! € 20.0!
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
no
!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
sm
al
l!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
la
rg
e!
du
ct
!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
Urban
BC!40!years
BC!20!years
 
€# €5! €10! €15! €20! €25! €30!
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
Aggressive
Aggressive!+!20%
Aggressive!+!40%
no
!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
sm
al
l!d
uc
t!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
la
rg
e!
du
ct
!
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
Rural
BC!40!years
BC!20!years
 
 
122  Chapter 5 
  
 
very positive, with all scenarios remaining well below this threshold. For the 
urban area, we see that especially the longer planning horizon proves a 
significant improvement to the business case. The combination of this longer 
planning horizon with one other measure (at least 20% demand aggregation or 
small duct availability) is sufficient to arrive at an interesting economic case. In 
the rural area, however, these conclusions do not hold and the business case will 
never prove to be economically viable.  Even when being able to reuse about 
50% of ducts (large availability, which is a rather unlikely scenario due to the 
low overall availability of “old” infrastructure in rural areas), attracting 40% of 
households from the start, and amortize the investment over a time-span of 40 
years, the business case still need more than the assumed €10 monthly ARPU. 
5.3.3.f Use of State Aid or other public funds  
In the previous sections we have indicated that, even when implementing 
improvement measures, the business case for the physical infrastructure provider 
remains very difficult, especially in rural areas. Despite of the potential 
additional revenues from e.g. non-telecom customers, the cost reduction based 
on duct reuse and the positive impact of demand aggregation on the timing of the 
revenues, it is clear that there will remain scenarios (combinations of areas and 
adoption curves) that will not result in a positive business case.  
In case the provision of a broadband network is regarded as a service of general 
economic interest ("SGEI") [5.41], state funding might fall outside the scope of 
State Aid and therefore could be a solution to make the case economically viable. 
Otherwise, in case the physical infrastructure is deployed by some undertaking, 
state funding might still be involved (e.g. in a Public Private Partnership) when 
the capital placed by the State - directly or indirectly- is at the disposal of an 
undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions. A 
third option allows Member states to call upon the Universal Service Directive to 
fund underserved regions. This directive specifies that: “Member States must 
ensure that the electronic communications services detailed in the Directive are 
made available to all users in their territory, regardless of their geographical 
location, at a specified quality level and an affordable price” [5.45]. Finally, 
when assigning Right-of-Way privileges to operators for densely populated 
areas, obligations to serve other remote regions can be coupled (cross-
subsidizing). 
5.3.4 Conclusions on the PIP business case 
This section investigated the business case for the physical infrastructure 
provider in a buried deployment, as previous research has shown that the civil 
works needed for deploying this infrastructure take up to 70% of the total 
investment. Different scenarios were calculated, based on reference areas (urban, 
dense urban and rural), as well as likely, aggressive and conservative adoption 
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curves. Based on an average monthly ARPU of max 10 euro, the case is only 
profitable in a dense urban area with aggressive adoption. In the other scenarios, 
the estimated payback time clearly exceeds the considered 20 years, thereby 
fiercely increasing the investment risk. 
Different improvements to the business case were hence proposed. Demand 
aggregation ensures a significant market share and therefore revenue 
immediately after deployment by having interested customers sign a cooperation 
agreement upfront. A level of demand aggregation of 40% can nearly make all 
scenarios in urban and dense urban areas profitable. Taking advantage of duct 
reuse has an important impact on the cost base; and leads to significant decreases 
of the trenching costs. Reusing ducts results in a very positive business case for a 
dense urban region, and makes the required investment pit for the urban and rural 
regions less deep, but does not result in a positive business case. Another option 
is to look for other types of customers than the pure residential ones: additional 
revenues from public institutions or businesses (large, medium and small 
enterprises) can help to improve the case. Furthermore, as we are considering an 
infrastructure investment here, it might make sense to prolong the planning 
horizon beyond 20 years. A discounted payback time of less than 40 years was 
observed in the dense urban scenario, independent from the adoption curve. Also 
for an aggressive adoption in the urban scenario, we see a positive case in less 
than 40 years.  
Since in real-life projects, these proposed improvement measures will not be 
implemented in isolation, but combined where possible, this section investigated 
this combined improvements’ impact too. When using more than one 
improvement measure, the business case for the dense urban area proves to be 
successful in almost all scenarios; for the urban areas, not all scenarios result in a 
positive outcome, but successful business cases can definitely be found when 
directing the market parameters right. We therefore suggest that Member State 
plans should comprise a balanced set of policy actions to incentivize and 
supplement private-sector action, with targeted measures for different region 
types. Private investment should be encouraged by appropriate coordination of 
planning and rules for sharing physical infrastructure and by targeted financing 
measures to reduce risk and promote new open infrastructures.  
 
Despite all measures discussed above, even if combined, the business case for 
the physical infrastructure provider in rural areas seems not to fly. The use of 
public funds might be the only way out. If the Member State considers the 
provision of a broadband network should be regarded as a service of general 
economic interest, state funding might fall outside the scope of State Aid and 
could therefore be feasible. The same holds when the capital placed by the State 
is at the disposal of an undertaking in circumstances which correspond to normal 
market conditions. 
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The Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access (NGA) 
networks suggests enabling attractive and fair profits for investors. If 
implemented, regulated prices for access to fiber networks should therefore fully 
reflect investment risk for the investing companies. Regulated fiber access prices 
are only available in a few Member States now (like the Netherlands), however, 
based on the discussion above we can assume that they will or should on average 
be clearly higher than the 10 euro assumed throughout this chapter. Furthermore, 
in order to remove risk for the PIP, fiber access prices can reflect costs in some 
way, e.g. taking into account distances or area types. 
5.4 Business case for the network provider 
In this section, we will investigate the business case for a network provider, who 
is responsible for deploying, activating and operating the active equipment on 
top of the passive infrastructure. We make the distinction between the traditional 
architectures and a selection of NGA architectures. For the traditional 
architectures, we consider a planning horizon of 10 years (from 2010 to 2020), 
since this corresponds more or less to the typical lifetime of active equipment 
[5.18]-[5.19]. For the NGOA architectures, we take a planning horizon of 20 
years, and consider migration from the traditional ones to the NGOA in 2020 (so 
that each architecture covers a lifetime of about 10 years).  
This section deals with the business case of one NP, meaning that we make 
abstraction of open access possibilities and competition on NP layer for now 
(this will be taken up in chapter 7). We therefore only consider service 
provisioning costs for new customers (as customers cannot change NPs): churn 
(number of switching end users, see chapter 7.2.3) on the NP layer is set to zero.  
5.4.1 Traditional architecture 
In this first section, we will focus on the evaluation for the business case for the 
NP for traditional architectures (P2P Ethernet, in which each end-customer is 
served by a dedicated fiber from the central office) over a planning horizon of 10 
years. We will calculate the NPV and needed revenues per customer for the NP 
for the nine combinations of regions and adoption curves (dense 
urban/urban/rural x conservative/likely/aggressive) as described in section 4.1.1 
and Figure 5-10. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the Customer 
Premises Equipment (CPE) cost (which includes the cost for in-house cabling 
and the ONT and its installation), and look for alternatives to improve the 
business case. So depending on the scenario under study, the total NP cost 
contains NP CapEx (Central Office equipment and installation), NP OpEx 
(operations and recurring costs like energy, maintenance and fault management), 
Service Provisioning (actual connection of the customers) and CPE costs (in-
building infrastructure and ONT, as well as operational expenditures related to 
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those). We will first give an overview of the TCO for an NP, to continue with the 
evaluation of the NPV and needed revenues for multiple scenarios. 
5.4.1.a TCO for the NP 
When evaluating the TCO for the NP (Figure 5-18), it becomes clear that this 
cost is much lower than the cost for the PIP (see Figure 5-11). It is furthermore 
much more influenced by the actual customer uptake, which can be explained by 
the fact that the NP only installs new equipment the moment it is needed (i.e. 
when new customers subscribe), while the PIP deploys everything in the 
beginning of the planning horizon. 
 
 
Figure 5-18: TCO for the NP, including NP, CPE and Serv. Prov. cost  
(cumulative and discounted with 10% after 10 years) 
The share each of the three costs takes up is also interesting to evaluate in more 
detail: the CPE cost is definitely the highest, and doesn’t vary too much with the 
adoption curve, while this impact is more visible in the NP and Service 
Provisioning cost.  
This can be explained by investigating the cost breakdown in more detail. As 
mentioned before, the CPE cost consists of the cost for the in-house cabling and 
the cost for the ONT (including installation). While the ONT cost is incurred 
only when the end-customer actually subscribes, the cost for in-house cabling 
(better understood as in-building cabling: providing the cables between 
households in Multi-Dwelling Units) is largely upfront (e.g. when one house 
organization decides to fiber up all its buildings). The ONT related costs in the 
CPE will therefore be more impacted by the adoption, while the upfront in-house 
cabling installation is to a large extent independent of the adoption curve (Figure 
5-19). 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e
Li
ke
ly
Ag
gr
es
siv
e
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e
Li
ke
ly
Ag
gr
es
siv
e
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e
Li
ke
ly
Ag
gr
es
siv
e
Dense9urban Urban Rural
M
ill
io
ns
'€
CPE
Serv.9Prov.
NP9Capex9and9Opex
126  Chapter 5 
  
 
 
Figure 5-19: Cumulative and discounted CPE cost for the dense urban region  
(10 years period, discount rate of 10%) 
 
 
Figure 5-20: Cumulative and discounted NP and service provisioning cost for the 
dense urban area, aggressive adoption curve 
The impact of the adoption curve on both CapEx and OpEx costs of the NP, as 
well as on the service provisioning is shown in Figure 5-20 (an example for the 
dense urban area and aggressive adoption curve). The S-shaped adoption curve 
can be clearly deducted from this graph and thus reflects the time-dependent 
expenses of the NP. It is exactly this time- or customer-dependency that 
differentiates the business case of the NP from that of the PIP: for a large part, 
the NP costs will only be made from the moment the NP has ensured revenue, 
while the PIP has to hope for a high subscription rate to recoup its huge upfront 
investments. This leads to a higher uncertainty for the PIP business case, which 
therefore is subject to higher risk. 
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5.4.1.b Evaluating the business case for the NP 
Keeping the cost analysis as described above in mind, this paragraph will 
investigate the business case for the NP by comparing the costs with the 
expected revenues.  
 
 
Figure 5-21: NPV curves for the NP business case (likely and conservative curves 
are coinciding) 
When using the estimated monthly customer revenue of €10 (as a first 
assumption, the NP revenues cannot exceed the monthly revenues for the PIP, 
given the comparison of needed investment in both layers), Figure 5-21 shows 
that the business case for the NP is not economically viable. The NPV is 
negative in all scenarios, and doesn’t seem to improve in the long run. This can 
be explained when returning to the cost breakdown described in the previous 
paragraph: the large investment pit in the beginning of the planning period is due 
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to the in-house cabling cost that the NP makes upfront, while the extra costs 
incurred later in the planning period are due to the ONT costs and installation. 
Although amelioration is seen at the end, it doesn’t cover for the high initial pit. 
The curves are quite similar for the different areas and adoption forecasts (Figure 
5-21), it is only the debt of the curve that is different. As will be concluded later 
is this paragraph, this can be explained by the dependency of the overall NP cost 
on the number of subscribers. 
 
It is clear that €10 per customer per month will not suffice to cover the business 
case for the NP (with the forecasted adoption curves and planning horizon), but 
what is then a realistic price? Figure 5-22 provides the answer: in the aggressive 
adoption scenario at least about €21 per customer per month, in the likely 
adoption €75-90 and in the conservative even €90-110! It is thus clear that the 
business case for the NP in these economic conditions does not fly! 
 
 
Figure 5-22: Needed revenues (per customer per month) to arrive at a positive 
business case for the NP after 10 years, including CPE cost 
5.4.1.c Possibilities to improve the business case for the NP 
From the previous analysis, it has become clear that in the assumed conditions, 
the NP will never have a positive business case. Other paths should therefore be 
explored to verify what can be done to better reflect the reality (the business case 
for the NP is never seen as truly economically unviable). This paragraph will 
discuss several possibilities, like charging the customer an upfront fee to cover 
for the high CPE cost, prolonging the planning horizon, ensuring a higher 
adoption uptake by demand aggregation, etc. 
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Recouping the CPE cost by charging an upfront fee 
From Figure 5-18, it is clear that it is the high CPE cost that makes the business 
case so negative. This paragraph will therefore focus on finding other ways to 
recoup these high costs. As shown in Figure 5-19, the CPE cost mainly consists 
of two parts: the in-house cabling on the one side, and the ONT including 
installation on the other. Both also incur some operational expenses for fault 
management and energy consumption (but those are only minor).  
 
How to recoup the in-house cabling cost? 
As described above, the in-house cabling is mainly done upfront, when a group 
of building owners or housing organizations decide to wire their buildings with 
fiber. This wiring can be done by the PIP, by the housing organization itself, or 
by the NP. It therefore can be the responsibility of the NP, but this is not 
necessary. Furthermore, this responsibility is only applicable for multi-dwelling 
units, since for single houses, the fiber will most likely end at the front door of 
the customer’s premises. 
In this case, we assume that the in-house cabling is asked for by the housing 
organizations, and consequently paid by them. The housing organizations 
themselves can then recoup the costs by increasing the rent for the apartments 
with a couple of euro a month. 
If we assume 50% of the people living in MDUs, the housing organizations 
would have to increase their monthly rent with €3-€4.50 (for all inhabitants, 
independent of their actual subscription to the FTTH network), depending on the 
area, which is a marginal increase when compared to the average monthly rentals 
for apartments across Europe. 
 
How to recoup the cost for the ONT and its installation? 
When a customer decides to subscribe, a socket and ONT should be installed in 
his home to ensure the end-to-end connectivity. When comparing to current 
VDSL or DOCSIS installations, operators frequently charge the customers a one-
off installation fee. It thus makes sense to investigate how much this fee would 
need to be in the case of FTTH ONT installation. 
When taking into account that this upfront cost should cover for the ONT, its 
installation and the possible operational expenditures over a period of 10 years, 
an upfront charge of about €50 - €55 should be charged to each customer, which 
is reasonable and comparable to the upfront fees charged by DSL or DOCSIS 
operators nowadays. It furthermore is not too high, because this fee is charged in 
the same time period (year) in which the cost for it is made. If costs are only 
recouped in a later stage, the impact of discounting makes that a much higher fee 
should be paid then. 
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What is the impact of excluding CPE costs on the business case for the NP? 
Following the results of the extra upfront charge and monthly rental increase, 
which can be assumed as reasonable, we decide now to leave them out when 
calculating the business case for the NP. The updated NPV curves, which now 
only include “true” NP and service provisioning costs, are shown in Figure 5-23 
(for a monthly customer revenue of €10). It is clear that this evaluation is 
definitely better from an economic point of view, the business case is positive in 
every scenario. 
 
 
Figure 5-23: NPV curves for the NP business case, excluding the CPE costs, show 
positive results for all cases (likely and conservative curves are coinciding) 
Using estimated monthly revenue of €10 per customer, the results are positive, 
but how many revenues are now exactly needed? The answer is given in Figure 
5-24: €5.75 - €7.50 per user per month, depending on the area and the adoption 
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curve. Although the difference in between area types and uptakes are much 
smaller than for the PIP results (even invisible in the figure), there is a trend in 
these dependencies on area type and adoption curve. Similar to the PIP, the cost 
for deploying active end-to-end connectivity in a dense urban area is cheaper 
than in a rural area, and thus the needed revenues there will be lower. When 
looking at the adoption curve on the other hand, we see a different trend: the 
higher the uptake, the higher the needed revenue. This can be explained by the 
impact of discounting: in case of the aggressive curve, customers are connected 
earlier on, so that, although the absolute cost is the same, the discounted cost is 
higher. 
 
 
Figure 5-24: Needed revenues (per customer per month) to arrive at a positive 
business case for the NP after 10 years, for the case including CPE costs and 
excluding CPE costs 
Why are these charges so much lower than the one presented in the business case 
for the NP including the CPE costs? An explanation can be found in the way the 
costs are recouped: 
- The upfront in-house cabling is recouped by letting ALL households 
pay a higher rent if the MDU is fibered up, even if the household itself 
doesn’t subscribe to the network (and thus decides not to take an 
Internet subscription). Dividing the high in-house cabling cost by all 
residents leads to a very low extra fee (a couple of euro per month), in 
comparison to a very high fee for the few FTTH subscribers. 
- The ONT cost is recouped at quasi the same moment as it is made, 
which filters out the impact of discounting (i.e. if fees are paid during a 
later period in time, they are less worth because the value of money 
decreases over time). 
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Demand aggregation to ensure take-up from the beginning 
Although recouping the CPE costs in one or another way is the most likely 
option to improve the business case for the NP, we also investigate the impact of 
demand aggregation: what is the impact on the business case if there is an 
ensured take-up of 20% or 40% from the beginning of the project?  
 
 
Figure 5-25: NPV curves for the NP business case (including CPE costs) show 
that demand aggregation improves the business case, but does not make it viable 
Figure 5-25 (example of the aggressive adoption curve) shows that there is 
clearly an improvement to the business case if there is a demand aggregation of 
20% or 40%. In the case of 40%, the NPV is almost positive after 10 years for 
the dense urban and urban regions, and even absolutely positive for the rural 
regions. The difference in between regions can be explained by the fact that, for 
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the rural region, there is less in-house cabling needed since there are not so many 
MDUs. 
The revenues needed per customer per month shrink sharply to about €13 for the 
aggressive adoption curve with 20% demand aggregation, and even to about the 
assumed €10 per customer per month for 40% aggregation of demand from the 
start. 
5.4.1.d Conclusion on the NP business case for traditional architectures 
Following the results of the paragraphs above, we can conclude that the business 
case for the network provider for recouping the investment in traditional 
architectures (the results follow the example of a P2P Ethernet) is viable, on the 
conditions that the cost for in-building and ONT (including installation) is 
recouped in an alternative way. We proposed to recoup the in-building wiring 
through the housing companies, which in turn can slightly increase their rent, and 
recoup the ONT cost by charging a small upfront fee to new users. 
5.4.2 Business case over 20 years: migration to Next 
Generation architectures 
As mentioned above, the active equipment (network layer) has a far shorter 
lifetime than the physical infrastructure (10 years on average compared to 20-50 
years). If comparing the investment for the PIP with the investment case for the 
NP, the planning horizon is therefore an important parameter to take into 
account.  
While the previous section calculated the NP business case for a shorter planning 
horizon (10 years), this section will approximate the planning horizon of the 
physical infrastructure, therefore taking into account the migration step to Next 
Generation (NG) architectures in the middle of the planning period (year 10). 
Two architectures will be compared: Next generation AON (NG-AON), 
migration from AON, and time and wavelength division multiplexing (TWDM) 
PON, migration from GPON [5.46]. For an explanation about AON and 
TDM/WDM PONs, we refer to section 3.2.2. 
5.4.2.a NG-AON and TWDM-PON 
NG-AON (Figure 5-26a) is the natural evolution of an AON, active star 
architecture in which the customer has already been connected by means of 
Ethernet switches (32 ports switches are used in the study) from the central 
office (CO) via an intermediate aggregation point at a remote node/cabinet. One 
of the NG-AON variations is to adopt WDM-PON technology which can be used 
to backhaul the existing AON active star architecture. In a migration towards a 
node consolidation strategy [5.47], the first level of (or legacy) COs in the 
current FTTH network will be closed down, and hence, the OLTs and other 
equipment in the CO must be relocated further to an aggregated central access 
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node (CAN). In relation to the NG-AON solution, arrayed waveguide gratings 
(AWG, 1:40) are placed in the legacy CO locations to backhaul all the traffic and 
forward them to the CAN. In total, this NG-AON can serve up to 32x40 (1280) 
customers from one feeder fiber. The migration from the existing AON active 
star to NG-AON (WDM PON backhauling) architecture can be deployed 
smoothly without changing the fiber infrastructure in the existing distribution 
network. Some NP equipment in the existing AON architecture (e.g. optical 
network terminals (ONTs) and Ethernet switches) can be reused in the NG-AON. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-26: Architecture changes for (a) migration from active star AON to NG-
AON, and (b) migration from GPON 1:16 to TWDM-PON 
TWDM-PON (Figure 5-26b) is a natural evolution of a TDM-PON in which the 
customer is connected to the CO by means of a power splitter (1:16) (see also 
section 3.2.2.a). As TWDM-PON solution, we assume that 80 of the existing 
1:16 TDM-PONs are gathered further in the network by means of a 1:80 AWG. 
In this way each TDM-PON has its own wavelength and serves in turn 16 
customers in a TDM manner. In total, a TWDM-PON80x16 will serve up to 
1280 customers from one feeder fiber.   
This chapter will compare the migration costs of NG-AON and TWDM-PON, 
and indicate how they can be made competitive. 
5.4.2.b TCO for both migration paths 
The Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) includes both upfront and operational costs, 
and makes the distinction between general capital and operational expenditures 
(CapEx, OpEx), service provisioning and customer premises equipment (CPE - 
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installation and maintenance of the ONT). CapEx include the purchase and 
installation cost of the equipment in the CO and remote nodes, while OpEx refer 
to maintenance and energy consumption of this equipment. Patching and 
administrative costs related to a new subscription are grouped under service 
provisioning. When calculating the TCO for both migrations, and taking into 
account a payback of investment within 10 years, it is possible to determine the 
needed ARPU for the NP for each reference scenario (Figure 5-27). Since we 
consider two technologies that result from a natural evolution of typical, current 
deployments (Active Ethernet AON and TDM-PON), we assume a migration 
towards the new technologies in 2020 (hard migration of all connected customers 
in one year), as this provides a fair basis for the cost comparison. We will 
therefore only study the business case from 2020-2030 (a planning horizon of 10 
years), and make abstraction of the costs incurred in previous periods. 
 
 
Figure 5-27: Needed monthly ARPU to turn break-even after 10 years, for both 
migration steps  
From this analysis, it is clear that the TCO for migrating from GPON to TWDM-
PON is higher than the migration from AON to NG-AON. This can mainly be 
explained by the need for replacement of the GPON ONTs, while the original 
AON ONT can be reused. The AON ONT will also need replacement 
somewhere in the lifetime, but this exchange should not be performed at once. 
The CPE CapEx and OpEx (replacement of ONTs for existing customers, new 
ONTs for new users and in-house installation, maintenance and energy 
consumption for both) therefore takes up a much higher share of total cost in 
TWDM-PON than in NG-AON (30-50% versus 10-40% respectively, depending 
on the adoption curve). 
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The impact of the adoption curve is also interesting: the higher the initial 
adoption in time of migration, the lower the needed ARPU, which can be 
justified by the higher number of subscribers sharing part of the upfront 
investment (NP CapEx – purchase and installation of CO equipment, as well as 
CPE CapEx – sharing of in-building installations, see Figure 5-28).  The results 
for the likely and conservative curve show less difference than likely and 
aggressive, but this can be easily explained by a smaller difference between 
those adoption curves (see Figure 5-10). 
Finally, we see a higher service provisioning cost per customer in NG-AON, 
which can be explained by the higher cost of physical provisioning required at 
remote nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5-28: Breakdown of the yearly cost per customer for a network provider 
(Dense Urban area)  
5.4.2.c How to improve the business case for TWDM-PON 
When comparing the ARPU found above with current FTTH offer prices, we can 
conclude that the business case for TWDM-PON migration will most probably 
not hold. It is therefore appropriate to search for improvements. 
Since a large part of the TCO can be attributed to the necessary replacement of 
the ONTs in the PON migration case, recouping these costs in another way might 
help to reduce the monthly needed ARPU. One option is to charge an upfront 
fee, marketed as a necessary installation fee for upgrading the customer’s 
subscription. 
Charging customers €100 installation fee (which corresponds in order of 
magnitude to the cost of a TWDM-PON ONT), reduces the needed monthly 
ARPU to €6 - 12 (in line with NG-AON). 
A second option to improve the business case is to spread the cost of migration 
over time (referred to as ‘soft migration’). In this case, all new customers are 
connected directly to the new technology, while the existing customers are left 
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with the choice for upgrading. In this way, the investment is spread out over a 
number of ‘soft migration years’, after which a forced migration upgrades the 
remaining customers on the old technology. In order to avoid parallel operations 
of two technology generations, the soft migration period should be kept limited 
in time. However, for the TWDM-PON architecture under study here, the extra 
cost of this co-existence is limited (introduction of a migration specific WDM 
coupler per TDM-PON during the maintenance window), so we study the impact 
of soft migration over the entire planning horizon (1-10 years) for the exemplary 
case of an urban area with aggressive adoption (Figure 5-29). The impact of the 
soft migration is clearly shown as a shift (and reduction, due to the effect of 
discounting) of the cost migration peak to a later stage. This may lead to savings 
on cumulative CPE CapEx of 3% for a 5-years-, and even 5% for a 10-years- soft 
migration period. 
 
 
Figure 5-29: Prolonging the soft migration period shifts and lowers the 
investment peak for the CPE CapEx  
5.4.2.d Conclusions of the migration business case 
Although the initial CapEx investment in AON infrastructure might be higher 
than the investment in PON, this analysis clearly shows that upgrading AONs is 
cheaper than upgrading PONs. On the other hand, if the costs for CPE equipment 
(ONT, optical socket and installation) can be recouped in another way or spread 
out over time, this significantly ameliorates the business case for PON upgrade 
and makes it again competitive to AON. 
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5.5 Summary and conclusions 
The previous chapters showed, by exploring technological, policy and market 
conditions, that the business case for FTTH investment is difficult. Therefore, 
before starting the actual production or rollout, a need arises for a detailed 
modeling and understanding of the different costs that are included, and this for 
the different partners involved. The business model shows which partners to 
contact and which cost factors to take into account, but this is merely a starting 
point. A detailed cost modeling is required in order to get a good estimation of 
the costs, but also get a look at the potential risks, alternative scenarios, etc. It is 
important to build such cost models based on expert knowledge and translate this 
into a model everybody can intuitively understand and which naturally follows 
the actual cost structure. As such several domain specific cost modeling 
languages should be used and combined into one overarching model. In a first 
part of this chapter, we detailed both the cost and revenue modeling languages 
that can be used in evaluating the business case for FTTH deployment. The first 
language allows modeling the trenching and cable distance for newly-to-deploy 
networks, and is based on a set of analytical models. ECMN, the second 
language, allows calculating the amount and cost of equipment placement by 
setting up a granular tree structure. BPMN uses process flowcharts to estimate 
the cost of specific processes. Finally, different approaches for revenue modeling 
were proposed. 
This explanation of the used models was followed by a quantitative evaluation 
section, which provided the business case results for a physical infrastructure 
deployment. By calculating different scenarios, based on reference areas (urban, 
dense urban and rural) and adoption curves (likely, aggressive and conservative), 
the conclusion was made that the business case is only profitable in a dense 
urban area with aggressive adoption. In the other scenarios, the needed revenues 
are much higher than the assumed monthly ARPU of €10, which followed from 
realistic case studies. It thus made sense to take a closer look at the business case 
assumptions, and identify potential refinements that can improve the case and 
hence reduce the economic risk: demand aggregation, reusing available ducts, 
additional revenues from public institutions or businesses, prolonging the 
planning horizon, etc. Following these improvements, the business case could be 
made viable in dense urban and urban areas, but for rural areas, subsidies or state 
aid measures seem the only way out. 
 
A third and final part of the chapter investigated the business case for the 
network provider. Although the NP’s investment only constitutes 30% of the 
overall deployment costs, the active equipment has a shorter lifetime (in the 
order of 10 years), which is also an important factor in the analysis. Two 
approaches were taken to include the notion of a shorter lifetime: a business case 
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for only the traditional architectures on a 10-year planning period on the one 
hand, and a business case over 20 years including a migration to NG 
architectures on the other.  
In the analysis of the traditional architectures, the conclusion was made that the 
business case is viable, on the condition that the CPE costs are not taken into 
account when calculating the needed monthly ARPU. The cost for in-building 
networks can be recouped through the housing organizations, while the cost for 
the ONT (and its installation) are easiest taken into account by charging an 
upfront fee to new subscribers.  
The business case over 20 years compared a migration scenario for two 
architectures: NG-AON (upgrade from AON) and TWDM-PON (upgrade form 
GPON). Although the initial CapEx investment in AON infrastructure might be 
higher than the investment in PON, this chapter clearly shows that upgrading 
AONs is cheaper than upgrading PONs. On the other hand, if the costs for CPE 
equipment (ONT, optical socket and installation) can be recouped in another way 
or spread out over time, this significantly ameliorates the business case for PON 
upgrade and makes it again competitive to AON. 
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6  
Modeling for public partners: 
extension to social cost-benefit 
analysis 
 “The Gross National Product does not include the beauty of our poetry 
or the intelligence of our public debate.  
It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom  
nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion.  
It measures everything, in short,  
except that which makes life worthwhile” 
- Robert F. Kennedy 
As mentioned already in chapter 2, deploying an FTTH network is not only a 
technological matter. Following the results of the cost-benefit analysis for the 
different layers in the FTTH network (sections 5.3 and 5.4), it is clear that, 
especially for the deployment of the physical infrastructure, the business case is 
not viable in many areas. Furthermore, the market and policy analysis of several 
FTTH deployments showed that, in many cases, other actors will be involved in 
the FTTH network rollout and operations (see chapter 4). Although technical and 
economical improvements were already suggested and evaluated in the previous 
chapter, this involvement of especially public actors, such as governments, 
municipalities or other authorities, makes room for evaluating other benefits an 
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FTTH network would entail, thereby affecting many, if not all, sectors of the 
economy and society. Despite an increasing growth of broadband networks 
combined with a rising number of studies calculating in great detail the direct 
costs and benefits of these deployments, less attention has been paid to the 
indirect effects resulting from those emerging applications. This chapter will 
therefore rely on the results of [6.1] and [6.2] to investigate the field of indirect 
benefits by both identifying and quantifying them. As these effects have proven 
to contribute to economic growth, this chapter argues for including indirect 
benefits in the techno-economic analysis, thereby extending it to a social cost-
benefit analysis (SCBA). 
 
After this introduction paragraph, section 6.1 defines indirect benefits, lists the 
sectors under study, and gives an overview of existing studies. A model for 
conceptualization, measurement and quantification is proposed in section 6.2, 
and is applied to the areas of eGovernment (related in particular to savings on 
travel and waiting time by introducing an e-counter) and eBusiness (related to 
reducing traffic jams by allowing employees to work at home) in section 6.3. In a 
bottom up manner, section 6.4 quantifies the indirect benefits in these two 
sectors by studying two cities: Ghent (Belgium) and Eindhoven (the 
Netherlands), chosen based on comparability regarding number of inhabitants 
and information-intensive enterprises, size, presence of university, etc. By 
quantifying these benefits per actor, we show that the indirect benefits would 
provide large businesses and local authorities additional incentives to stimulate 
investment in broadband networks. The results are benchmarked to the results of 
previous studies in section 6.5, and linked to regulations and investment 
decisions in section 6.6. Finally, section 6.7 concludes this chapter. 
6.1 Indirect benefits:  
what, and more importantly: why? 
Conventionally, investment in broadband access networks has been evaluated 
using the narrow focus of cost-benefit analyses (CBAs), which indicate that 
investments needed to upgrade current networks are huge and can hardly be 
covered by customers’ incremental monthly subscription fees [6.3]-[6.4], but 
which insufficiently identify indirect effects generated by e-services emerging in 
sectors outside of telecom. Based on the Bresnahan and Trajtenberg’s concept of 
general purpose technologies [6.5], however, it has been shown that broadband 
infrastructure can act as an enabler supporting an endless variety of applications 
using the Internet as a platform [6.6]. As such, broadband access networks are 
pervasive technologies affecting different sectors of the economy in providing 
opportunities for growth of new e-services in a complementary manner. If these 
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complementarities are taken into account, CBAs have to focus in great detail on 
the conceptualization, measurement and quantification of indirect effects [6.7].  
We argue that indirect effects of broadband infrastructure should be taken into 
account in the evaluation of broadband deployment projects as these effects are 
responsible for economic growth and thus necessary to account for the full 
impact of broadband deployment and uptake. Since Aschauer’s original 
argument [6.8] that there may be substantial discrepancies between the results of 
conventional CBAs and the ultimate effects of such investments on welfare, 
research in the public choice tradition has increasingly focused on the existence 
and the quantification of indirect effects.  Furthermore, the “Guide to Cost 
Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects” [6.9] stresses the need for incorporating 
the socio-economic benefits in the project objective and evaluation, but 
acknowledges the difficulties in predicting and quantifying all impacts of the 
project6. 
6.1.1 Many terms, one definition? 
Indirect effects, social benefits, induced effects, uncaptured value, etc.: there are 
many terms to indicate the extension of a traditional cost-benefit analysis to a 
social cost-benefit analysis. Before explaining the model used for identification, 
categorization and quantification, let us first start by giving a definition of 
indirect effects.  
Forzati et al [6.12] write about uncaptured values and identify them as “an 
important portion of benefits which are not necessarily internalized and 
represented by the end-user willingness to pay for specific services”. In a study 
by Eijgenraam et al. [6.13], indirect effects are effects that are not a direct 
consequence of the project, but which follow from the direct effects. Common 
examples they mention are re-distribution effects, cluster effects, welfare effects 
and efficiency improvements. An investment in infrastructure (road or railway) 
could on the one hand lead to a higher clustering of certain activities, which 
induces higher economies of scale (e.g. production of certain regions is grouped), 
but on the other lead to a higher spread of other activities, which in turn induces 
a reduction in traffic costs. As such, they argue that the indirect effects should 
always be evaluated case-by-case, as they frequently involve trade-offs. They 
furthermore mention the notion of external effects, which are defined as 
unwanted, non-priced effects on the welfare of those who will not directly be a 
consumer of the project. Good examples here are consequences of infrastructure 
projects for the environment and nature. 
 
6 It should be noted though that the context and historical developments strongly affect 
these effects. Recent work (e.g. [6.10]-[6.11]) suggests that ICTs do not always lead to 
productive uses by people. For more details, we refer to section 6.5.2. 
148  Chapter 6 
  
 
The “Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects” [6.9] makes the 
distinction between indirect effects and indirect network effects. Indirect effects 
are “effects outside the transport market as the result of a transport initiative, 
typically including changes in output, employment and residential population at 
particular locations”. They mention the example of people moving because of 
better connections to their work due to new infrastructure. Indirect network 
effects are “effects on the transport network of choices made in other markets 
(land and property markets, the labor market, product markets and the capital 
market), as a result of changes in generalized costs brought about by a transport 
initiative”. For instance, they mention a change in the way traffic flows due to 
the moving of many households because of the installation of a new 
infrastructure. 
In this work, we will use an intermediate, more generalized definition, stating 
that indirect benefits are benefits for one actor, caused by actions of another 
actor. Indirect effects from a network deployment are not limited to the 
telecommunications sector only, but spread out to the entire economic, social 
and cultural environment. Examples include savings that can be made from 
keeping elderly longer at home, benefits from e-learning and possibilities for 
businesses and their employees (teleworking, cloud computing etc.). 
6.1.2 Impact on sectors outside of telecommunications 
Introducing broadband or more specifically, Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) 
networks will entail new services in many sectors outside the 
telecommunications domain Figure 6-1.  
 
 
Figure 6-1: Overview of sectors influenced by indirect effects of broadband 
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courses or working from home, thereby significantly reducing transport needs 
and time. Also in other sectors, such as eGovernment and eGaming, similar 
savings effects can be found. In investigating a number of sectors, [6.14] 
concluded that the cost savings in just four sectors of the economy (particularly 
transport, health, electricity and education) would justify the construction of a 
nationwide FTTH network. Although having looked at different sectors of the 
society, this chapter will only focus on two specific sectors where most indirect 
benefits can be expected in the near future [6.15]: eBusiness and eGovernment. 
6.1.3  Evaluating indirect benefits 
Literature has just started to provide conceptual frameworks to examine these 
indirect benefits. In the discussion on the “real” benefits of broadband 
infrastructure for economic growth [6.16]-[6.17], rarely any agreement has been 
reached with respect to common methodologies and appropriate data sources to 
measure and evaluate these benefits.  Although there have been a few studies 
focusing on the value of these indirect benefits, they have not been consistent 
and frequently not transparent in describing their methodologies. It is 
furthermore not always clear if the baseline for comparison is a low-speed 
connection (e.g. dial-up), broadband (e.g. ADSL) or no Internet connection at all. 
The authors are aware of the fact that this study is not the first in its sort, but do 
however believe that the identification, categorization and quantification 
processes used overcome some pitfalls of previous research. This section will 
therefore shortly compare with previously published models, which are divided 
into two categories: bottom-up (the approach used later in this chapter) and top-
down. Top-down models use statistical methods on macro-economic data to 
draw conclusions about trends and causal effects. A bottom-up model, on the 
other hand, starts from the added value of individual effects, which are later 
summed to get an overall effect on society. Although this paragraph will focus 
mostly on the benefits of the bottom-up model that will be introduced in this 
chapter, we admit that both bottom-up and top-down models can be 
complementary in evaluating the value of indirect benefits. 
6.1.3.a Top-down 
First of all, the comparison with top-down approaches should be made. Top-
down approaches are models which use macro-economic input data in statistical 
evaluation models, such as regression or input-output analysis. Katz et al. [6.18], 
for example, investigated the impact of broadband on the German economy, 
using input-output analysis on two investment scenarios: a national broadband 
strategy (50 Mbps for all by 2014), and an ultra-broadband strategy (at least 50 
Mbps on VDSL, 100 Mbps on fiber by 2020). Another recent study calculates 
the effects of FTTH-FTTx on employment and population evolution in Sweden 
[6.19]. They apply a multivariate regression analysis, but only use a limited 
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number of time periods (2007-2010). Finally, we refer to the research of Ida et 
al. [6.20], who use a mixed logic econometric model on the results of a large-
scale survey to estimate the willingness to pay for services over FTTH in Japan. 
Here, the main drawback is, as mentioned in [6.21], that “people often don’t 
know what their willingness to pay for a product is, until they are required to 
make a purchase”. 
The main advantage of using top-down approaches is the theoretical 
underpinning of the models themselves, which improves the reliability of the 
results. However, since most models experience a large degree of complexity, 
they are frequently misused and results are often wrongly interpreted. 
Furthermore, statistical models only indicate a correlation in between 
parameters, but do not procure causal insights of individual effects and benefits. 
A final, and perhaps most important, drawback of these types of methods is the 
use of macro-economic data, which allow only for ex-post evaluation. Of course, 
predictions of future behavior can be asked for in surveys (as was partly done in 
[6.20]), but these data are rather subjective and can be biased. 
6.1.3.b Bottom-up 
Following the argumentation described above, we opted for a bottom-up 
quantification, because (i) the possibility of forecasting, (ii) the (causal) 
relationship of individual effects and their subsequently generated benefits. This 
paragraph will describe some previously published bottom-up studies and 
indicate where they are different from the methodology used in this research. 
The methodology of the New Zealand Institute [6.22] is comparable to the 
methodology used in this chapter: they also start from a number of sectors, for 
which they expect indirect benefits. Evidence and values for these indirect 
effects are gathered from national and international sources. The main difference 
is that they quantified the value for each effect at once, and did not start from the 
value per individual or unit, as will be done in this chapter. The methodology is 
therefore less detailed, and risks double-counting effects by grouping them.  
The study of Columbia Telecommunications [6.23] is less transparent in its 
methodology, the main similarities with our study are that they also used a 
categorization tree, they only quantified actual monetary savings, and they used 
interviews with experts on the field to identify the effects and gather input data. 
This study claims to evaluate the benefits of high-speed broadband on top of 
traditional broadband, but a meta-study by Hayes [6.15] shows that these 
assumptions do not hold. 
The study that matches best with our study in methodology used is the study by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers [6.21]. They also investigated the effects of different 
specific applications using the bottom-up approach, and made the distinction 
between adoption of broadband in general and the adoption rate of the different 
applications. While in that study, only an overall economic benefit was 
Modeling for public partners: extension to social cost-benefit analysis 151 
 
calculated, this study adds the allocation of the benefits to the different actors. 
They furthermore included the quantification of subjective and large 
environmental effects (e.g. opportunity cost of time involved in commuting 
related to salary, the cost of traffic congestion and the effect on the climate 
change), which we did not consider. Finally, the willingness to pay (WTP), 
which was estimated as the current subscription revenues, was attributed to the 
direct benefits in the overall economic total. We however believe that this WTP 
of customers does not necessary equal the current average revenue per user 
(ARPU); in a lot of European countries where there is a lack of competition, 
broadband subscription rates are sometimes said to be kept artificially high by 
incumbents, as regulatory authorities see the need for setting price caps and 
defining access regulation [6.24]. 
The final study we want to mention is The Guide to Cost Benefit Analysis of 
Investment Projects [6.9], which acknowledges the importance of including both 
direct and indirect effects, and applies quasi the same monetization methodology 
to reflect social opportunity and market value cost for indirect effects. The main 
difference with our study is that they do not attribute these costs to the actors.  
 
Having identified the clear need for the identification and quantification of these 
effects, as well as the discrepancy in previous evaluation studies, this chapter 
investigates the indirect benefits using a bottom-up approach, which allows to 
more clearly link the monetary results to the individual effects [6.25], while top-
down methods only evaluate the overall effect using aggregated macro-economic 
data. It therefore provides more detailed results compared to top-down 
approaches [6.26]-[6.27]. Furthermore, since no macro-economic data 
comparing ante- and post-deployment situations are needed, our model allows 
forecasting the value of the effects whereas top-down models only allow for 
evaluating ex-post of deployment. The main disadvantage of bottom-up 
approaches is its sensitivity to input assumptions: since calculations are based on 
a range of input parameters, multiplications of a large number of small 
deviations could have a significant impact on the output. Careful and well-
founded estimation of input data is therefore an absolute requirement of a 
bottom-up approach. 
6.2 Identification, categorization and quantification 
of indirect benefits: a description of a bottom-up 
model 
As described above, this chapter will focus on modeling the indirect effects using 
a bottom-up approach. This section will describe the identification and 
categorization process, give some more details on the practical approach of data 
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gathering and explain the evaluation model. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the advantages of bottom-up modeling are a clearer link between results 
and individual effects, more detailed results and a possibility of forecasting. 
Despite some criticism of cost modeling exercises for infrastructure planning 
[6.28], an objective method for quantifying indirect social benefits of broadband 
networks should be used by decision-makers to think about “real” solutions to 
municipal problems, such as savings achieved by telecommuting or e-
government services. 
6.2.1 Identification process is defined in a tree structure, 
categorization is performed along three dimensions 
The identification process takes the form of a tree structure, starting from the 
different sectors that can be influenced, to identifying specific services (and 
subservices) that are deployed, to finally arrive at the actual effects. Figure 6-2 
gives a graphical representation of this identification tree structure, both in 
general (a), as well as applied to the concrete example of teleworking (b). Using 
this tree structure for the identification process allowed structuring the different 
effects, and ensured completeness.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6-2: Generic example of identification tree 
The individual effects are subsequently categorized along three dimensions: 
measurability, term and actor (Table 6-1). 
Table 6-1: Abbreviations used for categorization 
Measurability S Subjective 
O Objective 
Term LT Long term 
ST Short term  
Actor influenced 
G Government and local authorities 
C Companies 
I Individuals 
S Society 
 
Sector
Service Service
Subservice Subservice
Effect Effect
…
…
eBusiness
Teleworking Training/of/employees
Working/from/
home
Video8
conferencing
Reduced/travel Reduced/stress
…
…
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The dimension measurability indicates whether the value of the effect can easily 
be transformed into a monetary value. There is a distinction between subjective 
(cannot be converted in a monetary value) and objective (can be more easily 
converted into a monetary value). 
The second dimension is the term: here the effects are grouped on basis of the 
period in which the underlying services reach the minimal adoption rate, 
meaning that 50% of the target audience uses the specific service and will 
therefore be impacted by the effect. An arbitrary distinction is made between 
short term (operational within 2 years after deployment) and long term (more 
than 2 years are needed to reach 50% adoption).  
The third and last dimension of categorization refers to who benefits from the 
effects. The distinction is made between “government” (all local and national 
authorities), “companies” (all private entities, both SME’s and larger firms), 
“individuals” (inhabitants of the region under study) and “society” (a more 
general actor that accounts for e.g. environmental effects).  
6.2.2 Practical approach and data gathering process 
The process of building up the tree’s structure was done iteratively, based on a 
combination of desk research in literature and interviews with several experts in 
the field to validate and comment. The literature studied included publications in 
national and international journals, consultancy reports, presentations, press 
releases and websites (concrete sources are referred to further). Interviews were 
conducted with representatives of cities, ICT responsibles of universities and 
some smaller companies, head of a telecom company, etc. It should be noted that 
the list of identified effects is not exhaustive, but aims at capturing the most 
important ones.  
Geographical, demographical and statistical data were gathered using national 
and regional databases, while sector-specific data were collected from 
measurements at the departments of the city and some companies, respectively. 
An overview of all data used can be found in Appendix A of this book. 
6.2.3 A bottom-up quantification model 
The quantification model, consisting of three calculation steps per effect, was 
developed by the authors. The first calculation step quantifies the Total Value 
Potential (TVP) per service, which indicates the maximum monetary value a 
certain service or effect could entail, independent of the market that adopts it. 
Secondly, since the goal is to allocate the right monetary benefit to the right 
actor, we calculate the Total Value per actor (TVPa) per time period by taking 
into account the share of the actor and the adoption curve of the service. The 
actor’s share represents the portion of the total effect that can be contributed to 
the respective actor, determined according to a statistical allocation key, while 
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the adoption curve represents how fast the service is taken up by the customers. 
Finally, the effect of adoption of the technology, broadband or FTTH, is taken 
into account, resulting in the Total Value for all effects for broadband or FTTH, 
respectively.  These different calculation steps are shortly explained and clarified 
by means of exemplary figures for the specific case of teleworking below. Note 
that all formulas detail the benefits per year, and that a multi-period analysis 
should include discounting before final summation. 
As mentioned above, one should first calculate the TVP per service. This is a 
simple multiplication of four parameters: the population group experiencing 
influence of the effect (e.g. the labor force), the benefit expressed in units U (e.g. 
amount of km saved by avoiding commuting), the conversion factor (e.g. 1 km 
equals €0.5, taking into account the fuel and insurance costs of the vehicle 
([6.29]-[6.30]), and the occurrence (in case of teleworking, we assume that 
people work 1 day per working week from home, which leads to 44 days a year). 
 
 
 
To calculate the TVP per actor (TVPa), the TVP for each service is multiplied 
with the share of the respective actor (e.g. about 90% of the cars are privately 
owned, so 90% of the benefits are assigned to “individuals”) and the Adoption 
Curve (AC) of the specific service, which reflects how fast the service is adopted 
over time (e.g. a Bass adoption curve with innovation coefficient equal to 0.03, 
imitation coefficient equal to 0.38 and maximum market potential set to 32% 
([6.21], [6.31]).  
 
 
 
Finally, the Total Value (TV) for Broadband (BB) and Fiber-to-the-Home 
(FTTH) can then be calculated by summing all TVPa, multiplied with the 
adoption curves and the share taken up by broadband (i.e. traditional broadband 
including wireless, up to 20 Mbps) and FTTH respectively. The adoption curves 
for broadband (consisting of DSL and DOCSIS technologies) and FTTH were 
determined using an extension of the model developed by Norton and Bass 
[6.32], which allows for calculating the adoption of successive technologies in 
one market divided amongst three platforms (a DSL-based network, a DOCSIS-
driven coaxial cable network and an FTTH network). The parameters for the 
model (model coefficients and technology introduction years) were derived 
!"#$(&) = )*)+,-&$*./01*+)$ × +.$&/34.45$&/[7] × 9*.:41;$*./[€/7]× /*99+14.94/(&)!
!"#$(&) =) !"#*(&) × ,ℎ$./*$∑ ,ℎ$./*11 × 23*(&)* !
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according to [6.33]. The shares taken up by broadband and FTTH were 
determined based on needed bandwidth per service7. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Identifying and categorizing the effects for 
eGovernment and eBusiness 
After having introduced the methodology, this section will apply it to 
eGovernment and eBusiness, because these sectors conceal the most important 
effects for the near future [6.15]. Electronic Government utilizes the ICT 
environment in an integrated manner to offer public services to all, at any 
moment of the day. Using eGovernment will improve the quality and speed of 
those services and enhance the support of the government policy and the 
democratic process [6.34]-[6.36]. eBusiness on the other hand is typically 
defined as the application of ICT for the support of all kinds of business 
activities [6.37]. Using ICT in the working environment improves the efficiency 
of employees, helps to improve the productivity of companies and allows 
flexibility in working hours and location [6.38]-[6.39]. 
6.3.1 eGovernment: from physical contact to electronic forms 
Within eGovernment, the effects of two main services have been identified 
(Table 6-2), depicting all applications for which the citizen needs to contact the 
administrative center (e.g. extraction of birth certificate, application for a driver’s 
license, etc.). The discussion on eGovernment services has been driven by the 
assumption that these services generate increasing and proportional cost-savings 
[6.40]. In literature, there is some agreement [6.35]-[6.36] that the introduction 
of interactive services (like the e-counter in the Netherlands and Belgium) 
provides a major step in cost savings of government services. For example, 
transforming this physical contact into an electronic format, saves the citizens (at 
least some) travelling to the city hall. For (local) authorities, this effect entails a 
huge amount of savings on paper and letters to be sent. One typical example of 
this electronic format is the online submission of taxes, which is now already 
 
7 Note that the parameters for the Bass curve are based on reference values from literature 
[6.21], [6.33], and that varying these parameters will undoubtedly affect results. This kind 
of sensitivity analysis however falls beyond the scope of this chapter. 
!"##(%) =( )ℎ+,-+## × /0##(%) × !"1+(%)+ !!"#!!$(&) =) *ℎ,-.,#!!$ × 0122(&) × !"3,(&), !
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used by a fair amount of the population in both Ghent and Eindhoven (the cities 
under study in this chapter, see further) [6.41]-[6.42].  
Table 6-2: Identified services and effects for eGovernment 
 
6.3.2 eBusiness: travel savings from teleworking and distance 
training 
In eBusiness, the most important services that create indirect effects are 
teleworking and (distance) training of employees, see Table 6-3. A high-speed 
broadband connection (preferably over fiber) will allow people to access their 
files at home as quickly as at the office, or enable employees to discuss with 
colleagues all over the world through real-time HD videoconferencing. These 
options permit employees to work (partly) from home, reducing their commuting 
time and cost, give the companies the opportunity to cut back on their 
operational expenditures (e.g. rental fees for office space), while 
videoconferencing decreases the necessity of business travel [6.43].  
eGovernment 
Service Subservice Effect Meas. Term Actor Quantified? 
Government
-citizen 
transactions 
Switching 
from personal 
contact to 
electronic 
contact 
(income tax 
preparation 
and return, 
applying for 
licenses, 
paying for 
tickets, etc.) 
Reallocation of the time 
of the administrative 
personnel (capacity can 
be used for other services, 
like back office) 
O LT G Yes 
Time gain O ST I Yes 
Travel cost saving, both 
fuel and parking costs 
O ST I, C Yes 
Decreased consumption 
of paper (e.g. sending 
letters) 
O ST G Yes 
Decreased traffic jams 
and road accidents 
O LT S Yes 
Less stress S LT I No 
Reduced CO2 emission 
(and other harmful 
gasses) 
O LT S Yes 
Providing 
information 
and resources 
for citizens 
online (e.g. e-
newsletters, 
city 
information, 
personal 
profile, etc.) 
Time gain O ST I, G No 
Reallocation of the time 
of the administrative 
personnel 
O LT G Yes 
Travel cost saving O ST I, G No 
Decreased consumption 
of paper (e.g. brochures) 
O ST G No 
Retrieving information 
outside office hours 
S LT I No 
!
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Table 6-3: Identified services and effects for eBusiness 
 
6.3.3 Not only positive effects 
Although both tables above clearly focused on the identification of the benefits 
of broadband, the authors are well aware of possible negative sides. This 
paragraph will shortly describe some of the disadvantages (as for the positive 
effects, the list is not, and will most probably never be, exhaustive), but these 
will not be used further down in the actual calculations.  
eBusiness 
Service Subservice Effect Meas. Term Actor Quantified? 
Teleworking  Working from 
home 
Reduced travel (time and 
costs for both fuel and 
parking) O ST I, C Yes 
Decreased traffic jams 
and road accidents O LT S Yes 
Reduced emission of CO2 
(and other harmful 
gasses) O LT S Yes 
Reduced stress S LT I, C No 
Decreased number of 
absenteeism by illness O LT C, G Yes 
Reduced office space and 
operational expenditures O LT C, G Yes 
Higher independency and 
flexibility for the 
employee S ST I No 
Reduced spending on 
human resources O LT C, G Yes 
Videoconferen
cing 
Less business trips 
O LT C Yes 
Training of 
employees 
Grouped 
management 
of ICT 
infrastructure 
for clustered 
companies 
Reallocation of the time 
of the support staff O LT C No 
More efficient use of 
network- and ICT 
services 
O LT C Yes 
Online 
training 
(possibly from 
home) 
Reduced travel (time and 
costs for both fuel and 
parking) O ST C, I No 
Reduced training expenses O ST G, C Yes 
Reduced stress  S LY C, I No 
Reduced emission of CO2 
(and other harmful 
gasses) O LT S No 
Decreased traffic jams 
and road accidents O LT S No 
!
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A common critique on working at home is the transfer of electricity consumption 
from the employer to the employee [6.17]. This is of course true, but this part of 
the cost is small compared to the other operational savings (like office space 
rents and furniture). Furthermore, these operational savings free money at the 
employer’s side to fund, for example, the employee’s Internet subscription. 
Secondly, there is the logical possibility that allowing people to work from 
home, will make them move further away from work (since commuting is no 
longer necessary every day). It is however a question whether this effect is really 
negative, since it can also be looked at from the opposite side: working at home 
allows people to keep on living in remote or smaller villages, and liquidates the 
necessity to migrate to the larger cities [6.19]. Although it has been stated that 
“households may redistribute non-work travel among their members on 
workdays to take advantage of telecommuters’ additional flexibility or location 
at home, […] the net effect is still a reduction in trips per household on 
workdays” [6.44].  
On eGovernment, there has been less criticism, but there the main question deals 
with the necessity of all-fiber networks – does basic broadband not suffice to 
offer an e-counter? This is indeed true to some extent, as will be shown later. 
6.4 Calculating the indirect effects for Ghent and 
Eindhoven 
The model will be applied to two case studies: Ghent, an urban city in Belgium 
with a well-developed xDSL and cable network (but no FTTH yet), and 
Eindhoven in the Netherlands that owns a well-established FTTH network, 
deployed in 2007, but which doesn’t cover the whole city yet. 
These two cases were selected because of comparability on demographical, 
geographical, economic and cultural basis. Both cities can be categorized as 
urban, house a university with comparable number of students, as well as a 
business campus where lots of smaller high-tech enterprises are settled. Exactly 
this combination of a high degree of comparability with the difference in telecom 
offerings, will allow evaluating the impact of FTTH on the effects that have been 
identified. 
6.4.1 Overview of the input parameters  
Table 6-4 gives an overview of the input parameters used. In order to fairly 
compare both cases, the economic parameters are kept the same. The calculation 
period is limited to 2012-2030, and the discount rate set at 10% (based on the 
rate of the Belgian incumbent, Proximus (former Belgacom) (9.61%) [6.45], and 
the Dutch incumbent, KPN (10%) [6.46].  
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For similar reasons, the parameters determining the adoption curve for the 
services will be kept the same (which can be justified by the comparable 
economic and cultural background), only the introduction years of the services 
vary. The adoption curves of the technologies (traditional and FTTH) were based 
on existing data where possible, and extrapolated into the future. The penetration 
curves of traditional broadband could therefore be based on existing data for both 
cases. For FTTH, the introduction year for Eindhoven was set at 2007 (the year 
of the deployment of FTTH there [6.47]), while in Ghent, we assume a 
deployment at the start of the business case analysis, which means that first 
FTTH effects will be visible in 2014. Note that this assumption was made when 
the study was made (2012). If the study would be re-executed now, this FTTH 
deployment date in Ghent should be shifted in time. 
Table 6-4: Comparison of regional data for both case studies: Ghent and 
Eindhoven [6.48]-[6.49] 
 
Before we elaborate on the output of our model, we would like to discuss the 
significant difference in the penetration rates of both municipalities. The 
penetration of FTTH (homes connected) in the municipality of Eindhoven is 
about 17% [6.50]. The total Internet penetration is 92%, which is in line with the 
Dutch average. The fiber penetration is significantly higher than the country’s 
average, which is 4.19% [6.51]. At the time of this analysis (mid-2013), there is 
no FTTH rolled-out in the municipality of Ghent. The total broadband 
penetration is similar to the Dutch situation though. In the outcomes, this will 
have a clear impact on the results, since the effects of fiber will be present from 
the start in the case of Eindhoven. 
6.4.2 Results from the bottom-up methodology: comparison of 
Ghent and Eindhoven 
After having described the model, input parameters and identified effects, this 
section focuses on the results of the actual bottom-up calculation. We will first 
discuss the total value of the indirect effects for both sectors, identify the most 
important effects, to finally evaluate the value per actor.  
Parameter Ghent Eindhoven 
Number of inhabitants 246,719 217,223 
Number of households 106,805 97,523 
Number of SMEs 7,289 6,513 
Number of students at the university 31,445 21,743 
Commuting population 138,597 143,100 
!
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6.4.2.a Total value 
The total value represents the combination of the effects due to current 
broadband and the effects of fiber, and sums to €930 million for Ghent and 
€1140 million for Eindhoven (discounted and cumulative up to 2030). The 
higher value for Eindhoven in comparison to Ghent can be explained by the 
influence of the presence of the FTTH network there (see further for more 
details).  
Calculating this total value is of course relevant, but digging deeper down to the 
value per inhabitant (for eGovernment) or per company (eBusiness) might give a 
better insight. These values are shown in Figure 6-3 (cumulative and discounted 
over 18 years), where a distinction is made between the value obtained by 
customers that have “normal” broadband, and those who are subscribed to fiber. 
It is clear that the portion taken up by fiber is much higher in Eindhoven than in 
Ghent, which can easily be explained by the fact that there are already more 
FTTH subscribers.  
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Value of the indirect effects for eGovernment per individual, and 
eBusiness per company 
From this graph, it can be concluded that there is a clear advantage of FTTH for 
the eBusiness sector, since the value per company for Eindhoven is significantly 
higher than that for Ghent, and the portion taken up by fiber is also significantly 
larger. For eGovernment on the other hand, the additional value that fiber brings 
is only limited. This can be explained by the services that were identified for 
eGovernment: most of them can also easily be used on “normal” broadband (for 
more details on these services, see Table 6-2). The value of eGovernment is only 
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€100 spread out over 18 years, so this value might not provide an incentive to 
invest in fiber infrastructure. The value of about €150 000 per company, on the 
other hand, is significant. 
6.4.2.b Most important effects  
To identify the most important effects, we step away from the technology and its 
adoption, but only look into the maximum potential of the service itself, adjusted 
with its adoption curve (TVPi x ACi). We opted to exclude the impact of 
adoption of the technology, so that we can compare both cities on a fair basis. 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Indication of the most important effects for eGovernment 
 
Figure 6-5: Indication of most important effects for eBusiness 
The comparison for eGovernment is made in Figure 6-4. We see similar results 
for both cases: the travel savings take up the largest part (88% for Ghent, 87% 
for Eindhoven, respectively). These savings include savings on time, fuel costs, 
parking costs and other costs related to automobiles, like insurance. It has to be 
mentioned that these costs only apply to inhabitants that visit the administrative 
center of the city hall by car. We didn’t take public transport or biking into 
account, so this value could even be higher. The other effects are much smaller, 
but not negligible. 
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The same analysis can be performed for the eBusiness sector (Figure 6-5). Here, 
about 80% is taken up by savings in travel and office space (about €103 000 per 
company in Ghent, €120 000 in Eindhoven). Allowing people to work from 
home, can on the long term reduce the amount of office space needed. On a 
shorter term, these effects are already translated in operational savings (for e.g. 
lightning, electricity, cleaning staff, etc.). 
The same reasoning holds for a more efficient use of ICT: if a fast broadband 
connection is present, companies can centralize their ICT infrastructure (servers 
etc.), which allows sharing this infrastructure among different locations. 
Although not included in the eGovernment sector (we assumed one 
administrative center location in each city), this sharing of ICT infrastructure 
could also entail large savings for the authorities, and should be kept in mind 
when evaluating public investment in fiber infrastructure. 
6.4.2.c Value per actor 
To conclude this results section, we give an overview of the results per actor 
(Figure 6-6). The spreading of the results do not differ much between Eindhoven 
and Ghent, and this can mainly be explained by the value of the shares 
contributed to each actor type, which were comparable for both cities. 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Overview of the value of the indirect effects per sector and per actor 
Clearly, the largest part of the savings for eGovernment can be allocated to the 
individuals. This can be easily explained by comparing Figure 6-4 and Figure 
6-6: the largest effect: travel savings, is of course an advantage for the 
inhabitants of the city.  
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The same reasoning holds for eBusiness: the largest part is taken up by savings 
in operational expenditures and office space, which is of course a saving for the 
companies. The individuals primarily benefit from the savings in travel time and 
costs. Surprisingly, the government also gains a fair share of the savings of 
eBusiness. This is due to the split in types of businesses: private and public 
enterprises, whereas the advantage for the public enterprises is allocated to the 
actor “government”. 
6.5 Benchmarking our results: comparison to other 
studies 
To benchmark our results, we will compare them with other studies available in 
literature. Based on transparency and degree of comparability, three studies were 
selected, among which two of them also used the bottom-up approach ([6.22], 
[6.23]); the third study opted for a top-down methodology ([6.18]).  
6.5.1 Comparison with other bottom-up studies 
Both studies ([6.22], [6.23]) identify different types of effects, but chose to only 
quantify the more objective effects (similar to the strategy followed in this 
chapter). Furthermore, they both claim to quantify the incremental effects of 
high-speed broadband on top of existing infrastructures. Although this seems to 
be the case for New Zealand, the meta-study of Hayes showed that the baseline 
for Seattle is no broadband at all [6.15]. We will therefore compare the results of 
New Zealand with the incremental effects of FTTH found in this study, and the 
results for Seattle with the total effects of this study (from traditional broadband 
and FTTH combined). Note that these incremental effects are different from the 
results described in section 6.4, as that section also included the effects for 
“normal” broadband for the fiber customers (so that Ghent and Eindhoven could 
easily be compared). For a methodological analysis of all studies, we refer to 
section 6.1.3. 
6.5.1.a Comparison with New Zealand for eBusiness effects 
Unfortunately, the New Zealand Institute did not quantify the effects for 
eGovernment, so there is no basis for comparison here. They did quantify the 
effects for eBusiness extensively, allowing us to make a detailed comparison. 
Table 6-5 gives the value per individual and per year for the three cases: Ghent, 
Eindhoven and New Zealand.  
The results for New Zealand and Ghent are very comparable, while the value for 
Eindhoven is more than double. This can be explained by a higher fiber adoption 
in Eindhoven (already 16.5% in 2012), but also in the higher benefits from fiber 
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for eBusiness. The highest benefits for eBusiness for New Zealand were also 
found in remote working (or teleworking) and reduced travel costs in general. 
Table 6-5: Comparison of the monetary value of the incremental effects of FTTH, 
per capita and per year, for eBusiness 
 
6.5.1.b Comparison with Seattle 
Comparing the results of our study with the study of Columbia 
Telecommunications is less straightforward than the comparison with the study 
for New Zealand, because the report is not very transparent in explaining its 
methodology. The positive point is that they did calculate values for 
eGovernment. Table 6-6 shows that the results are in same order of magnitude, 
but show some variation. Note that the values are significantly higher than those 
of Table 6-5, since these take into account the combined effect of broadband and 
FTTH. 
When comparing eBusiness, it is clear that the value found in Seattle is higher 
than the results of this study (about double). This can however be explained by 
the type of effects that were taken into account in both studies: in Seattle, more 
than two third of this value can be accounted to a reduction in traffic congestion, 
an effect that we did not quantify (because of subjectivity, and a lack of available 
input data). 
The same, almost tripled, result is found for the eGovernment sector. Again, this 
value can be explained by the fact that our study did not take an effect into 
account that was rather important for Seattle: the more efficient use of ICT by 
sharing infrastructure amongst governmental buildings. As mentioned before, we 
did not take this value into account because we started from the assumption of 
one administrative center per city. 
Table 6-6: Comparison of the monetary value of the total effects of broadband 
and FTTH, per capita and per year, for both eBusiness and eGovernment 
 
 This study - 
Ghent 
This study - 
Eindhoven 
New Zealand 
eBusiness €15 €38 €12 
!
 This study - 
Ghent 
This study - 
Eindhoven 
Seattle 
eBusiness €193 €270 €547 
eGovernment €5 €7 €15 
!
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6.5.1.c Comparison with a top-down study for the impact of broadband on 
the German economy 
Katz et al. [6.18] investigated the impact of broadband on the German economy, 
using input-output analysis on two investment scenarios (see section 6.1.3.a for 
more information on the methodology). The results of this study predict that the 
German GDP (Gross Domestic Product) will grow with €170.9 billion between 
2010 and 2020. 
This total value counts both direct and indirect effects, and includes all sectors 
(so does not limit to eBusiness and eGovernment). The direct effects include the 
direct economic activity related to the deployment of the network (job creation 
and the purchasing of expensive equipment), the indirect effects consist of a 
faster innovation process and the creation of new business activities. 
It is of course far from straightforward to compare a macro-economic analysis 
starting from general economic indicators with a bottom-up analysis that 
identifies the value for the different effects separately. We opted for an 
estimation of the importance of eBusiness and eGovernment compared to other 
sectors (such as eHealth, eEntertainment etc.), and used this percentage to 
calculate the macro-economic value of eBusiness and eGovernment, as found by 
Katz et al.  
Based on a more extensive, internal study including also other sectors, the 
combined share of eGovernment and eBusiness in the total share of possible 
indirect effects, is 59%. Applying this percentage to the value found by Katz et 
al. (who calculated the effect for the entire economy, while this study focused 
only on eBusiness and eGovernment), leads us to the conclusion that these 
values are very similar (Table 6-7). The value for Eindhoven is again higher due 
to the extra benefits already perceived for eBusiness on fiber. 
Table 6-7: Comparison of bottom-up (this study) to top-down [6.18] (yearly 
basis) 
 Total value 
per capita 
Percentage 
allocated to 
eBusiness and 
eGovernment 
Result: value per 
capita for 
eBusiness and 
eGovernment 
This study 
(Ghent) 
€198 100% €198 
This study 
(Eindhoven) 
€277 100% €276 
Katz et al. 
(Germany) 
€333 59% €196 
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6.5.2 Impact of regional differences 
The results of this and the previous section show that indirect benefits are clearly 
present, but the comparison of studies however showed significant differences in 
order of magnitude. Part of this difference can of course be explained by the used 
methodology and included effects, but part can be allocated to the size of the 
region, population density, industry sector, etc.  
Not only can we see a regional impact by comparing quantitative results of 
earlier studies, previous literature also indicates this. In [6.52], for instance, the 
authors found that “broadband alone is not responsible for increased levels of 
productivity, but rather the availability of both broadband and high-quality 
human capital is key to broadband-related productivity increases” (p. 18). That 
paper also argues that faster broadband only proves its use when people are 
trained enough to apply it effectively to their daily work. Geographical location 
and population density are furthermore noteworthy characteristics to address in 
the future, as they not only affect the magnitude of the benefits, but can also 
induce extra costs (adopting a more complex Internet technology can require 
significant co-invention costs [6.53]). Finally, linkages of companies within 
particular broadband regions have proven that there are industry effects of 
broadband [6.54]-[6.55] and agglomeration effects fostered by broadband [6.56]-
[6.57].  
Although the goal of this work was to compare the two regions under study 
(Ghent, Eindhoven), future work should account for these regional differences by 
extending this study towards including regions with other characteristics. 
6.6 Impact on the investment decision and guidelines 
for the specific actors 
Within the discussion on Next Generation Access (NGA) networks in Europe 
[6.58]-[6.59], fiber technologies have been considered as the most future proof 
technology. Compared to other broadband technologies like xDSL and Cable 
Modem technologies, fiber infrastructure providers face high sunk costs and 
demand uncertainty (see section 5.3 and [6.6]). Based on current uptake 
predictions [6.60] and expected Willingness to Pay [6.61], investors face 
payback periods of 20 to 40 years (see section 5.3.3.c and [6.62]-[6.63]), which 
are too long to be justified in the current economic climate. However, these 
investments are necessary to reach the goals set out by the European Union in its 
Digital Agenda: “By 2020, all Europeans should have access to Internet of above 
30 Mbps and 50% or more of European households have subscriptions above 
100 Mbps” [6.64].  
Although the key question for investment in broadband infrastructure has been to 
choose projects which “have the longest lifespan, highest efficiencies and 
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strongest social benefits” [6.7], these benefits are not taken into account in most 
techno-economic analysis of investments in NGA infrastructures. This chapter 
calculated that these indirect benefits are significant (in comparison to a 
deployment cost of €550 - €1750 per home, depending on the type of 
infrastructure and the region – see section 5.3.1), especially for individuals and 
companies, and to a lesser extent for the government. If these indirect benefits 
could be internalized in the willingness to pay of the respective actors or 
externalized to other market parties in the business or government sector, they 
could provide a significant boost to the business case of broadband deployment. 
They can further prove useful in drafting national broadband plans [6.65]. 
If the indirect effects are included in conventional Cost-Benefit Analysis, a better 
case for local government involvement in municipal networks can be achieved. 
This methodology can be useful in specifying the conditions for the application 
of the Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI) principle with respect to 
NGA networks [6.58], which allows addressing the “real” problems persisting in 
local communities such as digital inequality issues, restructuring of deprived 
areas and industrial parks to solutions provided by NGA networks and new 
broadband services.  
Furthermore, there are other options to incentivize the right actors to help 
stimulating the investment. Authorities on all levels should promote the 
deployment of new and faster broadband networks. Apart from intervening 
financially, this chapter learns that this can also be done qualitatively, by making 
e.g. the companies aware of the potential savings that could be obtained in 
operational expenditures. These companies could then decide to compensate 
their employees by paying for their home Internet subscription as an extra non-
statuary benefit. On the other hand quantitative measures taken by the authorities 
are also possible, by using benefits in kind for targeted households (as is done in 
other sectors such as health, education, etc. [6.66]). Past initiatives such as the 
Private PC initiative (a legislation that provided tax benefits for companies that 
equip their employees with a home computer and Internet connection [6.67]), 
could be extended towards low-income households in the future.  Concrete 
actions like this do not interfere with European State Aid regulations, as their 
primary goal is to reduce the digital divide by including those targeted 
households in the digital society. By indirectly increasing the willingness to pay 
of those specific households, however, those initiatives could stimulate 
investment at the same time. 
6.7 Conclusions and future work  
Following the tricky investment case for FTTH deployment (section 5.3), linked 
to the identified positive effects of stable, reliable and fast broadband for society, 
this chapter argued for investigating the indirect benefits of NGA networks and 
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internalizing them in the investment decision of the involved actors, thereby 
extending traditional cost-benefit analysis to social cost-benefit analysis. Indirect 
effects are benefits for one actor, caused by actions of another actor. Indirect 
effects from a network deployment are not limited to the telecommunications 
sector only, but spread out to the entire economic, social and cultural 
environment. Since existing studies about these indirect benefits are rare and 
unclear about the used methodology for quantification, this chapter introduced an 
identification, categorization and quantification model for indirect benefits. The 
first step of the model relies on a tree structure, in which sectors, services and 
sub-services lead to the identification of the individual effects. These latter are 
categorized along three dimensions (measurability, term and actor) in a second 
step, and finally quantified using a bottom-up model. In this research, we opted 
for a bottom-up methodology because it allows modeling the effects separately, 
and in more detail. Although this model is more influenced by the values of the 
input parameters than a top-down approach (which uses statistical data in 
regression analyses), it gives a clear causal relationship between the input 
parameters and the final result. Bottom-up models furthermore allow forecasting 
the effects, while top-down statistical calculations require ex-post macro-
economic data.  
Although benefits will become apparent in multiple sectors, such as eHealth and 
eEducation, literature showed that the sectors of eGovernment and eBusiness 
conceal most effect in the near future. Therefore, the model was applied to these 
sectors, for two specific, comparable cities: Ghent and Eindhoven. 
Within the sectors eGovernment and eBusiness, the most important effects 
(leading to the highest monetary value), are travel gains from reduced physical 
contact in the administrative center, and operational savings for companies by 
introducing teleworking. From the comparison of Ghent (without FTTH) and 
Eindhoven (with a well-established FTTH network), it became clear that some 
services, like teleworking, clearly benefit from the presence of fiber all the way 
to consumers’ homes, while for others (e.g. the e-counter for eGovernment) 
traditional broadband through DSL suffices. To benchmark our results, they were 
compared to earlier studies found in literature. In general, the results of this study 
are in line with the outcome of previous investigations.  
Finally, the chapter indicated how and where the quantification results could be 
used to improve the business case for NGA deployment. Not only was shown 
that the value of the indirect benefits is significant when compared to the 
investment needed for FTTH deployment, also some recommendations were 
formulated about how to steer these savings into the investment case. Two main 
recommendations focus on non-statuary benefits for employees in the form of 
broadband subscription fees, and benefits in kind for targeted households, 
granted by local authorities. 
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Future work in this domain includes the extension of the study to other sectors, 
like the health and entertainment industry, as well as the extension of the study to 
include regional differences (size, population density, labor force, industry 
sector, etc.), as indicated in section 6.5.2. Furthermore, we should evaluate the 
different services separately, to see which bandwidth speeds they actually need 
and which kind of limitations they have, so that a more accurate calculation can 
be performed.  
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7  
Sharing infrastructure and 
cooperating does not come for free: 
extension to multi-actor analysis 
 “Most economic fallacies derive from the tendency to assume that there 
is a fixed pie, that one party can gain only at the expense of another” – 
Milton Friedman 
 
The previous chapters clearly showed the shift in responsibilities for network 
deployment and operations. While in the past, telecommunications access 
networks (PSTN, CA-TV) were in the hands of one, vertically integrated, 
operator, new deployments observe a range of parties active on different layers, 
thereby sharing the underlying infrastructure. New business models arise, which 
focus on the sharing of this infrastructure, preferably in an open and non-
discriminatory way. When the non-discrimination rule is enforced through 
restricting each operating firm to one dedicated layer of the deployment 
(physical infrastructure, active equipment or services only), an open access 
network is achieved. In the case that lower-layer actors are also allowed to act 
and compete on higher layers, the scenario is referred to as unbundling, whereas 
the network should be shared among competitors, although the actor that owns 
the underlying infrastructure can be favored and should be regulated.  
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Sharing of underlying infrastructure may avoid duplicating huge investments; it 
also entails some extra costs. Extra equipment needs to be installed to allow for 
competition on higher layers, additional processes need to be executed to permit 
collaboration and transactions in between different business entities and also 
entail an extra cost. This chapter builds on the results of [7.1] and [7.2] to 
describe these costs in a cost breakdown and to quantify them for the different 
types of open access. 
7.1 Sharing infrastructure requires collaboration 
The previous chapters argued that moving towards an FTTH access network in 
which an optical fiber is running all the way from the central office to the 
customer, is from a technological point of view the best solution as an optical 
fiber has superior properties in comparison to a twisted copper pair or a coaxial 
cable. However, the deployment of this fiber network requires a high initial 
investment, and this investment cost holds back the installation of fiber in those 
regions where twisted-pair copper and/or coaxial cable networks are available. 
Clearly these investments will only be made when there is sufficient certainty of 
a payback over a limited period. As the installation of the outside plant takes 
over 70% of the total network cost [7.3], increasing the amount of customers on 
the infrastructure will also increase the chances of payback considerably. This 
can be achieved by opening up (renting) the physical infrastructure or a higher 
network layer to be used by different competing operators in a so-called open 
access network, thereby maximizing the use of the underlying network 
infrastructure.  
Sharing the infrastructure avoids duplication of what is often perceived as a 
natural monopoly, however it does not come for free. Allowing competing 
operators on top of one infrastructure entails extra costs in terms of equipment, 
processes and transactions. The open access network will require additional 
equipment for providing isolated network interfaces towards the different 
operators operating over it, hence ensuring equal and non-discriminatory access. 
Connecting new operators and new customers will require additional operational 
handling steps. Especially the cost of connecting and disconnecting customers 
might become an important cost taking into account typical customer churn in 
highly volatile markets. Thirdly, the presence of multiple operators will induce 
additional administration for contract negotiations, subscription, follow-up and 
termination procedures, all of which are not needed when the entire network 
(PIP-NP-SP) is operated by one single, vertically integrated operator. 
Opening up the network can technically be done in three basic ways: on dark 
fiber level (layer 1, allowing multiple NPs), wavelength level (layer 1.5, 
allowing multiple NPs, though with the restriction that they need to deploy the 
same technology) and bitstream level (layer 2, allowing competition on SP 
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level). However, as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) is only used on a 
very small scale in the access, this technical option has been described (section 
3.3.2), but will not be evaluated. The other options: fiber open access (on both 
P2P and P2MP networks) and bitstream open access are shown in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1: FTTH open access types 
Opening up the network on layer 2 (bitstream) provides the access seeker with 
end-to-end connectivity. The service provider links in through the E-NNI (= 
External Network-Network Interface) at the network side (Point of Interconnect - 
POI), and connects its Residential Gateways (RGW) to one port on the ONT, 
located in the home. This connection opportunity is also referred to as the UNI 
(User Network Interface). The layout and technology used in the network is of 
no interest to the SP, as only connectivity is offered, i.e. a certain guaranteed 
upload and download bandwidth speed. 
In the case of fiber open access, a point-to-point fiber cable is offered in between 
the central office and the end customer’s premises. Depending on the underlying 
network topology, the link can be direct for each user separately (in case of a 
P2P network, then the connection happens at the splice vault (SV) or cross-
connect ODF), or direct for each NP (P2MP layout). In this latter case, the PIP 
should provide an extra splitter in the field (street cabinet – SC) per connected 
NP. For a detailed technical description on how open access is offered on both 
levels, we refer to section 3.3. 
7.2 Procedures that entail extra costs 
As explained above, offering open access entails extra costs related to the 
collaboration of multiple actors. These extra costs are especially seen when 
executing certain procedures, such as (1) connecting a new provider (NP in case 
of fiber open access, SP in case of bitstream), (2) connecting a new end user and 
(3) when an end user decides to switch provider (procedure of churn). This 
section will shortly detail the different steps that need to be undertaken for each 
procedure, thereby indicating potential sources of extra cost. 
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7.2.1 Connecting a new provider 
The first procedure depicts the connection of a new provider: an NP in the case 
of fiber open access, an SP in the case of bitstream. Figure 7-2 shows the 
different steps that need to be taken. 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Flowchart representation of the different steps for the procedure of 
connecting a new provider 
In a first step, the provider needs to search if the network infrastructure is 
available, i.e. if there is enough dark fiber in case of an NP connecting, or 
enough spare connectivity in case of an SP. Secondly, the provider needs to 
negotiate the terms of the contract with the lower-level operator. If they do not 
reach an agreement, the procedure starts again and the provider can look for 
another network to connect to, if available. After the contract terms have been 
agreed upon, the new provider should be subscribed to the network, which 
encompasses administrative procedures such as sharing contact information, 
setting up billing, etc. All these administrative actions can be categorized as 
transaction costs (see further). 
Subsequently, the needed equipment can be installed in the provided co-location 
space. This step, as well as the physical connection depends on the type of open 
access offered.  
In case of fiber open access on top of a P2P topology, the PIP should install a 
cross-connect ODF (patch panel) in the central office, while the NP installs its 
own ODF there. The cost for the cross-connect ODF scales with the number of 
connected end users in the area, as for every end user, an ODF slot must be 
provided. The ODF of the NP will need to be connected to the cross-connect 
ODF for all existing users, which will induce patching costs. In our model, we 
assume that no end users are subscribed upfront, thus that the installation of the 
NP specific equipment is postponed and will therefore be counted in the 
procedure for connecting new end users (see section 7.3.2). 
In case of a P2MP topology, fiber open access is offered by placing an extra 
splitter per NP in each street cabinet. The NP’s users should be connected to that 
splitter, as should the NP’s feeder fiber. In the central office, a co-location space 
is provided by the PIP, in which the NP installs its ODF. The PIP then connects 
this ODF to the NP’s feeder fiber.  
Look$up$
available$
network
Contract$
negotiation
Administrative$
subscription
Physical$
installation
Provider$
connection
+
Physical$
installation Prepare$
co<location$
space
Install$open$
access$
equipment
Install$provider$
specific$
equipment
OK
NOK
Sharing infrastructure and cooperating does not come for free 179 
 
The handover point for bitstream open access is offered at the POI, where the SP 
connects its router to the assigned E-NNI port of the NP’s EAS. Furthermore, a 
CVC is set up between the POI and the different COs. 
After the provider is physically and logically connected, users can subscribe to 
this provider, which is the subject of the following section. 
7.2.2 Connecting a new end user 
When an end user wants to subscribe to a broadband service, he will always 
contact an SP that is offering services in his area. A contract is “negotiated” 
between the end user and the SP, which in most cases comes down to the end 
user choosing one of the broadband offers of the SP (specified data rate and 
monthly download volume). The SP receives this offer and negotiates the right 
Quality of Service (QoS) agreement with the NP he is connected to. This QoS 
denotes the requested best-effort bandwidth and the so-called Committed 
Information Rate (CIR – the minimum bandwidth that is available to the end 
user’s OVC at all times). If the contracts are settled, an administrative procedure 
will be set up for the actual subscription, after which the CPE needs to be 
installed and connected: an ONU to terminate the end-to-end connection of the 
NP and a RGW to send and receive service-specific data (of the SP). The 
installation of this CPE can be executed by the provider(s) or by the end user 
itself in case the fibers are pre-connectorized and don’t need to be patched. In 
fiber open access, the NP should install additional equipment (OLT-shelf-rack, 
according to the equipment trees described in [7.4]) in the central office, if 
needed. 
 
Figure 7-3: Flowchart representation of the different steps for the procedure of 
connecting a new end user 
As a last step, the user needs to be connected to the network. In case of bitstream 
open access, this connection is only a logical connection: the NP should assign 
the right OVC to the link in between the end user and the SP’s router. In case of 
fiber open access, the right distribution fiber needs to be terminated at the NP’s 
splitter (P2MP topology) or a fiber needs to be patched from the cross-connect 
ODF to the NP’s ODF (P2P topology). After the physical connection, the NP 
should connect the user also logically: this is a software cost. The different steps 
for the process of connecting a new end user are summarized in Figure 7-3. 
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7.2.3 Churn of an end user 
When an end user decides to switch provider, be it SP or NP, he is said to churn. 
Because the steps for churning SPs are different from churning NPs, the 
procedures will be handled separately.  
 
 
Figure 7-4: Flowchart representation of the different steps for an end user 
churning SPs 
When an end user wants to switch SP (Figure 7-4), he first has to search for an 
alternative offer (SP2). He places an order with this SP2 and the contract is 
negotiated, after which an administrative subscription is started. Simultaneously, 
the end user notifies his original SP (SP1) about terminating his contract. The 
original RGW is disconnected, the OVC is terminated (including logical 
disconnection) and SP1 sets up a final billing. The new RGW is installed (by SP2 
or by the user itself) and a new OVC is set up between the SP2’s router and the 
end user’s RGW. 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Flowchart representation of the different steps for an end user 
churning NPs 
In case an end user wants to switch NPs, which can be triggered by the request to 
be connected to a new SP (business-wise linked to a new NP) or by the 
opportunity of cost savings (cheaper NP, this will most likely be triggered by a 
range of end users living in the same geographical area switching), he looks for 
an alternative NP and contracts are negotiated. If positive, the end user’s SP will 
be subscribed to the new NP, while the original NP disconnects the end-to-end 
connectivity and prepares the administrative termination (final billing). The new 
NP requests the PIP for a reconnection of the end user’s fiber to his splitter (in 
case of P2MP topology) or a reconnection at the cross-connect ODF in the CO 
(P2P topology). If the original and new NP use non-compatible technologies, 
ONUs might have to be replaced. As a final step, the new NP sets up the logical 
connection so that end-to-end connectivity is achieved and the SP can continue 
offering its service to the end user. The different steps are visualized in Figure 
7-5. 
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7.3 Evaluating the cost of cooperation 
In order to investigate the cost impact of open access, we must be able to identify 
and classify the different costs. The total cost is subdivided in three categories: 
equipment related costs, process related costs and business or transaction related 
costs (Figure 7-6).  
 
Figure 7-6: Conceptual cost breakdown 
The equipment related costs are further detailed in costs related to (1) the 
physical infrastructure, which corresponds to all extra equipment that needs to be 
installed in the outside plant, both active and passive; (2) the extra equipment in 
the central office, also referred to as system side and (3) the CPE side: Customer 
Premises Equipment, such as adjustments to the ONT or RGW. 
Secondly, process related costs consist of software costs and manual processes, 
the latter being split up in manual interventions such as patching, and 
transportation.  
Finally, there are business related costs, also referred to as transaction costs. 
They represent the extra costs related to interactions between the different actors 
and are further categorized following the framework proposed by Williamson 
[7.5]. Search and information costs aim at reducing information asymmetry and 
include costs for planning, standardization and research. Bargaining costs are all 
costs related to the negotiation and administration of contracts. Enforcement 
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costs are costs required for making sure everything works as agreed upon, and 
include for instance the enforcement of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). 
Table 7-1: Overview of input values for open access cost calculations, applicable 
on a European urban access network setting 
Equipment related costs 
RGW €50 
ONT (including installation) €80 
1:32 Splitter €330 
Ethernet Aggregation Switch (Layer 2) €650 
SP Router (Layer 3) €180,000 
ODF slot €20 
ODF Rack €800 
Floor space per ODF Rack 1.40m2 
OLT card (P2P) €600 
OLT card (P2MP) €2000 
Shelf with switching fabric (P2P) €5900 
Shelf with switching fabric (P2MP) €5375 
System Rack €600 
Floor space per System Rack 0.78m2 
Floor space cost €150/m2/year 
Process and transaction times 
Look up  0.5h 
Contract negotiation between providers 1h 
Contract negotiation user-provider 0.25h 
Administrative subscription new provider 4.2h 
Administrative subscription new user 1.7h 
Administrative termination user 1.7h 
Logical Connection 0.5h 
OVC Connection 1.3h 
Logical Disconnection 0.4h 
Cost per patch in CO €19.5 
Cost per patch in SC €17 
Labor costs 
Customer service desk €45 per h 
Technician €52 per h 
Network Operating Center €58 per h 
Transport Costs 
Transport to CO (round trip time) €14 
Transport to SC (round trip time) €28 
Transport to household (round trip time) €36 
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Equipment related costs are calculated based on the purchasing cost of the 
equipment itself, which includes a maintenance contract, as well as the cost for 
floor space. Process and transaction costs are calculated based on the time 
consumed to execute the process (e.g. make the connection) or the transaction 
(time needed for the administrative subscription or termination for instance), and 
the labor cost per hour. Please note here that contract handling between providers 
includes contract negotiation for connecting to a new region (we assume well-
established, operational providers) and the procedure of administrative 
subscription (setting up a new account, assignment of costs, distribution of bill 
and verification of payment). Contract handling between a user and a provider 
includes the administrative subscription (create account, assign cost, distribute 
bill), as well as the cost for customer helpdesk (requesting information and 
handling administrative issues, typically clustered at the beginning and the end of 
a contract period). Transport costs are calculated taking into account both time 
and fuel consumption. The input values used for these calculations can be found 
in Table 7-1. These values were retrieved from a range of reference sources: the 
equipment related costs were found in [7.4], [7.6]-[7.8], the process and 
transaction times were based on [7.9] and [7.10], the labor costs were retrieved 
from [7.10] and the transport costs were calculated based on own estimations of 
distance and fuel costs. 
This conceptual cost breakdown can now further be used to quantitatively 
evaluate the extra cost for the different procedures introduced in section III, for 
both fiber and bitstream open access. 
7.3.1 Connecting a new provider 
The first procedure that will be evaluated is also the first chronological 
procedure: a provider (NP in case of fiber open access, SP in case of bitstream 
open access) needs to be present before end users can subscribe.  
Figure 7-7 shows the open access cost for connecting a new provider in the three 
scenarios under study. The additional cost open access adds for connecting a new 
SP is almost negligible and only consists of the establishing of the handover 
point and limited transaction costs. No real upfront investment is needed here, as 
no open access-specific equipment must be installed. This stands in great 
contrast to both fiber open access flavors, which both have transactions costs 
similar to bitstream open access, but incur significant upfront investment in the 
installation of additional equipment. 
To verify whether it is useful to offer open access, the cost for connecting a new 
provider to an existing infrastructure should compared to the cost of deploying a 
second, parallel infrastructure. Hereby, it makes sense to compare the cost of 
passing a house (deploying passive infrastructure in the streets, €570 to €1750 
per home, depending on the region under study, see section 5.3.1), to the cost 
calculated here, which comes down to €10-12 per household for fiber open 
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access, and less than €0.5 per household for bitstream open access (assuming 
20,000 households per CO or POI). 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Open access cost for connecting a new provider, for fiber (P2MP and 
P2P) and bitstream open access 
When investigating the difference between P2P and P2MP fiber open access, we 
see a clear influence of varying the number of NPs on the open access cost per 
provider (Figure 7-8). Note that, theoretically, there is no upper limit to the 
number of competing NPs in fiber open access but, following the study of 
existing fiber deployments (chapter 4 and [7.11]), the assumption was made that 
never more than five network providers will be active in the same geographical 
area at the same point in time. In P2P fiber open access, the main part of the cost 
can be attributed to the installation of the patch panel in the central office 
(equipment – system), which has to be installed only once, independent of the 
number of connected NPs. Please note that, although indicated here as an extra 
cost, a single, vertically integrated provider might also need an ODF for 
flexibility purposes. In P2MP, on the other hand, an extra splitter for each new 
NP has to be installed in each street cabinet, thus explaining both the equipment 
cost (cost for splitters) as well as the process cost (transport to all SCs and 
connecting the fibers to the splitters). Transaction costs are very low (in the order 
of €300 per provider) and, as they mainly constitute of administrative actions, 
they are equal for each new provider, independent of the total number of 
providers in the region. Process costs for a new NP in P2P are close to 
negligible, as they only comprise one transport to the CO. 
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Figure 7-8: Varying the number of NPs has a clear influence on the open access 
cost per provider 
As both equipment and process costs for P2MP fiber open access are significant, 
it makes sense to investigate whether they can be reduced by enlarging the street 
cabinets. Compared to the reference split ratio of 1:32, huge savings can be made 
by grouping more users in one street cabinet (Figure 7-9). 
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Figure 7-9: The influence of the number of users per street cabinet on the cost for 
connecting a new provider in P2MP fiber open access 
7.3.2 Connecting a new end user 
The cost for connecting a new end user is significantly more expensive in case of 
an open access network, as can be seen from Figure 7-10. Connecting a new end 
user on P2MP open access is 60% more expensive than connecting a new end 
user in a vertically integrated scenario. For P2P fiber open access and bitstream 
open access, the cost is 42% and 45% more expensive, respectively. 
To recoup this connecting cost using the recurring monthly fees a provider 
receives from its end user over a contract period of 24 months, an extra monthly 
fee of €5.2, €4.6 and €3.1 needs to be charged to the end user in case of fiber 
open access P2MP, fiber open access P2P and bitstream open access, 
respectively. 
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Figure 7-10: Cost for connecting a new user is more expensive in an open access 
network 
In case of fiber open access, we see a significant increase in bargain costs, as 
now, contracts need to be handled between the end user and the SP, SP and NP, 
as well as NP and PIP. In the case of a vertically integrated operator, there is 
only one operator, so there is no need for contracts between SP, NP and PIP. A 
second difference can be found in the cost for transport and manual process, 
which can be explained by the need for re-patching of the user’s fiber, at the CO 
for P2P fiber open access and at the SC for P2MP fiber open access. A small 
difference can be seen in the Equipment System costs, which consist of the NP 
specific equipment installed in the central office. In the case of 2 providers, the 
OLTs, shelves and racks are used less efficiently, thereby explaining the minor 
increase in cost. This difference is higher for P2MP fiber open access as users 
located on different splitters need to be connected to different OLTs. 
€0
€50
€100
€150
€200
€250
€300
€350
€400
connection.new.user.fiber.
P2MP
connection.new.user.fiber.
P2P
connection.new.user.
bitstream
1.provider
multiple.providers
188  Chapter 7 
  
 
 
Figure 7-11: Cost split for connecting a new end user, for the three open access 
types 
The cost for connecting a new user in a bitstream open access network only 
includes an increase in software cost for setting up the SP-specific operator 
virtual circuit. Here, bargaining costs are not increased vis-à-vis the vertically 
integrated scenario as there is only contact needed between the end user and the 
SP. This contact includes contract information and administrative subscription of 
the user with the provider and is independent of the number of providers, since 
the contract between the end user and the provider needs to be established 
anyway. This is different from the fiber open access case, where no 
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administrative subscription with NP and PIP is needed in case of a vertically 
integrated operator (SP, NP, and PIP roles are taken up by one single firm).  
Note that, although the values for contract handling (bargain) are based on other 
research, precise estimation of these costs strongly depends on the specific 
contract and providers involved, and hence is difficult. Nonetheless, the results in 
Figure 7-11 show that the impact of transaction costs is significant. 
7.3.3 Churn of an end user 
The last procedure under study is the churn of an end user, in which an end user 
decides to switch provider. As can be seen from Figure 7-12, this cost is about 
€400 per churn process (for P2MP fiber open access, 3% and 12% cheaper for 
P2P fiber and bitstream open access, respectively) and thus comparable for all 
three cases.   
 
 
Figure 7-12: The cost for churn is comparable for all three open access cases 
(fiber open access P2P and bitstream open access are presented relative to fiber 
open access P2MP, which is the most expensive option) 
Around half of the total churn cost is taken up by transaction costs, which 
include the administrative termination with the original provider (assign final 
cost, distribute bill, check payment, close account and helpdesk, 53% of 
transaction costs) and the administrative subscription with the new one (create 
customer account, assign cost, distribute bill, 47%). Smaller parts are taken up by 
equipment costs (new RGW – in case of SP churn, new ONT for NP churn), 
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transport and process costs (for re-patching the fibers at the CO or SC) and 
software costs for setting the right logical connection.  
Similar to the connection of a new user, the note about the difficulty in 
estimating the exact cost of administrative subscription, termination and 
customer helpdesk, also holds in this case of estimating the cost for customer 
churn. 
The cost for churn for fiber open access could be reduced by standardizing the 
ONU, so that no replacement is needed. By grouping churning end users in time, 
the transport cost can be shared among those, thereby reducing the transport cost 
per end user significantly. Note that this especially holds for P2P fiber open 
access, as the reconnection of the fiber has to be done in the central office for all 
users, whereas for P2MP fiber open access, only churning users in the same 
geographical area (connection located in the same street cabinet) will be able to 
benefit from the sharing of transport cost.  
In case of bitstream open access, the main saving that can be achieved is by 
standardizing the RGW, again avoiding replacement. Although this is definitely 
possible, it will be more difficult than standardizing the ONU, due to the 
specifics of the service of each service provider (e.g. Internet and digital TV 
bundles). The total cost reduction is represented in Figure 7-13. 
 
 
Figure 7-13: Optimizing the cost per churning end user by standardizing the CPE 
and sharing transport costs provides significant reductions 
7.3.4 Optimizing the cost of cooperation 
As the results show that the additional costs for offering open access are not 
negligible, it is worthwhile searching for how to reduce them. Some possible 
€0
€100
€200
€300
€400
€500
P2MP*fiber*open*access P2P*fiber*open*access bitstream*open*access
original
optimized
CPE CPE CPE
CPE*install
transport
CPE install
transport
Sharing infrastructure and cooperating does not come for free 191 
 
optimizations were already mentioned: increasing the number of users per street 
cabinet in a P2MP network, standardizing the CPE equipment or sharing 
transport among end users. Another option is to replace the cross-connect patch 
panel in P2P fiber open access with an automated switch. The purchasing cost 
for this type of equipment will of course be significantly higher than the manual 
patch panel we implemented in the reference scenario, but it will induce savings 
in the churning process, as the re-connection of end users can be done 
automatically instead of manually. This results in a trade-off question between 
upfront investment and operational expenditures, and will heavily depend on the 
amount of churn. Quantitative calculations for this optimization can however not 
be included in this paper, as such an automated cross-connect switch is not 
commercially available yet (so no reliable cost estimates can be found). 
Apart from optimizations in equipment and process costs, the transaction costs 
could also be optimized.  One way to reduce transaction costs is by reducing the 
uncertainty that is coupled with the transaction. Uncertainty can be reduced by 
increasing the level of information sharing. A greater degree of information 
sharing will lower the information asymmetries and as such the search and 
information costs, which will in turn lead to a reduction in transaction costs. An 
example of information sharing is the use of integrated databases.  
A second factor influencing the transaction costs is the frequency of the 
transaction. Here, both economies of scale and scope, as well as learning curves 
can reduce the cost for the transaction over time.  
Finally, a third factor impacting transaction costs is the ease of measurement. By 
automating billing and payment checking processes, the administrative 
bargaining costs can be significantly reduced. 
Although described here shortly, the quantitative evaluation of these impacting 
factors on the total transaction cost for the three procedures described here, 
requires extended modeling and practical testing of these possible reductions, 
which falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Following the huge investments that installing an FTTH network brings, it is 
unlikely that these investments will be duplicated by two separate operators 
deploying parallel networks in the same geographical region. Still, as 
competition in service offerings for end users is desirable, another option to this 
unlikely infrastructure-based competition is allowing competing operators using 
the same underlying infrastructure. By sharing the infrastructure among multiple 
operators, the use of this underlying infrastructure can be maximized, thereby 
reducing the investment risk. However, opening up the network in an open 
access scenario also entails additional competition and collaboration costs. 
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This chapter investigated the cost for offering open access on top of a Fiber-to-
the-Home network, thereby comparing open access on fiber and bitstream layer. 
The additional cost for opening up the network was evaluated for three 
procedures: the connection of a new provider (network provider in case of fiber 
open access, service provider for bitstream open access), the connection of a new 
end user and the churning process of end users. The results show that the 
additional open access cost for connecting a new provider is significant for fiber 
open access, but negligible for bitstream open access. The main chunk of this 
additional cost is taken up by the installation of extra equipment, in the central 
office for a P2P network, in the street cabinets in case of a P2MP network. The 
cost per provider could be reduced by increasing the number of providers in a 
P2P access network, and by increasing the number of end users per street cabinet 
in case of a P2MP topology. 
The additional cost for connecting a new end user in an open access network can 
mainly be found in setting up the physical or logical link between the provider 
and the end user: manual patching of fibers in case of fiber open access, 
establishing an isolated virtual circuit in case of bitstream open access. A 
significant increase in transaction costs is furthermore noted for fiber open 
access, as multiple contracts need to be signed. 
The final procedure, the churn of end users, is dominated by transaction costs 
needed for administrative termination of the original contract and the 
administrative subscription of the new one. Other significant parts are the cost 
for renewing of the CPE equipment, which can be avoided when standardized, 
and the cost for making a new provider-to-end user link (physical re-patching in 
case of fiber open access, logical setting up of a new OVC in case of bitstream). 
 
In general, findings in this chapter show that open access can be a viable 
alternative for telecom operators in regions where infrastructure-based 
competition is not economically profitable. This chapter can furthermore also 
provide insights for public actors (such as governments and municipalities) on 
the additional cost for the different types of open access, especially when 
choosing the network topology (P2P – P2MP) and the layer of opening (on top 
of PIP or on top of PIP+NP). 
 
Future work in this domain can include investigating the cost for wavelength 
open access, as next-generation access networks will most probably be supported 
by wavelength division multiplexing. Furthermore, optimizations for reducing 
the open access costs could be found by investigating more ways to standardize 
equipment and automate processes, while the impact of reducing uncertainty, 
increasing the frequency and enhancing the ease of measurement should be 
quantitatively calculated to estimate the possible optimizations in transaction 
costs. 
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8  
Conclusion 
 “I think and think for months and years.  
Ninety-nine times, the conclusion is false.  
The hundredth time I am right.”  
– Albert Einstein 
The ever increasing bandwidth demand generated by new and enhanced services 
asks for continuous upgrades of telecommunications networks. These upgrades 
can be tackled by installing higher performing signaling equipment, but also 
includes replacing the former twisted copper pair or coaxial cables with optical 
fiber. A few decades ago, fiber cables were introduced in the core networks, 
connecting continents and larger cities. Gradually, optical fiber was deployed 
further down in the network (metro, access), eventually reaching the end 
customer: Fiber-to-the-Home. The closer the fiber is brought to the end user, the 
more expensive the investment gets, as the fiber is shared by less users. This 
makes current operators frequently postpone the investment in an all-fiber access 
network, as they do not clearly see sufficient revenue potential from this network 
upgrade. 
This dissertation investigated the strategic decision in FTTH investment, by 
performing detailed techno-economic analysis taking into account the important 
boundary settings. This final chapter will provide the main conclusions of the 
performed research, and will give directions for future work. 
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8.1 Summary and conclusion 
Following the exploration of historical and recent developments in FTTH 
networks worldwide, we conclude that techno-economic analysis of strategic 
network decisions should be taken with respect to the technological, policy and 
market characteristics that are different for each investment case.  
Studying the layered structure of the telecommunications network (according to 
the Internet protocol stack), allows subdividing the responsibilities in deploying 
and operating an (access) network in three general roles: the physical 
infrastructure provider (PIP – physical layer), the network provider (NP – data 
link, network and transport layer) and the service provider (SP – application 
layer). The PIP determines the topology of the network: point-to-point versus 
point-to-multipoint. The NP is responsible for the architecture decisions, where 
the choice depends on the presence of active equipment in the field (active 
versus passive optical networks). The SP, finally, contracts with the end 
customer and offers different services and applications. This observed trend of 
splitting up responsibilities amongst different entities requires evaluating their 
business cases separately, though not independently.  
Evaluation of physical infrastructure investment learned that it can be made 
profitable in most (dense) urban areas, given the right conditions and 
improvements on both cost and revenue side. Deployment of dark fiber 
infrastructure in rural areas will most probably not be economically viable 
without financial support (from public authorities). Investment in active network 
equipment should be evaluated using shorter time horizons or by including 
technology and equipment migrations, given its limited lifetime. 
Sharing the infrastructure investment among multiple actors avoids duplication 
of investment in infrastructure that is often perceived as a natural monopoly, but 
requires additional equipment, process and transaction costs for connecting a 
new provider and connecting a new or churning end user. 
 
Following this general summary, the remainder of this section gives an overview 
of the most important take-aways and recommendations of this dissertation 
(Figure 8-1). 
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Figure 8-1: Overview of this dissertation 
Sharing the infrastructure and allowing competition amongst multiple 
network and service providers avoids duplication of infrastructure 
investment and can be achieved by opening up the network at fiber, 
wavelength or bitstream layer. When the underlying network layer is opened 
up, multiple operators can compete on a higher layer. A PIP can allow multiple 
NPs on top of its physical infrastructure by providing fiber or wavelength access. 
When opening on the fiber layer, each NP receives dedicated fibers to reach its 
end customers. This is done by a dedicated fiber per end user connected to the 
NP’s equipment via a patch panel in case of a P2P topology, while a splitter per 
NP connects the distribution fiber to the NP-specific feeder fiber in a P2MP 
network. In case of opening at wavelength layer, each user is served through a 
dedicated wavelength, which can be patched manually to the right NP in the 
central office or automatically through the use of an AWG in the street cabinet. 
Competition amongst SPs can be achieved through opening at bitstream layer. 
Through the use of an isolated, virtual connection in between the NP’s 
aggregation switch and the end user’s ONT, the SP is offered dedicated end-to-
Market''' '''Policy
Technology
FTTH'business'case
costs benefits
PIP
NPNPNP
NPNPSP
infrastructure
equipment
direct
indirect
cooperation cooperation
processes
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end connectivity, which can be used to provide dedicated services to its 
subscribers. 
 
Many current FTTH deployments are initiated by a combination of public 
and private actors, driven by distinct goals and taking up separate 
responsibilities in different business models. For investigating the conditions 
set by the market and policy pillar, a variety of operational FTTH deployment 
cases was studied on six characteristics: the region type and scale of deployment, 
the policy conditions, the initiator and key drivers, the financing structure, the 
applied business model and existing competition, both inter- and intra-platform. 
A clear link could be found between the region type (dense urban, urban or rural) 
and the existing competitive infrastructure. Rural areas are in general less 
interesting for high return on investment from broadband deployment, hence the 
most public involvement was seen there. Although more explicit in rural regions, 
public involvement was noticed in almost every case, thereby ranging in both 
level of institution (national government, local municipality, regional public 
utility owner), as well as in degree of involvement (granting Right of Way, 
aggregating demand, financial support, direct investment). Public involvement is 
mostly driven by socio-economic advantages (universal access for all citizens, 
reduced prices due to enhanced competition) and linked to an open access 
business model, whereas private players want to maximize return on investment, 
preferably by prohibiting intra-platform competition as a vertically integrated 
operator. Competitive pressure is regarded as the stimulus for private initiative in 
FTTH investment. 
 
Evaluating strategic network decisions in FTTH deployment requires a 
detailed and reliable estimation of both costs and revenues, and thus asks 
for the development of novel techno-economic models. As different actors 
take up different roles in the network, their business case must be evaluated 
separately. Specific cost and revenue models were developed for analyzing both 
the PIP and NP business case. On the cost side, three modeling languages were 
built. Analytical models for different street topologies allow for a fast estimation 
of physical infrastructure deployment costs (PNMN). Granularity-driven trees 
calculate the amount of equipment to be installed, as well as their associated cost 
for energy and maintenance (ECMN). Process flowcharts, finally, generate the 
statistical cost of operational processes (BPMN). On the revenue side, different 
pricing schemes allow for matching the estimated willingness to pay to the 
forecasted adoption curve. 
 
The business case for physical infrastructure investment is very difficult, 
especially for less populated areas, and thus requires measures for 
improvement or even public funds. Evaluating the business case for physical 
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infrastructure investment showed that, under the conditions of a monthly ARPU 
of 10 euro and a time horizon of 20 years, profits are only made in the dense 
urban area under an aggressive take-up rate. Measures for improving the 
business case were thus proposed. Demand aggregation, as already applied by 
Reggefiber in the Netherlands and Google Fiber in the USA, can make nearly all 
dense urban and urban deployments profitable. Reusing existing ducts (from 
legacy twisted copper pair or coaxial cable networks, or other utility 
infrastructures) can significantly reduce the trenching costs. Prolonging the time 
horizon to 40 years can make a positive business case in the urban area with 
aggressive adoption. Despite these improvements, even if combined, the business 
case for FTTH deployment in a rural area remains difficult. Here, using public 
funds might be the only way out. 
 
As the lifetime of equipment and their related technologies is shorter than 
that of the physical infrastructure, business case analysis for network 
provider investment should be done on shorter time spans or include 
migration. The investment part for the network provider only constitutes 30% of 
total upfront investment, but its active equipment will not last as long as the 
buried physical infrastructure. When evaluating the business case for the NP on a 
10-year period, profits can be made on the condition that the CPE and in-
building wiring is recouped separately from monthly customer fees. If a longer 
time horizon needs to be considered (to make a fair comparison to the business 
case of the physical infrastructure), technology and equipment migration needs 
to be taken into account. The analysis here concludes that, although the upfront 
equipment investment for active optical networks may be higher, upgrading 
AONs is significantly cheaper than upgrading PONs, mainly because of 
compatibility of ONT equipment. 
 
Including the value of indirect benefits as an additional revenue source from 
FTTH investment can convince public partners to get involved. Public and 
private partners have different goals when getting involved in FTTH deployment 
cases. Whereas private partners strive to maximize their financial profits, public 
entities are mainly driven by socio-economic goals. Internalizing these so-called 
indirect benefits of broadband networks in the investment decision of the public 
actors might therefore improve their business case prognosis. In this research, the 
indirect benefits were identified, categorized and quantified using a bottom-up 
approach. The advantages of this approach are (1) that it allows modeling the 
benefits separately, thereby holding on to a cause-effect relationship, and (2) that 
it provides the possibility of forecasting the added value of the effects. Top-down 
modeling is less influenced by input parameter values, but it is less accurate in 
determining the causal relationship and can only be applied ex-post. The 
developed bottom-up model was applied to two sectors: eGovernment and 
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eBusiness, for two cities: Ghent and Eindhoven. The main added value was 
found in the travel gains (for both commuting and traveling to the city’s 
administrative center), as well as operational savings (in office space and 
electricity). The value of these indirect benefits was shown to be significant 
when compared to the investment needed for FTTH deployment, and could be 
steered into the business case by granting broadband subscription fees as non-
statutory benefits for employees or by local authorities providing benefits in kind 
to targeted households. 
 
Although open access entails additional equipment, processes and 
transaction costs for connecting a new provider or connecting a new or 
churning end user, this extra cost is very low compared to the investment 
needed to deploy a parallel infrastructure. The business case analysis for both 
the physical infrastructure and the network equipment learned that FTTH 
investment is not easy. However, if the infrastructure can be shared amongst 
multiple operators (NPs or SPs), the investment risk can significantly be 
decreased. Although open access allows this sharing, it does not come for free, 
but entails extra equipment, processes and transaction costs. Connecting a new 
NP in fiber open access entails a significant upfront equipment and process cost 
in the installation of a patch panel in the central office (P2P network) or a splitter 
per new NP in each street cabinet (P2MP topology). The cost for connecting a 
new SP on bitstream open access is negligible as it comes down to a very limited 
transaction cost. Connecting a new end user is driven by the process costs for 
setting up a physical (fiber open access) or virtual (bitstream open access) link. 
The cost for churning end users is mainly driven by extra administrative 
transactions, whereas the cost for replacing the CPE can be reduced by 
standardization. 
8.2 Future work  
Future work to this research mostly focuses on extending the work to other 
domains and sectors. 
 
Extension to other regions. The cases studied in this research were all situated 
in developed countries, as their historical background provided more means for 
comparison, especially in terms of economic setting. Recently, however, new 
FTTH initiatives are rising in the developing world. Operators such as Zuku in 
Kenya and Vivo in Brazil are starting to deploy fiber in major cities. Since their 
market settings and policy conditions are significantly different, adding these 
types of cases to the list will allow for further investigation and generalization of 
the found conclusions.  
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Studying the background settings (in terms of economic situation, geographical 
areas and political environment) will learn if the developed models are generic 
enough to be applied to those cases, or if adjustments in terms of modeling or 
parameters (new parameters and/or new values to the existing ones) are needed.  
 
Extension to other sectors. The evaluation of indirect benefits in this work was 
limited to eGovernment and eBusiness, as literature indicated that these sectors 
conceal the most indirect effects for the near future. However, other sectors 
could also entail significant effects worth valuating. The education sector for 
instance could benefit significantly from distance learning (especially in remote 
areas), while remote surgery is an example of a service that could generate 
serious benefits for the health sector. Finally, the hidden value of broadband for 
the entertainment industry should also not be forgotten: there is significant 
willingness to pay for e.g. virtual presence in gaming.  
Applying the bottom-up methodology used for the monetary evaluation of 
eGovernment and eBusiness on other sectors influenced by broadband and FTTH 
(eEducation, eEntertainment, eHealth) can lead to additional potential savings. 
To do this, the right services, their effects and related input data should be 
collected by a combination of both desk research, evidence from existing use of 
those services and interviews with both local and international experts. 
 
Extension to other technologies. As wavelength division multiplexing is not 
commercially available yet, the additional costs for wavelength open access were 
not yet taken up in this research. However, the opportunity identified by TWDM 
could provide a flexible and affordable solution on existing PONs, and should 
hence be explored further. As technology evolves further, the cost of this type of 
open access should be evaluated and compared, together with its advantages and 
disadvantages, to the already discussed options of fiber and bitstream open 
access. Furthermore, the current cost and revenue models should be applied to 
longer-term evolutions in telecom access networks, which are studied by both 
industry and academia (e.g. in research projects such as OASE). 
The developed cost modeling languages (ECMN, BPMN, and PNMN) and 
revenue pricing schemes can be applied to model the expected cost evolution and 
needed revenue estimation for these evolutions in both network architectures and 
open access types. Furthermore, as all languages are developed in a generic way, 
they are applicable for the techno-economic modeling of other broadband 
technologies, such as wireless 4G/5G deployments or in-house broadband wiring 
installations. 
 
Extension to other players. As this dissertation focused on the deployment of a 
new access network, based of optical fiber, the business case for the service 
provider was not tackled explicitly. However, the recent discussions about net 
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neutrality, including who should be responsible for paying for the Internet traffic, 
could provide good arguments to investigate the costs and benefits of a service 
provider in more detail.  
Modeling the costs and revenues of a service provider would first require a 
qualitative identification and categorization of the different cost components, for 
instance using a lifecycle cost breakdown (planning, deployment, migration, 
operations and teardown). This breakdown allows for identifying hardware costs 
(set-up boxes, streamers), operational costs (connection and maintenance 
processes, but also customer relations and helpdesk), license costs (for video and 
TV content) and software costs (development of applications and related 
interfaces). While the modeling of hardware and software costs can be tackled 
using (a modified version of) ECMN and BPMN, software costs will require a 
new type of modeling language. On the other hand, as revenues for service 
providers do not always (only) originate from the end users, but frequently 
include advertisement income, the pricing schemes developed should be 
extended to allow for calculating these new types of revenue sources as well. 
 
Extension to other modeling approaches. This research strongly relied on 
bottom-up approaches for modeling both costs and revenues for the different 
actors involved in a FTTH deployment. However, if sufficient macro-economic 
data for sufficient cases is available, the costs found in this research could be 
benchmarked against the results of top-down approaches. This comparison was 
already performed in the chapter on indirect benefits, where the results of this 
bottom-up research were compared to other top-down approaches.  
Top-down modeling applies statistical regression and input-output methods on 
sufficient and reliable trend data. Calculating costs and revenues for FTTH 
deployments in a top-down manner would therefore have to rely on a much 
bigger number of cases, such that relationships between geographical, economic, 
technological and political parameters on the one hand, and deployment and 
operational costs and revenues on the other, can be used as benchmarks for other 
regions and guidelines for policy makers. 
 
Extension to other application domains. Although the Social Cost-Benefit 
models developed in this research were applied to the case of FTTH deployment, 
the trend towards opening up the value chain and allowing multiple actors to take 
up separate roles is not only visible in telecom. The separation between 
infrastructure deployment and maintenance on the one hand, and service 
offerings on the other, is also applicable to recent trends in the electricity and 
railroad market, and appears in the split between platform and application 
developers in sectors such as mobile phones and eHealth applications. 
In order to apply the concepts developed in this research on other application 
domains, similar steps need to be followed. First, the distinct roles need to be 
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identified, and mapped to the right actors. Next, a cost breakdown for all separate 
roles needs to be composed, thereby indicating the cost driver and potential cost 
modeling language for each category. Calculating the costs and matching them to 
a good pricing scheme for an estimation of the needed revenues is the following 
step. The last hurdle is the identification and estimation of the cooperation costs, 
i.e. does splitting up the roles among multiple actors lead to savings or only 
induces additional costs?  

  
A  
Gathered input data for the 
quantification of indirect benefits 
This appendix summarizes the input data used for quantifying the indirect 
benefits for eGovernment and eBusiness, for the cities of Ghent (Belgium) and 
Eindhoven (The Netherlands). For more information about the methodology and 
subsequent results, we kindly refer the reader to sections 6.3 and 6.4. 
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Table A-1: Input data for eGovernment in Ghent 
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Table A-2: Input data for eGovernment in Eindhoven 
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Table A-3: Input data for eBusiness in Ghent 
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